In Defense of Over-the-Counter Derivatives - Swaps grew out of the banking system because writing risky, custom contracts is a lot like making loans

In Defense of Over-the-Counter Derivatives. By MARK C. BRICKELL
Swaps grew out of the banking system because writing risky, custom contracts is a lot like making loans.
WSJ, May 14, 2010

In 1989, there were $2.5 trillion of swaps outstanding, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. Today there are $464 trillion. Why?

Few business activities grow by 30% annually for decades, so this success deserves scrutiny. The first step is to understand that swaps—as federal law calls the custom-tailored derivatives that banks and their corporate customers privately negotiate—help companies shed the risks they don't want and take on risks they prefer to manage.

McDonalds, for example, is expert in training young workers, marketing, and managing global real estate. But if selling hamburgers worldwide generates revenue in Japanese yen and New Zealand dollars, it also means smaller profits when those currencies decline in value. A swap contract can shift that risk to a bank that is as good at managing currency risk as the corporation is at buying beef. By outsourcing the management of its financial risks, a company can focus on its true sources of comparative advantage. That strengthens the firm and speeds economic growth.

Within the financial system, transferring risks is no less important. Different banks specialize in managing different risks and have customers with differing needs. If banks lent money to or wrote swaps with no one but their clients, they would accumulate too much risk in their portfolios. They manage this by writing swaps with other banks or nonbank risk-takers like hedge funds to transfer some risks away.

More companies, governments and banks are using swaps for two reasons.

First, swaps can be custom tailored in helpful ways. For example, anticipating falling interest rates, a company with fixed-rate debt can "swap" from fixed to floating by having its bank pay the fixed interest rate on the firm's five-year bonds, precisely to the dollar and to the day. In return, the company pays the bank the floating rate of interest, as it changes during those five years. Simpler derivatives, like futures, lack this attribute because they must be standardized to trade on futures exchanges.

Swap contracts are also customized to manage the credit risk of losing money if a counterparty defaults. Using private credit information, banks can decide to make a swap without taking collateral, just as they would to make an unsecured loan.

Futures traders, in contrast, outsource the credit risk of all their derivatives to central counterparties called clearinghouses, which require cash collateral or "margin" payments. If American companies were required to make such margin payments on their swaps, they would have to set aside billions of dollars that would no longer be available, as 3M testified last year, to build more factories or create new jobs.

Second, it costs less to move risks with swaps than with cash. The treasurer of the company that prefers floating-rate liabilities could ask his investment banker to track down the investors who own his fixed-rate securities and buy them back. He could negotiate a new, floating-rate bank loan to pay for it. But think of the transaction costs involved. One phone call to a swap desk achieves the same result at less cost.

You can see why swap activity grew out of the banking system. Writing custom-tailored, long-term contracts with credit risk is a lot like making loans to companies. That's why a very high proportion of interest-rate, currency, equity, and credit default swaps has a bank on at least one side of the deal.

This is also why, in this country, a policy consensus has existed for more than 20 years that swaps are not appropriately regulated as futures or securities. Instead, swap activity has been monitored for the most part by the banking authorities. Banking supervisors have had a good window on the business, and the opportunity to give a nudge when they think banks need it. The contracts the banking supervisors don't see (the ones between nonbanks) are unlikely to be systemically important. They are fewer, smaller and shorter term—and with proper credit analysis even these swaps will pop up on the radar of banks and their supervisors.

Good business systems improve as they grow. Recently, swap banks have chosen to send roughly $200 trillion of interbank swap contracts to central clearinghouses. They have created central data repositories to record their deals and give all regulators a wider window on the business. They have increased their use of technology to confirm trades. All this was achieved without new laws or regulations.

But what of AIG? That federally regulated thrift holding company lost billions by writing mortgage insurance, purchasing mortgage-backed securities, and writing credit default swaps that guaranteed mortgage bonds owned by others. Its losses across multiple business lines were not a swaps problem, they were a mortgage problem—and what was true for AIG was true across the financial system.

More than a trillion dollars of losses accrued when virtually every institution in the housing finance chain, including mortgage lenders, securities underwriters, rating agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, investors, and the federal regulator at each step of the process underestimated the likelihood of an increase in defaults by mortgage borrowers. No one, certainly not the federal banking supervisors who already have reviewed derivatives activity before and during the crisis, has attributed this problem to swaps. But swaps did enable a few, wiser investors to let some air out of the housing bubble by putting on short positions efficiently.

A system-wide misjudgment of mortgage risk caused the financial crisis; understanding how that happened is the essential first step toward the policy reforms that will help us achieve the goal of financial stability. Legislation that targets over-the-counter derivatives will not further that goal.

Mr. Brickell was a managing director at J.P. Morgan and served as chairman of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.