“Torture” in the Dock. By John Rosenthal
A tough interrogation in Germany
Policy Review. December 2008 & January 2009. [Complete article with references here]
— Scene 1: Frankfurt, Germany, 1 October 2002, early morning
In the Frankfurt police headquarters, the atmosphere is tense. Deputy Police Chief Wolfgang Daschner is losing patience. On the previous day, his officers arrested one Magnus Gäfgen, a 27-year-old law student. Gäfgen is suspected of having kidnapped 11-year-old Jakob von Metzler, son of the banker Friedrich von Metzler. Two days earlier, Gäfgen had personally collected a 1-million-euro ransom payment. But there is no sign of the boy and Gäfgen has refused to give police interrogators accurate information about his whereabouts. A police psychologist, observing the questioning, describes Gäfgen’s responses as a “pack of lies” [Lügengebäude]. Deputy Police Chief Daschner fears that Jakob’s life may be in danger. In a memorandum, he writes: “We need to ascertain without delay where the boy is being held. While respecting the principle of proportionality, the police have an obligation to take all measures in their power to save the child’s life.”
Daschner decides to act. He dispatches police inspector Ortwin Ennigkeit to the office in which Gäfgen is being held for interrogation. Ennigkeit’s assignment: to make Gäfgen talk — if necessary by threat of torture. Indeed, Daschner has resolved not only to threaten Gäfgen with pain, but to carry out the threat if his prisoner is not otherwise forthcoming. A doctor has been found to supervise the proceedings.
In the interrogation room, Ennigkeit tells Gäfgen that a “special officer” is on his way. If Gäfgen does not tell Ennigkeit where the boy is, the “special officer” will “make him feel pain that he will not forget.” On Gäfgen’s own account, the formula is still more menacing: the officer “will make you feel pain like you have never felt before.” “Nobody can help you here,” Ennigkeit tells him, according to Gäfgen’s testimony. “We can do whatever we want with you.” On Gäfgen’s account, moreover, Ennigkeit already begins to rough him up: shaking him so violently that his head bangs against the wall and hitting him in the chest hard enough to leave a bruise over his collarbone. Gäfgen’s testimony is consistent with the tenor of Daschner’s instructions, which, on Daschner’s own admission, called for the “use of direct force” [ Anwendung unmittelbaren Zwangs].
In any case, whether the mere threat of pain has been sufficient or the latter has had to be supplemented by the “use of direct force,” within minutes of Ennigkeit’s entering the interrogation room Gäfgen talks. He tells Ennigkeit where Jakob is to be found. Police rush to the location and find the boy dead, his corpse wrapped in plastic and submerged under a wooden jetty in a pond.
— Scene 2:Guantánamo Bay Prison Camp, Cuba, ten days later
The atmosphere in Joint Task Force 170 is tense. The task force has been set up to obtain intelligence from detainees, but the effort is lagging and army interrogators are losing patience. They have discovered that one of the detainees appears to have been directly involved in the 9/11 plot. Mohammed al-Qahtani attempted to enter the United States in early August 2001, but was turned back by immigration officers in Orlando, Florida. Telephone intercepts of conversations of 9/11 facilitator Mustafa al-Hawsawi indicate that al-Qahtani was slated to serve as the missing “twentieth hijacker” on September 11. Plot leader Mohammed Atta is known to have been at Orlando International Airport on the day of al-Qahtani’s arrival, presumably to meet him. Al-Qahtani was sent back to his native Saudi Arabia and then traveled to Afghanistan. In mid-December, two months after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, he was taken prisoner on the Pakistani border along with 29 other suspected al Qaeda members apparently fleeing the Battle of Tora Bora.
In early October 2002, the questioning of al-Qahtani has been going nowhere. Interrogators and staff psychologists are convinced that he is lying: repeating prefabricated cover stories, no matter how implausible, as required by al Qaeda security protocols. He insists, for example, that he traveled to the United States to import used cars and that he was in Afghanistan merely to purchase falcons.
The first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has only just passed. A spike in intelligence has American officials on high alert. On October 8, Bin Laden deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri releases an audio statement threatening new attacks against America and American allies. The commanders of JTF170 decide they need to act. On October 11, Major General Michael E. Dunlavey sends a memo to U.S. Army Southern Command requesting authorization to use more aggressive interrogation techniques with the detainees. The request gains still greater urgency on the very next day as al Qaeda makes good on its threats, killing over 200 people in multiple bombings on the Indonesian resort island of Bali. Dunlavey’s request will be endorsed by SOUTHCOM and sent up the line to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
The request and the Department of Defense’s response to it have pride of place in the media-driven mythology of what have come to be known as the “torture memos.” The techniques proposed by JTF170 include several milder “Category I” and “Category II” techniques, such as yelling at a detainee (Category I), requiring a detainee to stand for a maximum of four hours (Category II), and “forced grooming” (i.e. shaving a detainee’s beard against his will — likewise Category II). All these techniques will be approved. Included among the harshest “Category III” techniques, however, JTF170 requests authorization to threaten detainees with “painful consequences” if they fail to cooperate. As it so happens, this is precisely the method used by German police inspector Ortwin Ennigkeit a mere ten days earlier to obtain the cooperation of Magnus Gäfgen. Following the advice of Department of Defense general counsel William J. Haynes, the request for authorization of this method is . . . refused.
The Gäfgen torture complaint
In june 2005, the child-murderer and law student Magnus Gäfgen lodged a complaint against Germany with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In his complaint, Gäfgen accused Germany of having violated his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and, more specifically, of having violated the prohibition on torture contained in Article 3 of the Convention.
On June 30, 2008, the European Court of Human Rights rejected Gäfgen’s complaint and cleared Germany of the charge of tolerating torture.3 The Court found that the treatment to which Daschner and Ennigkeit subjected Gäfgen did not reach the threshold required to be considered as torture (§69). On the Court’s assessment, it did, however, constitute “inhuman treatment” (§70), which is likewise prohibited by Article 3. Nonetheless, the Court found that German judicial institutions had acted in such a way as to provide Gäfgen sufficient “redress” for the offense suffered and thereby, in effect, to nullify any violation of the Convention. According to the somewhat surreal reasoning of the Court, Gäfgen had been, but was no longer, a victim of “inhuman treatment” (§82). He had “lost” his “victim status.”
The “redress” consists of two elements. In the first place, Gäfgen’s “confession” to Ennigkeit was not allowed into evidence in the German courts. By virtue of this exclusion, the Court was likewise able to find that Gäfgen’s right to a fair trial, as laid out in Article 6 of the Convention, had not been violated.
But the notion that the exclusion of the “confession” isolates the rest of the court proceedings from the effects of the torture threat — the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” as it is called in legal discussions — is patently absurd. In fact, strictly speaking, Gäfgen did not even “confess” to Ennigkeit. Rather, under threat of torture he was compelled to divulge the location of Jakob von Metzler’s body, thus leading the police to what is obviously the single most important piece of evidence underpinning the murder charge against him. Indeed, as the Bulgarian judge Zdravka Kalaydjieva pointed out in the sole dissenting opinion to the Court’s ruling, without the boy’s body it is doubtful that Gäfgen could even have been charged with murder.
The second element of “redress” identified by the Court is equally spurious and equally obviously so: The majority of the court found that Gäfgen had been afforded redress by virtue of the fact that a German court tried and convicted Daschner and Ennigkeit for their acts (§80). In December 2004, the District Court of Frankfurt am Main found Ennigkeit guilty of having “coerced” Gäfgen (i.e., by threat of violence) and Daschner of having incited his subordinate to do so.
But the verdict was purely theoretical: for while the court did indeed find the two men guilty, it refused to apply sanction. Daschner and Ennigkeit were merely “warned” and given “suspended” fines: or, in plainer language, they were not even fined. The European Court of Human Rights gingerly describes this as a “comparatively lenient” sentence (§78). If words are not to be abused, it is, more precisely, no sentence at all. Making a mockery of the principle that there is no law without enforcement, the German court itself observed: “The upholding of the legal order required a guilty verdict, but not punishment.” As further evidence of the practical nullity of the court’s verdict, neither man has a criminal record as a result of it. In effect, Daschner und Ennigkeit were found guilty, but not convicted. Barely one year after the judgment, Daschner was promoted to Chief of the Police Directorate for Technology, Logistics, and Management of the German state of Hesse.
The German court’s guilty verdict in the Daschner case amounts to nothing more than an alibi for Germany and the German legal order as a whole. By theoretically acknowledging the wrong committed, it permits Germany to appear to respect Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention — not to mention its obligations under the un Convention against Torture — while in practice ignoring them. It is remarkable that the European Court of Human Rights should find such an obviously bogus construction to be consistent with the requirements of the Convention. And it is both ironic and revealing that the only judge to insist on truly upholding the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment — that is, in practice and not merely “in theory” — should hail precisely from Bulgaria, a new eu member state the European Commission has recently seen fit to chastise for alleged insufficiencies in the rule of law. Judges from Denmark, Germany, and Estonia — all eu member states in good standing — had no such scruples.
The Article 3 prohibition is one of the few legal protections laid out in the European Human Rights Convention that is not burdened with all sorts of exceptions or subject to possible derogation in a “public emergency.” The Court majority itself recognized that the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment is unusual in this respect (§63): Unlike the highly “relative” guarantees provided elsewhere in the Convention, the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment is “absolute.” By, nonetheless, citing “mitigating factors” in its ruling (§69), the Court, in effect, jettisoned the absolute character of this supposedly “absolute” prohibition. In so doing, it adopted the perspective of the Frankfurt District Court, which, in its nominal ruling against Daschner and Ennigkeit, cited “massively extenuating circumstances” (massive mildernde Umstände) in order to justify its refusal to apply sanction. These “extenuating circumstances” included both the presumptive “good intentions” of the police officials —saving the life of Jakob von Metzler — and the stressful circumstances under which the infraction took place.
The Strasbourg court somewhat “hid” this relativizing of the prohibition by bizarrely including its own discussion of “mitigating factors” in its assessment of whether torture could be said to have occurred at all (§69) and not, for example, in the discussion of appropriate “redress.” But the result is the same. By finding that the prohibition could be violated without real consequence, the Court has, in effect, transformed the supposed legal protection provided by Article 3 into a discretionary matter. Moreover, as Judge Kalaydjieva notes in her dissenting opinion, in light of the “mildness” — in fact, the nonexistence — of the sanctions held to provide adequate redress, the Court’s ruling will give positive incentive for police officials to torture or threaten torture in the future.6 It thereby undermines the very raison d’être of the Human Rights Convention.
The Gäfgen ruling and the American “torture” debate
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Gäfgen case was eagerly anticipated and widely discussed in the German media. In keeping with the importance attached to the case in Europe, the Court took the unusual step of broadcasting the announcement of its judgment on the Council of Europe website. But the ruling went almost entirely ignored by the American news media. In light of the spectacular nature of the case and, above all, the raging American debate on torture in connection with the Guantánamo Bay prison camp and the war on terror, on first glance this might seem odd.
But on further reflection, it is perhaps precisely its obvious relevance to the American “torture” debate that explains the American media’s indifference to the ECHR ruling. The ruling was announced just as a campaign to charge senior Bush administration officials with “war crimes” was reaching fever pitch this past summer. With leading news organizations like the New York Times openly abetting that campaign, it would hardly have been opportune for those same news organizations to call attention to a European precedent that puts the actions of the American officials in a more favorable light — and all the less so as the editorial boards that have been most adamant in denouncing alleged American “torture” practices typically regard Europe as a paragon of virtue in the matter of respecting international law.
In mid-June, only two weeks before the announcement of the ECHR ruling in the Gäfgen case, the NGO Physicians for Human Rights released a widely-publicized report titled “Broken Laws, Broken Lives,” which purports to provide evidence of torture suffered by detainees held by the United States at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere. Almost concurrently, British lawyer Philippe Sands published his book Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). The memo in question is the December 2002 Department of Defense memorandum that authorized JTF170 to use aggressive interrogation techniques. (The memo was in fact authored by Pentagon General Counsel William Haynes, but it was approved by Rumsfeld.)
The cover of Torture Team features a close-up of Donald Rumsfeld’s signature on the document, darkly juxtaposed with a photo of barbed-wire. Somewhat comically, in light of the gravity of the context, the signature is accompanied by the following handwritten marginal comment: “However, I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” The remark highlights the relative mildness of the techniques actually approved by Rumsfeld and reveals, furthermore, its author’s reference to, so to say, “normal” intuitive standards of human durability in assessing their acceptability. This did not, however, prevent Sands’s publisher from splashing it over the cover of a book whose very premise involves abandoning such normal, intuitive standards in order to stylize those techniques into “torture.”
Two points are particularly notable about the ECHR’s Gäfgen ruling in light of the accusations against Rumsfeld and other Pentagon officials. The first is that the ECHR explicitly found that one of the techniques Rumsfeld and Haynes rejected as too severe does not meet the threshold for being regarded as torture. Citing the Army’s “tradition of restraint,” Rumsfeld and Haynes refused to authorize threats of physical violence, as well as two other “Category III” techniques, “exposure to cold weather or water” and what has come to be known as “waterboarding.” (The only “Category III” technique that was approved was the “use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.”) The Court, however, found that mere threats of violence, if they are not carried out, do not as such constitute torture. It came to this conclusion even while recognizing that Ennigkeit’s threats must have caused Gäfgen “considerable mental suffering” (§69). By the standards of the European Court of Human Rights, then, all less harsh measures should not be regarded as torture either.
The Court’s finding in this regard ought not, of course, to have any direct legal relevance. The United States is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and it is not represented in the Council of Europe to which the ECHR is attached. Nonetheless, the finding is especially awkward for Physicians for Human Rights and kindred NGOs, since such groups tend precisely to regard ECHR jurisprudence as authoritative even for countries like the United States that are not part of the Council of Europe. In this respect, the NGOs are following the lead of the un special rapporteur on torture, the Austrian professor Manfred Nowak, who, in accusing the U.S. of torture in a highly-publicized 2006un report, likewise cited ECHR jurisprudence.
The fact that the ECHR acknowledged Gäfgen’s “considerable mental suffering” renders its finding even more awkward for Physicians for Human Rights, since the latter makes ample use of the notion of “psychological torture” in order to elevate physically nonaggressive interrogation practices into the torture category. The group has indeed previously devoted a 135-page report to the subject. As it so happens, Ennigkeit appears to have expressly aimed to maximize Gäfgen’s psychological torment, not only by invoking the imminent arrival of the “special officer,” but also, if Gäfgen is to be believed, by threatening to allow him to be sexually abused by fellow prisoners.
Of course, even if the interrogation methods approved by the Pentagon do not rise to the level of torture, they could well be considered “inhuman treatment,” which is likewise prohibited under the un Convention against Torture (more fully, the un “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”). No one reading the transcript of Mohammed al-Qahtani’s interrogations that was leaked to the press in 2005 could doubt that the treatment to which he was subject by his interrogators was, by ordinary standards of human interaction, crude and abusive.
But this is where the second salient aspect of the ECHR Gäfgen ruling is especially relevant. For while the ECHR found that the Frankfurt police’s treatment of Gäfgen did constitute “inhuman treatment,” it accepted the Frankfurt District Court’s judgment that under the circumstances this treatment did not warrant punishment.
The compassion shown for the perpetrators in the Frankfurt court’s judgment is striking. In adumbrating the “massively extenuating circumstances” that on its view militated against the application of sanction, it notes that “for both of the accused, it was exclusively and urgently a matter of saving the child’s life.” It is “also to be taken into account,” the Court adds a bit further on, “that g’s [Gäfgen’s] provocative and unscrupulous manner of answering questions had strained the nerves of the investigators to the breaking point (aufs äußerste strapazierte). Trained in law, he knew how to formulate and present his responses, so that they constantly produced doubts, hopes, and disappointments and provided no certainty.” “Moreover,” the Court continues, “the situation was extraordinarily chaotic. The police personnel had been on duty overtime. They were worn out and tired. The accused E. [Ennigkeit] had worked through the night and the accused D. [Daschner] had only slept for a few hours. The overwrought sensibilities of the accused substantially reduces their guilt, since they lowered their inhibitions to acting. Neither man could take any more. Furthermore, both of them had led irreproachable lives up to that point.” And so on.
One may well wonder whether the accusers of Donald Rumsfeld and other Pentagon officials would be prepared to acknowledge “massively extenuating circumstances” in their cases. But if the desire to save the life of an eleven-year-old boy is an extenuating circumstance, how can the desire to prevent a follow-on attack to 9/11 and to save potentially thousands of innocent lives not be one? And if the difficulty involved in questioning a wily and arrogant 27-year-old student who has been “trained in law” is an extenuating circumstance, how can the difficulty involved in questioning an evasive and potentially dangerous al Qaeda operative who has been trained in operational security measures not be one?
To deny the same degree of forbearance to American officials and personnel involved in the war on terror is to imply that irregular combatants forming part of terrorist organizations deserve greater legal protections not only than ordinary prisoners of war, but indeed than ordinary citizens. Such an absurd — and for the United States suicidal — logic could only be embraced by persons who are fundamentally committed to seeing American counter-terrorism efforts fail.
John Rosenthal writes on European politics, with a special focus on Germany and France. His work has appeared in the Claremont Review of Books, Opinion Journal, Les Temps Modernes, and Merkur. He is a contributing editor for World Politics Review.
After Sharp Words on C.I.A., Obama Faces a Delicate Task. By Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane
ReplyDeleteDecember 2, 2008
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/us/politics/03intel.html
WASHINGTON — For two years on the presidential campaign trail, Barack Obama rallied crowds with strongly worded critiques of the Bush administration’s most controversial counterterrorism programs, from hiding terrorism suspects in secret Central Intelligence Agency jails to questioning them with methods he denounced as torture.
Now Mr. Obama must take charge of the C.I.A., in what is already proving to be one of the more treacherous patches of his transition to the White House.
Last week, John O. Brennan, a C.I.A. veteran who was widely seen as Mr. Obama’s likeliest choice to head the intelligence agency, withdrew his name from consideration after liberal critics attacked his alleged role in the agency’s detention and interrogation program. Mr. Brennan protested that he had been a “strong opponent” within the agency of harsh interrogation tactics, yet Mr. Obama evidently decided that nominating Mr. Brennan was not worth a battle with some of his most ardent supporters on the left.
Mr. Obama’s search for someone else and his future relationship with the agency are complicated by the tension between his apparent desire to make a clean break with Bush administration policies he has condemned and concern about alienating an agency with a central role in the campaign against Al Qaeda.
Mark M. Lowenthal, an intelligence veteran who left a senior post at the C.I.A. in 2005, said Mr. Obama’s decision to exclude Mr. Brennan from contention for the top job had sent a message that “if you worked in the C.I.A. during the war on terror, you are now tainted,” and had created anxiety in the ranks of the agency’s clandestine service.
One of the first issues Mr. Obama must grapple with is the future of C.I.A. detention: will the agency continue to hold prisoners secretly, question them using more aggressive methods than allowed for military interrogators, and transfer terrorism suspects to countries with a history of using torture?
During the presidential campaign, a constant theme for Mr. Obama was the need to restore “American values” to the fight against terrorism. He pledged to banish secret C.I.A. interrogation rules and require all American interrogators to follow military guidelines, set out in the Army Field Manual on interrogation.
In a speech last year, Mr. Obama cast the matter as a practical issue, as well as a moral one. “We cannot win a war unless we maintain the high ground and keep the people on our side,” he said. “But because the administration decided to take the low road, our troops have more enemies.”
On Wednesday, a dozen retired generals and admirals are to meet with senior Obama advisers to urge him to stand firm against any deviation from the military’s noncoercive interrogation rules.
But even some senior Democratic lawmakers who are vehement critics of the Bush administration’s interrogation policies seemed reluctant in recent interviews to commit the new administration to following the Army Field Manual in all cases.
Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who will take over as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in January, led the fight this year to force the C.I.A. to follow military interrogation rules. Her bill was passed by Congress but vetoed by President Bush.
But in an interview on Tuesday, Mrs. Feinstein indicated that extreme cases might call for flexibility. “I think that you have to use the noncoercive standard to the greatest extent possible,” she said, raising the possibility that an imminent terrorist threat might require special measures.
Afterward, however, Mrs. Feinstein issued a statement saying: “The law must reflect a single clear standard across the government, and right now, the best choice appears to be the Army Field Manual. I recognize that there are other views, and I am willing to work with the new administration to consider them.”
Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, another top Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, said he would consult with the C.I.A. and approve interrogation techniques that went beyond the Army Field Manual as long as they were “legal, humane and noncoercive.” But Mr. Wyden declined to say whether C.I.A. techniques ought to be made public.
C.I.A. officials have long argued that publishing a list of interrogation techniques only allows Al Qaeda to train its operatives to resist them. But they say the secrecy has led to exaggeration and myth about the agency’s detention program.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama’s aides said he would consider allowing the C.I.A to continue holding prisoners in overseas jails, but would insist that inspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit them. They also said he would end the practice of “rendering” terrorism suspects to countries that have used torture.
One of the retired generals meeting with the Obama team on Wednesday, Paul D. Eaton, who oversaw the training of Iraqi forces for the Army in 2003 and 2004, said in an interview Tuesday that it was crucial for leaders to send the right message on the treatment of prisoners.
General Eaton pointed out that Vice President Dick Cheney once dismissed waterboarding, the near-drowning tactic considered by many legal authorities to be torture, as a “dunk in the water” and said such statements influenced rank-and-file soldiers to believe that brutality was not really prohibited.
“This administration has set a tone problem for the military,” General Eaton said. “We’ve had eight years of undermining good order and discipline.”
It is widely expected that Mr. Obama will replace Michael V. Hayden, the C.I.A. director. Among those mentioned as possible candidates for the job are Stephen R. Kappes, a C.I.A. veteran who is the deputy director; Tim Roemer, a former congressman from Indiana who was a member of the Sept. 11 commission; Senator Chuck Hagel, the Nebraska Republican who is retiring from the Senate in January; and Jack Devine, a former head of the agency’s clandestine service who left the C.I.A. before the Sept. 11 attacks.
The flap over Mr. Brennan, who served as a chief of staff to George J. Tenet when he ran the C.I.A., was the biggest glitch so far in what has been an otherwise smooth transition for Mr. Obama. Some C.I.A. veterans suggest that the president-elect may have difficulty finding a candidate who can be embraced by both veteran officials at the agency and the left flank of the Democratic Party.
A. B. Krongard, the C.I.A.’s third-ranking official under Mr. Tenet when the detention and interrogation program was created, called Mr. Brennan a “casualty of war” and said he believed C.I.A. tactics were being second-guessed for political purposes. The demise of Mr. Brennan’s candidacy, Mr. Krongard said, “is a huge loss to the country.”
But Mr. Krongard said he believed that ultimately, under a new director and a new set of policies, the agency would find common ground with Mr. Obama.
“The C.I.A.’s no different than any other place,” he said. “Probably 25 percent of the people there really like him, 25 percent don’t like him, and 50 percent are open-minded.”
Obama Under Pressure On Interrogation Policy. By Michael Abramowitz, Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus
ReplyDeleteSome See Harsh Methods as Essential
Washington Post, Saturday, January 10, 2009; A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/09/AR2009010903784.html
President-elect Barack Obama introduced his nominees to head his national security team on Friday. But now Obama begins a perilous balancing act to fulfill his pledge to make a clean break with the detention and interrogation policies of the Bush administration while still effectively ensuring the nation's security.
Obama named retired Navy Adm. Dennis C. Blair director of national intelligence and former congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta as his CIA director.
"Under my administration, the United States does not torture. We will abide by the Geneva Conventions. . . . We will uphold our highest values and ideals," Obama told reporters. "It is important for us to do that not only because that's who we are, but also, ultimately it will make us safer and will help in changing hearts and minds in our struggle against extremists."
At the same time Obama intends to curb counterterrorism practices he considers excessive or even illegal, he will also come under great pressure to leave the CIA the kind of flexibility its operatives have long considered necessary to heading off another Sept. 11-style attack, current and former national security officials said.
Many officials expect Obama to fulfill a pledge to eliminate the special rules for CIA interrogations of suspected terror suspects and require the agency's operatives to follow non-coercive military guidelines for questioning. Human rights groups are already calling on the president-elect to send a strong message to the world that U.S. policy on dealing with detainees has changed.
"With the stroke of a pen Obama could take a major step to restore America's moral authority and make clear that the United State no longer endorses torture, secret detention or abuse," Jennifer Daskal, senior counsel for Human Rights Watch, said yesterday. Her group has called on Obama to issue an executive order soon after taking office mandating a single U.S. standard for CIA and military interrogation that prohibits harsh tactics.
Agency officials have said they will do whatever the president orders -- but along with other senior Bush officials they have made little secret that they consider their interrogation program effective.
"Those were programs that have been absolutely essential to maintaining our capacity to interfere with and defeat all further attacks against the United States," Vice President Cheney said in an interview this week with CBS Radio. "If I had advice to give, it would be, before you start to implement your campaign rhetoric, you need to sit down and find out precisely what it is we did and how we did it, because it is going to be vital to keeping the nation safe and secure in the years ahead."
Obama did not refer to the interrogation controversies in introducing Blair and Panetta. Instead, he focused on the need for candid, unvarnished assessments, an apparent reference to allegations that intelligence was politicized in the run-up to the Iraq war.
"We've learned that to make pragmatic policy choices, we must insist on assessments grounded solely on the facts and not seek information to suit any ideological agenda," Obama said.
Obama went out of his way to defend Panetta, rebutting criticism from the Hill, which has receded in the last day or two, that the onetime White House budget director is not qualified for the job. Describing Panetta as "one of the finest public servants of our time," Obama said he would have his "complete trust and substantial clout" at the CIA, with the full authority of the White House behind him. "He has handled intelligence daily, at the very highest levels, and time and again he has demonstrated sound judgment, grace under fire and complete integrity," Obama said.
Obama also announced John Brennan, who had initially been considered for the CIA post, as homeland security adviser, a post that may be folded into the National Security Council after Obama takes office. Brennan will also have the title of deputy national security adviser. Mike McConnell, the current DNI, will retain an advisory position, Obama said, while Michael E. Leiter will keep his job as head of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Obama faces considerable pressure to take early and dramatic steps to shift course from the Bush administration on a range of legal issues involving terrorism -- shutting down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, curbing the practice of rendering terror suspects to other countries outside normal channels, rewriting legal opinions on terror policy his advisers have condemned. Dawn E. Johnsen, Obama's choice to lead the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel, has been a vocal critic of the office's output and the process by which it has reached conclusions, testifying before Congress that the Bush administration's approach to legal advice had been infected by political considerations.
Each of these terror issues present a series of minefields for the Obama administration, perhaps no more so than in the area of interrogation policy, which has been a major source of embarrassment for the Bush administration since revelations surfaced of the use of waterboarding (simulated drowning) and other harsh tactics on senior al-Qaeda operatives. In 2007, Bush signed an executive order that allowed the CIA to use interrogation tactics tougher than those allowed for the military, though he did not authorize some of the most controversial techniques, including waterboarding.
If Obama goes ahead with his plan to scrap the special CIA program, he could expose himself to criticism that he did not do all he could to prevent another terrorist attack. That is exactly the kind of criticism that President Bush himself was subjected to after the Sept. 11 attacks.
"The Bush White House was accused of paying insufficient attention to the threat posed by al-Qaeda before 9/11," said one senior administration official. "Will the new administration let the pendulum swing too far in the effort to purge the perceived excesses of the past? Will they have on blinders to the continuing threat?"
Some administration officials noted that outgoing CIA Director Michael V. Hayden is on the record saying that the special interrogation tactics have been effective. They point to a white paper put out by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence titled "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program," which attributed the waterboarding of Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, better known as Abu Zubaida, to getting the first information about Khalid Sheik Mohammed's role in 9/11 and intelligence that helped capture Ramzi Binalshibh, a prominent al-Qaeda operative.
"It is a very weighty decision to shut down a program entirely, one that intelligence professionals have said is a very valuable thing," said another administration official.
In finding his way on interrogation policy, Obama will have to be mindful of several other important constituencies, including Capitol Hill. Several prominent Democratic lawmakers, including new Senate intelligence committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), have publicly called for firm limits on interrogation methods, including a ban on the use of waterboarding, or simulated drowning. A bill introduced by Feinstein this week would require all American interrogators to adhere to the Army Field Manual, which prohibits an array of harsh interrogation tactics.
Even the Army Field Manual recognizes that drawing a bright line for interrogations is difficult. At one point it cautions, "Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible coercion, certain acts are clearly prohibited."
Congress last March passed a bill similar to Feinstein's and Bush vetoed it. Thus, Obama's problem is not only whether to decide whether to prohibit the techniques via executive order, but also whether he is prepared to veto such a measure to preserve presidential prerogatives.
Obama actions will also be watched closely by the career officials at the CIA, who want to see how supportive the new president and his team will be. Former CIA officials note that all the agency's actions were authorized by Bush with legal opinions and concurrence by senior White House officials and Congress. "The Obama people can run against the Bush guys all they want, but they shouldn't run down the CIA," said one retired agency official.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.