Thinking About the Unthinkable: Priorities for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review

Thinking About the Unthinkable, by Thomas M. Skypek
Priorities for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review.
The Weekly Standard, Mar 03, 2009 12:00:00 AM

Almost fifty years ago, the legendary defense strategist Herman Kahn published his classic work on nuclear strategy, On Thermonuclear War (1960), followed just two years later by a popularized rendering entitled Thinking About the Unthinkable (1962). An iconoclast and one of America's unsung Cold War heroes, Kahn argued throughout his career that it was the responsibility of the United States government to think creatively, honestly, and unemotionally about the prospects of nuclear war. Today, the need for an honest and open debate on the role of nuclear weapons continues, and the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) presents an ideal forum. While competing priorities such as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and a deteriorating economy at home have decreased the attention paid to the issue of nuclear strategy, its importance remains undiminished.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense Department has conducted two comprehensive reviews of U.S. nuclear strategy. The first NPR was conducted in 1994 during the Clinton administration and was plagued by infighting between the Pentagon's civilian and military leadership. The 1994 review failed to result in any major policy shift, leaving Washington's Cold War nuclear posture largely intact. The second comprehensive review was conducted by the Bush administration throughout 2001 and was submitted to Congress in December of that year. It marked the first real departure from Cold War thinking on nuclear strategy. The 2001 NPR called for significant reductions in the number of deployed warheads as well as a modernized force structure. The Cold War

Triad, which consisted solely of offensive strike systems including bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), was supplanted by a New Triad. The New Triad folded the offensive strike systems into one leg and incorporated advanced conventional munitions; passive and active defenses formed the second leg of the New Triad while a responsive defense infrastructure formed the final leg. This new construct codified the value of strategic defenses and the importance of human capital management.

The 2009 NPR will be the first major opportunity for the Obama administration to articulate a new vision for U.S. nuclear strategy. The congressionally-mandated review will be conducted by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in consultation with Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It will be submitted concurrently with the Quadrennial Defense Review--the Defense Department's forward-looking appraisal of strategy, programs, and resources--in December 2009. The NPR will examine a variety of issues ranging from arms control and nonproliferation to missile defense and the issue of nuclear modernization. It will address broad policy questions on the overall role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and the force structure required to maintain a credible deterrent in the twenty-first century. Issues related to stockpile security, targeting doctrine, and weapons employment will also be addressed.

Attempts to influence the upcoming NPR have begun in earnest. In November 2008, the Center for American Progress (CAP), a left-of-center think tank, released a study entitled "Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap." The study's authors, Andrew Grotto and Joseph Cirincione, outline a series of priorities for the upcoming review. The fundamental premise of the study is that current U.S. nuclear posture hampers nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This premise is based on the faulty assumption that U.S. nuclear posture is the primary driver of nuclear proliferation. The reality is that states acquire nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons including the significant political benefits derived from possessing a credible deterrent.

It remains fashionable in liberal foreign policy circles to argue that Washington's behavior is the main catalyst for the decision of other states to acquire nuclear weapons. Of course, Washington's behavior influences other states--but only to a degree. Washington's decision to reduce the number of its operationally deployed warheads from around 6,000 to approximately 2,000 has done nothing to dissuade Pyongyang or Tehran from operating aggressive nuclear weapons programs. At the heart of this discussion is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Routinely, these critics incorrectly cite Article VI of the NPT, which contains vague language about disarmament, as the linchpin of the treaty. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, now a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, outlined in a recent interview that he believes this is "an inaccurate rendering of the history and meaning of the NPT." The crowning achievement of the NPT, Feith insists, was the agreement of non-nuclear states to forgo nuclearization. By overemphasizing the language in Article VI, these critics are "rewriting the history of the NPT," he argues. Even Grotto and Cirincione acknowledge this point in their report, admitting that "concerns about U.S. compli ance with NPT Article VI are unlikely to exert a direct influence on rogue states' nuclear ambitions".

While the CAP study provides some thoughtful recommendations, it neglects the issue of modernization and the impact our aging stockpile will have on U.S. national security. Each of the systems that currently comprise Washington's nuclear strike portfolio was first deployed last century, most of them during the Cold War. The Minuteman III ICBM was first deployed in 1970; the Trident II D-5 SLBM in 1990; the B-52H bomber in 1961; the B-2 in 1997 and the Ohio Class SSBN in 1981. The United States has not produced a new nuclear weapon in almost two decades when production of the W-88 warhead was ceased in 1989.

Bradley A. Thayer and I detailed the consequences of this trend in the September/October 2008 issue of The National Interest:

Over the next ten to twenty years, the erosion of American nuclear superiority will have major ramifications for the global balance of power. It will place new constraints on our freedom of action and lead our friends and foes alike to doubt the credibility of all instruments of U.S. power. As a result, decades-old alliance structures may fracture amid a drift toward multipolarity. Leadership from Tokyo to Riyadh to Seoul may find new incentives to develop their own deterrents as the relative power of states like Russia and China increases.

Our aging nuclear weapons complex not only diminishes the credibility of our nuclear deterrent but invites proliferation by friendly states and rogue regimes. Modernizing our forces--while maintaining the moral high ground on nonproliferation--should be the cornerstone of the next NPR.

It is important to note that John Podesta, former White House Chief of Staff under President Bill Clinton and the president of CAP, served as President Obama's transition director. According to Politico's Ben Smith and Chris Frates, "The transition's operations director, general counsel, and co-director all shifted from similar jobs at CAP, and the transition is full of lower-level former CAP staffers or current board members." A number of former CAP staffers have already joined the Obama administration in senior policy-making roles, including Melody Barnes, appointed Director for Domestic Policy. Several other CAP staffers have since joined the administration and more appointments from CAP are likely. "It is difficult to overstate the influence in Obamaland of CAP," wrote Michael Scherer of Time after the November election.

While the Obama administration has filled several of the top appointed positions in the Pentagon, many important senior and mid-level positions remain vacant but will be filled in the coming months. The composition of the transition staff, along with confirmed and nominated appointees, remains a likely indicator of what the Obama administration's ideology and basic worldview will be once it is fully staffed. In fact, the Center's NPR report will almost certainly be viewed by some inside the new administration as a blueprint for the 2009 NPR, including two of President Obama's senior Defense Department appointees--Michèle Flournoy and Ashton Carter.

Flournoy and Carter, both veterans of the Clinton administration, have a long history of advocating deep reductions in the nuclear stockpile while habitually neglecting the critical issue of modernization. In their writings and speeches, each has failed to acknowledge the strategic consequences a weakened nuclear deterrent will have for U.S. national security over the long-term--let alone to offer a modernization policy. Flourony, recently confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, will oversee the 2009 NPR. In response to advance questions submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee prior to her confirmation, Flournoy offered only dispassionate, stock answers to key questions regarding U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

Carter, recently nominated to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, will also have a major role in shaping the NPR. He served as the co-chair of the contentious 1994 NPR, routinely clashing with his military counterparts who did not share his views on the future of nuclear weapons. The Pentagon's senior leadership cannot neglect the strategic implications of the erosion of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. While Secretary Gates is a supporter of modernizing U.S. strategic forces, it is clear that some members of the new administration are not.

Going forward, the aim of policymakers should be the simultaneous reduction and modernization of the nuclear stockpile, to include associated delivery systems. Older systems and warheads should be retired and replaced by newer, modernized systems. The United States should continue to reduce the number of its nuclear warheads, in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002. Under SORT, both Washington and Moscow agreed to reduce the numbers of operationally deployed strategic warheads in their arsenals to 1,700 to 2,000 by December 31, 2012. The United States can reduce the numbers of its warheads and delivery systems while simultaneously modernizing its forces. These efforts are not mutually exclusive, as some claim.

There are a number of specific actions and issues the 2009 NPR should consider:

Conduct a Net Assessment of the Strategic Nuclear Balance. U.S. nuclear strategy should not be crafted in a vacuum. The CAP study failed to acknowledge the fact that Washington's nuclear competitors--namely Moscow and Beijing--are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces. The NPR should be accompanied by a comprehensive net assessment of the global strategic balance. Understanding Washington's position in the international system relative to other nuclear states will provide much-needed context for thinking about threats, capabilities requirements, and the future nuclear force structure. The NPR should look seriously at the possibility of amending the current force structure to include significant reductions in the bomber fleet. An increased emphasis on SLBMs should also be examined.

Launch A New Manhattan Project. The United States should consider launching a new Manhattan Project to develop the next generation of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. This will not only combat the "brain drain" problem the U.S. is now experiencing but also modernize its aging fleet. The scientists and engineers, many of them Baby Boomers, who built these weapons during the Cold War, are retiring and the transfer of knowledge to younger generations simply is not happening. The challenge of preserving human capital is a "significant problem," according to Feith. Because the Department is "relying less and less on tests, highly experienced people" are needed to verify the safety and reliability of the stockpile through technical extrapolations. However, the knowledge required to conduct nuclear tests is also eroding and must be preserved should need for a resumption of nuclear testing arise.

Articulate a Clear Targeting Policy. The review should also communicate in no uncertain terms that the U.S. reserves the right to respond to nuclear, biological and chemical attacks on the U.S. homeland and its interests with nuclear weapons. This will serve to strengthen U.S. credibility and make clear to all members of the international community that the U.S. will not retreat from its commitments and that those who choose to cross pre-stated redlines do so at their own peril. A credible deterrent rests on modernized forces and a clear doctrine for the employment of those forces.

Deterring Non-State Actors. Research funds should be allocated to investigate new concepts related to the deterrence of non-state actors such as al Qaeda. The expertise of social scientists should be leveraged in support of this effort in a manner similar to the Pentagon's Human Terrain Team program, which assigns social scientists to forward-deployed military units. These social scientists rely on "cultural intelligence" to support counterinsurgency operations in the field. This type of "cultural intelligence" could help build tailored deterrence strategies for non-state actors.

Strategic Defenses. A robust Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system not only strengthens deterrence but also enables Washington to hedge against the possibility of a deterrence failure from rogue states like Iran. Washington should proceed with its plans to place interceptors and their associated radar components in Eastern Europe. The 2009 NPR should analyze the individual systems that comprise the BMD architecture in order to ensure that each component is achieving its milestones on time and within budget.

Organizational Changes in the Defense Department. In order to manage more effectively the Department's nuclear mission the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should be reorganized. Currently, responsibility for nuclear policy is spread throughout the Department. An assistant secretary of defense (ASD) position should be established to oversee all aspects of nuclear weapons policy for the Defense Department. The new ASD for Nuclear Weapons Policy should absorb the nuclear counterproliferation and threat reduction missions from the ASD for Global Security Affairs. Subordinate deputy assistant secretary positions should be created for Nuclear Deterrence Operations, Nuclear Threat Reduction and Stockpile and Delivery System Management. Additionally, Congress should amend the statutory membership of the Nuclear Weapons Council to include the deputy secretary of defense. The Nuclear Weapons Council is the joint Defense Department/Energy Department organization responsible for management of the nuclear stockpile.

Develop a Roll Out Strategy. The CAP study rightly noted the need for an effective strategy to communicate the findings of the NPR. False perceptions and an incomplete communications strategy plagued the 2001 NPR, which was widely misinterpreted both domestically and internationally. The Obama administration should go beyond the requisite public briefing and congressional testimony typically used to communicate the results of the NPR. It should engage in a continuous and open dialogue with allies and should also participate in round table policy discussions and lectures at think tanks throughout the country.

Lobby Members of Congress. In the final analysis, nuclear modernization cannot occur without the support of Congress. In recent years, Congress has simply refused to fund the Bush administration's nuclear modernization initiatives including the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, the replacement for the W-76 warhead, and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or "bunker buster." In September 2008, defense appropriators in the House and Senate refused once again to fund RRW. Opposition on Capitol Hill has been largely bipartisan. There are, however, a number of powerful advocates on Capitol Hill, who truly grasp the need for modernization. Senators Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) and Representative Terry Everett (R-Ala.) are three of the strongest advocates, who have consistently voted to fund important modernization efforts such as RRW. In a September 2008 speech at the George C. Marshall Annual Awards Dinner, Senator Kyl lamented the state of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex calling nuclear deterrence "an issue which has too long been ignored, primarily by the U.S. Congress." As Secretary Gates noted in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, "the Department of Defense and the air force have taken firm steps to return excellence and accountability to nuclear stewardship." He urged lawmakers on Capitol Hill fulfill their obligation: "Congress needs to do its part by funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program--for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent."

As Walter B. Slocombe observed in 1981, "The fundamental--and unchanged--strategic objective of the United States is to deter aggression that could lead to nuclear war." Nearly thirty years later that objective remains unchanged. It remains the solemn duty of the U.S. government to think about all possible contingencies to ensure this nation is as prepared as it can be--to think the unthinkable. On December 2, 2008, the bi-partisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism released its report declaring, "The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Another bi-partisan commission, the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which has been tasked to review all aspects of Washington's nuclear posture, will deliver its findings on April 1, 2009. Congress needs to do more than create bipartisan commissions to examine problems we know exist; it needs to appropriate the funds required to modernize our aging nuclear weapons complex.

On September 10, 2001, the notion that nineteen men with box cutters would hijack four commercial airliners and take nearly three thousand innocent lives in New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia would have been unthinkable--but it shouldn't have been. The idea of using commercial airliners as guided missiles was not new. In fact, author Tom Clancy wrote about it in his novel Executive Orders in 1994 and the 1995 Bojinka Plot included a similar attack on CIA Headquarters. The events of September 11, 2001 illustrated the consequences of the sterilized thinking of stove-piped bureaucracies and the costs of failing to consider the unthinkable.

Despite all our hopes, nuclear weapons will continue to exist. As Senator Kyl noted in his September 2008 speech, "The bottom line is that the nuclear genie is out of the bottle and nobody is ever going to stuff it back in, in spite of their good intentions or the audacity of hope or any other kind of slogan." It is a reality that all members of Congress--and the Obama administration--must accept if our deterrent is to be preserved and the unthinkable never allowed to happen.

Thomas M. Skypek is a Washington-based defense analyst. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.