Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine, by Ali Ahmed
IDSA, April 24, 2009

A long standing observation on India’s strategic culture is that national strategy remains unarticulated. A significant departure from this characteristic was made by India following a review of the nuclear doctrine in Jan 2003. It is now more than six years since the event. There is a need to review doctrine periodically in any case. In this specific case the need is more acute given changes in strategic circumstances. The present juncture is an apposite one in that a new government would be coming into power soon. Therefore initiating a case for a review of India’s nuclear doctrine is in order. This policy brief proposes a direction of review by interrogating a principal pillar of the doctrine – that of ‘massive punitive retaliation’.

There are other contending directions of review. These include whether India should continue to include ‘minimal’ in its formulation ‘credible minimum deterrent’ in light of ‘minimum’ seemingly contradicting the important dimension of the two i.e., ‘credible’. There has even been a recommendation by a departing National Security Advisory Board on jettisoning ‘No First Use’ – perhaps the most salient pillar of the doctrine. The votaries of the Triad would prefer a mention of a Triad based second strike capability in the doctrine. These possible directions indicate that there is a need for review. It is another matter that in doing so, some of the proposals would be accommodated and some disregarded.

In this regard, the proposal requires a shift away from ‘massive punitive retaliation’ in favour of ‘flexible punitive retaliation’. The policy brief first establishes the need to do so by discussing three conflict scenarios highlighting the dangers of the formulation and the advantages from the proposed shift. It concludes that a strategic dialogue with both China and Pakistan is necessary for clarity in communication. This would enhance deterrence and dispel possible misperceptions and apprehensions. This is particularly necessary with respect to Pakistan, given that the state is perpetually poised on ‘failed state’ status with implications for India.

The current doctrinal precept

The sub-paragraph of interest of the press release subsequent to the Cabinet Committee on Security endorsing the nuclear doctrine of 04 Jan 03 reads: “(ii) A posture of “No First Use”: Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”

The inclusion of the term ‘massive’ was a discernible change from the earlier formulation of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine in which the term had not found mention. Instead the Draft had used the term ‘sufficient’ implying a degree of choice on the nature of the response being available to the political decision maker. The specific sentence in the sub-paragraph on Credibility in the Draft reads: ‘Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.’ Though the Draft was just that - a ‘draft’ to compel the government’s attention, the critique stands. The principal problem with the change is that it restricts the choice of the decision maker by excluding the set of less expansive responses.

‘Massive’, not defined explicitly, can be taken as a product of throw weight and target set that produces the promised ‘unacceptable damage’. There are three implications: one is in terms of ‘pain’ implying counter value targeting; second, is reducing the ability of the enemy to mount a counterstrike, which would be counter force; and third is a mix of both. Since in all three options ‘unacceptable damage’ is inflicted, it is worth questioning whether only ‘massive’ nuclear counter strike would cause ‘unacceptable damage’. It is well understood that even a single warhead through a counter value strike can be ‘catastrophic’. Therefore, the term ‘massive’, in its emphasis on throw weight or numbers, is superfluous. It has even been averred that the inclusion of ‘massive’ was likely an ‘unconsidered formulation’. On this count there is a need for review.

Massive nuclear retaliation is definitely a possibility and would be credible in case the enemy’s nuclear first use is in an expansive (‘massive’) form such as resort to first strike, decapitating strike or counter value targeting. However, should ‘first use’ be of a restricted nature such as at the tactical level, for India to up the ante by going ‘massive’ to counter it would be irrational. This was an observation true in the Cold War era as pointed out by Thomas Schelling in his landmark, The Strategy of Conflict: ‘The threat of massive retaliation, if ‘massive’ is interpreted to mean unlimited retaliation, does indeed lose credibility with the loss of our hope that a skillfully conducted all out strike might succeed in precluding counter retaliation.’ Since precluding counter retaliation is not possible in India’s case with respect to Pakistan, leave aside China, it would be prudent for India to go down a route traversed by the US during the McNamara years. The logic that persuaded McNamara in his own words was:

‘One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action…What we are proposing is a capability to strike back after absorbing a first blow. This means we have to build and maintain a second strike force. Such a force should have sufficient flexibility to permit a choice of strategies… Such a prospect would give the Soviets no incentive to withhold attack against our cities in a first strike. We want to give them a better alternative…the strongest possible incentive to refrain from attacking our cities.’

India’s promise of massive counter strikes to first use against its territory or its forces is wanting in credibility, particularly if the strike were of a tactical nature but with a strategic purpose of nuclear signaling for war termination. This is particularly important since both the likely adversaries are unlikely to resort to nuclear weapons in a massive mode in the first salvo.

Consider the case of China. Though bound by an NFU, it is reportedly a qualified NFU in not being applicable to territory it claims. In a border conflict with India it could resort to nuclear first use on its claimed territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Such use would likely involve the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Since India’s is an Assured Retaliation doctrine, India would only be complicating the aftermath of the nuclear exchange for itself should its counter strike be ‘massive’.

The same is the case with Pakistan. Pakistan, emulating NATO in the Cold War era does not profess NFU. In case it were to resort to nuclear first use, it is quite apparent that this would not be of an order of a debilitating ‘first strike’ given the imbalance in numbers and the security of information surrounding locations of Indian nuclear assets. Even if it were to attempt to do so, it could not preclude assured Indian counter value retaliation. Having fired off a major proportion of its arsenal in attempting a first strike, it would not have the numbers to mount a counter strike. In effect, it would ab initio be deterred from attempting a first strike. Therefore Islamabad’s most likely first use is a tactical strike with a strategic purpose of forestalling Indian conventional military advances or to bring about conflict termination by focusing the efforts of the international community. Counter retaliation in a ‘massive’ mode to such a symbolic strike would be to India’s disadvantage since there is no guarantee that some Pakistani weapons would not survive. These would inevitably be directed at counter value targets to maximize vengeance. To open itself to such a threat would be irrational.

The problem has been pointed out earlier following the release of the Draft nuclear doctrine in the following manner:

‘….Our intent of causing ‘unacceptable damage’ is credible only in case our population centers and nuclear-industrial concentrations are hit, inclusion of military forces as targets that will invite such a response makes it less credible…the point is having caused ‘unacceptable damage’ is no consolation for ending up a recipient of it…Thus there is a need to move beyond the avatar of ‘massive retaliation’…in favour of ‘flexible response’…’ (Ali Ahmed, ‘Doctrinal Challenge’, USI Journal, Jan 2000)

It is seen that the term ‘massive’ is not only tying down India’s options but dangerously so. This is elaborated through scenarios in the next section with respect to Pakistan as the nuclear adversary. In the case of China as an adversary in similar scenarios, there is no way India could survive the eventual nuclear exchange.

[Full brief at the link above.]