CGFS Publications No 49
May 2013
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs49.htm
Executive Summary
The use of collateral in financial transactions has risen in many jurisdictions in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and is likely to increase further. This is driven by both market forces and regulatory changes, and has triggered concerns about real or perceived collateral scarcity and excessive asset encumbrance. Taking a system-wide perspective, this report examines how greater collateral use and asset encumbrance may impact the functioning of the financial system and draws lessons for policymakers. The key findings are summarised below.
Increasing collateralised funding and asset encumbrance
There is evidence of increasing bank reliance on collateralised market funding, particularly in Europe. A key driver of this development is perceptions of higher counterparty credit risk amongst investors, who demand more collateral or charge higher risk premia on unsecured debt.
However, the share of collateralised funding differs significantly among banks and between jurisdictions. Indeed, different business models, market structures and regulatory frameworks will tend to generate – and support – structurally different levels of collateralised funding in bank balance sheets.
Greater reliance on collateralised funding raises the share of bank assets that are encumbered. Asset encumbrance is also rising on account of initial margin requirements of central and bilateral counterparties to cover derivatives exposures and other aspects of regulatory reform.
No aggregate collateral shortages, but differences amongst jurisdictions
The demand for high-quality assets (HQA) that can be used as collateral will increase due to a number of key regulatory reforms. Examples are stricter standards for initial margin requirements on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions, both for central and for bilateral clearing arrangements, and the introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio under Basel III. This comes on top of greater demand for collateral assets in secured bank funding.
Current estimates suggest that the combined impact of liquidity regulation and OTC derivatives reforms could generate additional collateral demand to the tune of $4 trillion. At the same time, the supply of collateral assets is known to have risen significantly since end-2007. Outstanding amounts of AAA- and AArated government securities alone – based on the market capitalisation of widely used benchmark indices – increased by $10.8 trillion between 2007 and 2012. Other measures suggest even greater increases in supply.
Hence, concerns about an absolute shortage of HQA appear unjustified. Yet as the situation varies markedly across jurisdictions, temporary HQA shortages may arise in some countries, for example when the level of government bonds outstanding is low or when government bonds are perceived risky by market participants.
Implications for markets and financial stability
Private sector adjustments can mitigate shortages of HQA. Such adjustments include broader eligibility criteria for collateral assets in private transactions, more efficient entity-level collateral management and increased collateral reuse and collateral transformation.
Yet while lessening any collateral shortage, such endogenous responses will come at the cost of greater interconnectedness in the financial system, for example in the form of more securities lending or collateral transformation services. They may also increase concentration, if these responses rely on the services of only a small number of intermediaries, and will add to financial system opacity, including via shadow banking activities, and increase operational, funding and rollover risks.
Increased collateralisation of bank balance sheets mitigates counterparty credit risk, but adds to the procyclicality of the financial system. The channels through which this occurs, in times of financial stress, are the exclusion of certain assets from the pool of eligible collateral, higher haircuts on collateral assets, increased margin requirements on centrally cleared and non-centrally cleared derivatives trades and marking-to-market of bank assets in collateral pools.
Greater encumbrance of bank balance sheets can adversely affect the residual claims of unsecured creditors during bank resolution, increase risks to deposit insurance schemes and reduce the effectiveness of policies aimed at bail-in. Given limited disclosures on encumbered assets, the ability of markets to accurately price unsecured debt can also be impaired.
Implications for policy
Market discipline can be enhanced by requiring banks to provide regular, standardised public disclosures on asset encumbrance. Transparency about the extent to which bank assets are encumbered or are available for encumbrance will allow unsecured creditors to better assess the risks they face. Such disclosures would include information on unencumbered assets relative to unsecured liabilities, on overcollateralisation levels, and on received collateral that can be rehypothecated. Development of such standards would benefit from outreach to market participants and could involve the reporting of lagged, average values to limit adverse dynamics in crisis periods. Supervisors, in turn, should receive more detailed and granular data, as required, including the amounts and types of unencumbered assets.
Including asset encumbrance in the pricing of deposit guarantee schemes deserves consideration in jurisdictions where encumbrance is of concern. Since depositors will not themselves factor in the risks posed by increased asset encumbrance – as their deposits are guaranteed – risk-sensitive deposit guarantee premia could serve to discipline banks. This would internalise the effect of asset encumbrance on residual risks for such schemes, as well as for the government as the ultimate safety net. Further analysis is needed to make this operational, taking into account differences in business models.
To internalise the risks of rising asset encumbrance, prudential limits can serve as a backstop to other policy measures, as practised in some jurisdictions. In cases where encumbrance could become a material concern, banks should be asked to perform regular stress tests that evaluate encumbrance levels under adverse market conditions.
Central banks and prudential authorities need to closely monitor and oversee market responses to increased collateral demand and their effects on interconnectedness. This provides support for work on best practice standards in securities financing markets and for shadow banking activities more generally, as well as for supervisory reviews of financial institutions’ risk and collateral management arrangements.
Concerns over procyclical demand for collateral assets lend support to efforts targeting strict standards for collateral valuation practices and through-the-cycle haircuts.
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