Acquiescence: People can explicitly recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong but, nevertheless, stick with it

Risen JL. Acquiescing to intuition: Believing what we know isn't so. Soc Personal Psychol Compass. 2017;e12358. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12358

Abstract: When people identify an error in their initial judgment, they typically try to correct it. But, in some cases, they choose not to—even when they know, in the moment, that they are being irrational or making a mistake. A baseball fan may know that he cannot affect the pitcher from his living room but still be reluctant to say “no-hitter.” A person may learn that flying in an airplane is statistically safer than driving a car and still refuse to fly. Dual-process models of judgment and decision making often implicitly assume that if an error is detected, it will be corrected. Recent work suggests, however, that models should decouple error detection and correction. Indeed, people can explicitly recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong but, nevertheless, stick with it, a phenomenon known as acquiescence. My goals are to offer criteria for identifying acquiescence, consider why people acquiesce even when it incurs a cost, discuss how lessons that are learned in cases when acquiescence is clearly identified can be exported to cases when acquiescence may be harder to establish, and, more broadly, describe the implications of a model that decouples error detection and error correction.