Persistance of Somali Piracy, U.S. Navy and other Responses

Persistance of Somali Piracy, U.S. Navy and other Responses. By J. Peter Pham
The Tank/NRO, Thursday, February 19, 2009

This week my “Strategic Interests” column for the World Defense Review provides an updated analysis of the piracy phenomenon off the coast of Somalia and international responses to it, warning that the challenge “is not just ongoing, but incidents of attempted hijackings may actually increase” despite the efforts to counter them.

After reviewing the unprecedented level of international political and security cooperation—including United Nations resolutions and other efforts, multilateral and bilateral agreements, the stand-up United States-led Combined Task Force 151, the extension of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Naval Forces Africa “Africa Partnership Station” to Africa’s eastern littoral, and the deployment of other naval forces to the region—my article turns its attention to the “less promising indicators” among the Somali, including the internal contradictions within the ineffectual “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of Somalia, the rise of nefarious influence of piracy in the institutions of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, the continuing resurgence of the Islamist extremism spearheaded by al-Shabaab, and the pressure that Somaliland is increasingly under. Thus I conclude:

No doubt considerable progress has been made in recent months in the
international community’s appreciation of the challenge represented by the
Somali pirates. However, much more remains to be done before the threat can be
diminished. Ultimately . . . the problem of Somali lawlessness at sea
will only be definitively resolved when the international community summons up
the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of Somali
statelessness onshore. Absent a minimal framework of legitimate and effective
governance in what was formerly the territory of the unitary Somali state—and I
would include as an essential attribute of such governance some sort of coast
guard capability, probably externally supported, perhaps with its resources
divided between Somaliland (assuming the upcoming elections are held, their
conduct legitimate, and the aftermath stable) and Somalia proper (under United
Nations, African Union, or subregional tutelage until the TFG or whatever
alternative interim arrangement might emerge in its stead proves itself
effective and capable of handling such responsibilities)—the specter of piracy
will always be looming just over the horizon.