US Treasury Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 102 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

US Treasury Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 102 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Dec 31, 2008

This report fulfills the requirement under section 102 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) for the Treasury Department to report to Congress within 90 days of the passage of the bill on the insurance program established under Section 102(a).


Asset Guarantee Program

Treasury is exploring use of the Asset Guarantee Program to address the guarantee provisions of the agreement with Citigroup announced on November 23, 2008. Under the agreement, the Treasury Department will assume the second-loss position after Citigroup on a selected group of mortgage-related assets.

As required by section 102(a), Treasury established the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP). This program provides guarantees for assets held by systemically significant financial institutions that face a high risk of losing market confidence due in large part to a portfolio of distressed or illiquid assets. This program will be applied with extreme discretion in order to improve market confidence in the systemically significant institution and in financial markets broadly. It is not anticipated that the program will be made widely available.

Under the AGP, Treasury would assume a loss position with specified attachment and detachment points on certain assets held by the qualifying financial institution; the set of insured assets would be selected by the Treasury and its agents in consultation with the financial institution receiving the guarantee. In accordance with section 102(a), assets to be guaranteed must have been originated before March 14, 2008.

Treasury would collect a premium, deliverable in a form deemed appropriate by the Treasury Secretary. As required by the statute, an actuarial analysis would be used to ensure that the expected value of the premium is no less than the expected value of the losses to TARP from the guarantee. The United States government would also provide a set of portfolio management guidelines to which the institution must adhere for the guaranteed portfolio.

Treasury would determine the eligibility of participants and the allocation of resources on a case-by-case basis. The program would be used for systemically significant institutions, and could be used in coordination with other programs. Treasury may, on a case-by-case basis, use this program in coordination with a broader guarantee involving one or more other agencies of the United States government.


Justification

The objective of this program is to foster financial market stability and thereby to strengthen the economy and protect American jobs, savings, and retirement security. In an environment of high volatility and severe financial market strains, the loss of confidence in a financial institution could result in significant market disruptions that threaten the financial strength of similarly situated financial institutions and thus impair broader financial markets and pose a threat to the overall economy. The resulting financial strains could threaten the viability of otherwise financially sound businesses, institutions, and municipalities, resulting in adverse spillovers on employment, output, and incomes.


Determination of Eligible Institutions

In determining whether to use the program for an institution, Treasury may consider, among other things:

1. The extent to which destabilization of the institution could threaten the viability of creditors and counterparties exposed to the institution, whether directly or indirectly;

2. The extent to which an institution is at risk of a loss of confidence and the degree to which that stress is caused by a distressed or illiquid portfolio of assets;

3. The number and size of financial institutions that are similarly situated, or that would be likely to be affected by destabilization of the institution being considered for the program;

4. Whether the institution is sufficiently important to the nation's financial and economic system that a loss of confidence in the firm's financial position could potentially cause major disruptions to credit markets or payments and settlement systems, destabilize asset prices, significantly increase uncertainty, or lead to similar losses of confidence or financial market stability that could materially weaken overall economic performance;

5. The extent to which the institution has access to alternative sources of capital and liquidity, whether from the private sector or from other sources of government funds.

In making these judgments, Treasury will obtain and consider information from a variety of sources, and will take into account recommendations received from the institution's primary regulator, if applicable, or from other regulatory bodies and private parties that could provide insight into the potential consequences if confidence in a particular institution deteriorated.
TARP Accounting and Treasury's Loss Position

Treasury generally achieves a greater impact per TARP dollar absorbed by taking an early loss position over a narrow interval of losses rather than a late loss position over a larger range of losses.

Treasury's purchasing authority under TARP is reduced by the total value of the guaranteed asset less the cash premium received, where the premium is equal to the expected loss on the guaranteed asset. If the Treasury collects a non-cash premium . for example, preferred shares - the TARP purchasing authority is reduced by the entire value of the guarantee until the preferred shares are sold and converted to cash.

These accounting rules imply that if guarantees for two assets of different values have the same expected loss, the larger asset will be more TARP-intensive to insure. For example, suppose Treasury has the choice between guaranteeing two different assets, one of which is worth $50 and has a 10 percent chance of losing all of its value and the other of which is worth $10 and has a 50 percent chance of losing all of its value. For the sake of simplicity, the premium in this example will be paid in cash. If the premium received equals the expected value of the losses to TARP from the guarantee (thereby meeting the statutory requirement), Treasury would collect a $5 premium for guaranteeing either asset. However, the TARP purchasing authority would be reduced by $45 for the guarantee on the first asset (the $50 covered minus the $5 premium) and just $5 for the guarantee on the second asset (the $10 covered minus the $5 premium). Although the net expected payouts of the two guarantees are equal, the second guarantee is more valuable per dollar of TARP absorbed: covering the first asset uses $9 of TARP per $1 of expected loss, whereas the second asset uses only $1 of TARP per $1 of expected loss.

Because of this feature of TARP accounting under Section 102 of the EESA, Treasury in using the AGP will generally take a relatively early loss position over a narrow range of losses to provide the greatest protection per TARP dollar absorbed.


Other Potential Asset Guarantee Programs

Treasury is reviewing options for the development of other programs to insure troubled assets pursuant to the legislation. Two design considerations will be important factors for any potential program developed under Section 102:

(1) Accounting under the TARP purchasing authority: The TARP purchasing authority is reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount guaranteed less the premiums received; the expected net payout from the program is not considered for this purpose. This means that insuring an asset under section 102 has almost an equivalent impact on the TARP purchasing authority as purchasing the same asset (Section 102.c.4).

(2) Adverse selection: Information on the credit risk underlying a particular asset, notably complex assets such as mortgage backed securities, can often be understood only through intensive research.and even then, the risk will ultimately depend on outcomes such as future home price appreciation that can be forecast only imperfectly. If an insurance program were to offer a set premium for a specific asset class - even one that is narrowly defined - it could well be the case that only the holders of assets for whom the premium was either appropriate or underpriced would buy insurance. By construction, the credit risk associated with the securities that would actually be insured at any given premium would be higher than the premium would cover. Individually pricing the assets - a resource-intensive endeavor . is the only way of achieving an expected net payout of zero. In practice, this means that setting the pricing of the insurance premiums will inevitably require particular assumptions and judgments; the ex-post financial outcome involved with the guarantees could deviate substantially from the ex-ante actuarial analysis-for better or for worse.

To assist in the consideration of programs under Section 102, the Treasury issued Federal Register Notice (Docket # TREAS-DO-2008-0018 posted 10/16/2008). Treasury asked for comment on programs consistent with Section 102 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). Treasury particularly invited comments on the appropriate structure for such a program, and whether the program should offer insurance against losses for both individual whole loans and individual mortgage backed securities (MBS), as well as the payout and triggering event, estimation of losses, and setting the appropriate premium. A summary of the comments received is attached next as an Appendix to this report.