Opportunistic Accountability: State–Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests

Opportunistic Accountability: State–Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests. Shelby Grossman, Jonathan Phillips, and Leah R. Rosenzweig. Comparative Political Studies, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414017720706

Abstract: Conflicting preferences between the state and society underpin most accountability mechanisms by providing a credible way for society to impose costs on the state. Adapting a classic bargaining framework, we argue that broader conditions can support state–society bargaining. Policies that both the state and society value can also enhance society’s negotiating power, provided society has a relatively lower valuation and is more patient than the state. ***By threatening to sabotage their own interests but hurt the impatient state even more, citizens can compel the state to deliver broader policy benefits. We illustrate this logic with the case of polio vaccination in northern Nigeria, where entire communities have resisted the vaccine as a strategy to bargain for more desired services.*** To resolve and preempt noncompliance, the Nigerian government has enhanced service delivery in other areas, demonstrating the opportunity for improved accountability in the presence of shared-interest policies.