Don't Shoot the Speculators

Don't Shoot the Speculators. By L. GORDON CROVITZ
They predict prices, not set them.
WSJ, Jul 13, 2009

Speculators don't get much respect. Short sellers last year were blamed for their trades warning about the credit crisis, and commodities traders are now accused of causing higher oil prices. Even when traders are later proven right -- maybe especially when they're proven right -- we blame them for delivering the bad news.

Maybe it's human nature to reject Shakespeare's warning and shoot the messenger. The good news is that a recent proposal aimed at one group of speculators could prove that speculators of all kinds deserve our thanks -- or if that's too much to ask, at least to be left alone to bring valuable information to markets.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is considering requiring more disclosure, intended to ferret out what politicians like to call "excessive speculation." Whatever the intention, enough transparency could instead show that oil speculators are heroes, not villains.

Last week, new CFTC head Gary Gensler said the agency might set new limits on oil speculators now that oil prices have doubled this year from a low of $34 a barrel. This was surprising because just last fall, the agency issued an exhaustive study concluding that speculators were not to blame for the runup in oil prices that reached $145 last summer. It's also telling that no one accused traders of harmful speculation when oil prices tumbled from their earlier highs.

The more interesting part of the CFTC proposal is for new transparency to the positions that different kinds of traders take in futures trading. Under current rules, the CFTC sets limits on trading positions based on Commitment of Traders reports, which date back to the 1920s. These put trading in two key categories, based on the type of user, not the positions they have in various contracts. This anachronism has long led to uncertainty about why prices move, a lack of transparency that also feeds the blaming of speculators.

Business users such as airlines and oil companies are considered in the "commercial" category, with hedge funds and other financial traders in the other, more regulated "noncommercial" category. But many commercial users have active trading desks. Likewise, financial firms need to hedge against movements in commodities such as oil because they have trading contracts that leave them as exposed to price risks as the companies that actually use the physical product.

More-detailed reporting on who has which kinds of positions in oil would make the market more understandable. It would show that so-called financial speculators are trying to predict price movements, but also trying to hedge risk. Likewise, commercial traders that take delivery of oil are hedging risks, while also predicting future prices. As oil expert Daniel Yergin points out, more visibility "will give a better sense of how much is the market responding to supply and demand in physical oil and how much is it responding to the supply and demand of money on the part of investors."

It doesn't make sense to shoot either kind of messenger. Markets are collections of information, translated through trading into prices. These prices, unless there is manipulation, are the best estimate of future supply and demand. Such price discovery should not be controversial, though it too often has been.

"Oil market speculation is back in the news," Bob McTeer, a former Dallas Federal Reserve president, wrote on his blog. "I'm afraid I don't have much to contribute since Milton Friedman convinced me long ago that profitable speculation is stabilizing and destabilizing speculation is unprofitable. Speculation is profitable if the speculator buys lower than he sells; it's unprofitable if he sells lower than he buys. Even if they don't make a profit, they are trying."

Or, as the sign in the 19th century saloon put it, "Don't shoot the piano player; he's doing the best he can." Oil industry experts, whether "speculators" or not, do their best to predict price movements. Some focus on uncertainty about Iran. Others point to demand trends from China and India. There's the inherent volatility in this market due to the OPEC cartel having a firm grip on the supply spigot.

Finally, there's the growing role that commodities are again playing as a hedge against inflation and a weak dollar. Increased trading in commodities is a danger-ahead warning about U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. While Washington might like to stifle these particular messengers for the warning they're sending, the rest of us should welcome information about troubles to come.

Congress has succeeded in rattling regulators at the CFTC into doing something about speculators. They have more regulation in mind, but if the CFTC can bring more transparency to oil trading, the result will be excellent even if unintended: We can focus our attention on the real pressures on oil prices instead of wallowing in searches for scapegoats. Better disclosure can reduce the human tendency to blame traders for rising prices when the responsibility lies elsewhere.