Friday, June 2, 2017
Alemania reinventa la crisis energética. Por Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Alemania reinventa la crisis energética. Por Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023044482045791857 20802195590
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 8, 2013 6:28 p.m. ET
ObamaCare no es el único tren en camino de descarrilar que tenemos ahora. Como Mao apremiando a los campesinos para que fundieran sus cacharros, sartenes y útiles de labranza para convertir a China en un coloso del acero de la noche a la mañana, Alemania repartía alegremente subsidios para alentar a los ciudadanos y granjeros a instalar paneles solares y molinos de viento para luego vender la energía resultante a las compañías eléctricas a precios inflados. El éxito —Alemania obtiene un 25% de su energía de las renovables— ha resultado ser un desastre.
Mientras los alemanes se apresuran a hacerse con su dinero fácil, la producción de dióxido de carbono ha aumentado, no disminuido, porque las compañías, privadas de capital, han pasado a quemar carbón americano barato para proveer de la necesaria energía cuando el viento y el sol nos fallan.
Debido a que sol y viento son intermitentes y la red eléctrica está pobremente preparada para acomodar estas fuentes, los apagones y las reducciones de suministro amenazan en este invierno.
Como las facturas las pagan hogares y empresas, los precios de la electricidad son el triple que en los EE UU. Un pánico apremiante es el del empleo, ya que industrias de gran aportación se dirigen a EE UU para aprovechar la energía barata que ha producido la revolución de las arenas bituminosas y los esquistos. El máximo responsable energético de Europa habla ya francamente de la "desindustrialización de Alemania".
En UK, donde la política pública ha sido casi tan generosa con las renovables, "Está bien ser muy, muy verde, pero no si estás interesado en la fabricación", según queja de un prominente CEO.
La gran virtud de la democracia es que no sigue con ciertos planes hasta el precipicio, pero los mecanismos normales de ajuste están agarrotados por el hecho de que el desastre energético de Europa implica al entero espectro político.
Ed Miliband, líder del Partido Laborista de UK, ha fijado el tema de las elecciones del próximo año cuando prometió recientemente congelar los precios de la energía si se le elegía. Pero los laboristas no van a abandonar los subsidios solares y eólicos que crearon ellos mismos. Quieren dejarlos grabados en piedra, pasando los costes a las empresas. En Alemania, la conservadora Angela Merkel se adhirió completamente a las posiciones económicas sobre energía de la oposición tras Fukushima, dejando a los electores alarmados sobre los precios de la energía sin lugar al que tornar en las elecciones de septiembre excepto a Angela Merkel, quien de forma vaga mostró alguna moderación sobre la energiewende (revolución energética) que lanzó y continúa liderando.
Un infrecuente destello de raciocinio ha partido en realidad del probable socio de coalición de Angela Merkel, el SPD, autor de la ley original sobre energías verdes, cuyo portavoz dice ahora: "Necesitamos asegurar que la energía renovable es asequible. Y necesitamos terminar con la idea de que podemos salirnos simultáneamente de nucleares y el carbón. No va a funcionar."
Es tentador asumir que los políticos europeos eran feligreses de la iglesia del calentamiento global. Pero más importante es su apego a la ideología del agotamiento de recursos, que les convenció de haber elegido un ganador en esta idea porque estaba garantizado que los precios de los combustibles fósiles harían parecer baratos a los de la energía verde.
"Cuanta más gente consuma petróleo y carbón, más subirá el precio, pero cuanta más gente consuma energías renovables, más bajará su precio", explicó el asesor energético de Angela Merkel.
He aquí una idea que parece ser impermeable a la experiencia y que es parte del bagaje de todo político que pudiera ser elegido en nuestro mundo. "Es absolutamente cierto que la demanda [de energías fósiles] subirá mucho más rápido que el suministro. Ese es un hecho", explicó el presidente Obama en 2011. Los EE UU "no pueden permitirse apostar nuestra prosperidad a largo plazo a un recurso que con el tiempo se agotará."
El Sr. Obama mencionó los fósiles no convencionales exactamente una vez en su discurso — y solo para decir que también se agotarían.
Si todo esto fuera cierto, Europa no habría llegado a sus presentes trabajos. Esta es la realidad: la revolución de los fósiles no convencionales es menos revolucionaria de lo que parece. Ha sacudido los errores comunes solo porque ha sucedido en las mismas narices de los americanos, en áreas pobladas en que se asumía que los "recursos" se habían extraído y transportado hace mucho.
De hecho, los depósitos de hidrocarburos que hay en el mundo son verdaderamente vastos, incluyendo entre ellos cantidades inimaginables de hidratos de metano . El desafío es el tecnológico y económico de buscar el acceso a un determinado recurso a un precio asequible — un desafío desde que se usaban trapos para empaparlos en petróleo de manantiales naturales. Durante ciento cincuenta años, el precio del barril de petróleo ha fluctuado entre $10 y $100 (en dólares de 2011), un rango suficiente para encontrar nuevas reservas cada vez que se quería requerían con objeto de mantener a los hidrocarburos como fuente de energía de precio competitivo.
La crisis energética europea es muy parecida a la nuestra de hace 40 años — autoinfligida. El sueño de Europa dejó de ser sostenible al minuto de que los precios de la energía empezaran a caer en un competidor comercial importante como los EE UU. LA gran pregunta ahora es cuán lejos irá la secudida política cuando toda la élite está implicada en un insatisfactorio experimento energético, que inevitablemente se ha visto envuelta en el desencanto del público con otro projecto fracasado de la élite, la Unión Europea.
Va a ser fascinante también la suerte de los shales europeos. En Europa, el gobierno, no los propietarios, controla y se beneficia de los recursos minerales, creando la política de suma zero en lo referente a recusos que han hecho al Oriente Medio un parangón de estabilidad y progreso. ¿Y el calentamiento global? Por suerte la respuesta es fácil. Los votantes europeos se van a acercar al punto en que están los americanos, dándose cuenta de que abjurar de la energía barata no hará nada por los niveles de CO2 (y aun menos por el clima) mientras otros no abjuren de la energía barata también.
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Germany Reinvents the Energy Crisis
A love affair with renewables brings high prices, potential blackouts and worries about 'deindustrialization.'
By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023044482045791857 20802195590
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 8, 2013 6:28 p.m. ET
ObamaCare isn't the only policy train wreck in progress. Like Mao urging peasants to melt down their pots, pans and farm tools to turn China into a steel-producing superpower overnight, Germany dished out subsidies to encourage homeowners and farmers to install solar panels and windmills and sell energy back to the power company at inflated prices. Success—Germany now gets 25% of its power from renewables—has turned out to be a disaster.
As Germans rush to grab this easy money, carbon dioxide output has risen, not fallen, because money-strapped utilities have switched to burning cheap American coal to provide the necessary standby power when wind and sun fail.
Because the sun and wind are intermittent and the power grid is poorly arranged to accommodate them, brownouts and blackouts threaten this winter.
Because the bills are paid by households and businesses, electricity rates are triple those in the United States. An immediate panic is jobs, as prized industries head to the U.S. for cheaper energy unleashed by the shale revolution. Europe's top energy official now speaks frankly of the "deindustrialization in Germany."
In Britain, where policy has been nearly as generous to renewables, "It's fine being very, very green, but not if you're interested in manufacturing," complains a prominent CEO.
Enlarge Image
Wind turbines stand behind a solar power park near Werder, Germany. Getty Images
Democracy's great virtue is that it doesn't follow schemes off a cliff, but the normal adjustment mechanisms are hampered by the fact that Europe's energy disaster implicates the entire political spectrum.
Ed Miliband, leader of Britain's Labour Party, set the theme for next year's British election when he recently promised to freeze energy prices if elected. But Labour isn't about to disown the solar and wind subsidies it created. It wants to soldier on, shifting the cost to business. In Germany, conservative Angela Merkel embraced the opposition's energy economics wholesale after Fukushima, leaving voters who are alarmed about energy prices no place to turn in September's election except Angela Merkel, who vaguely indicated some moderation of the energiewende (energy revolution) she launched and continues to champion.
An unwonted glimmer of reason has actually come from Mrs. Merkel's likely Social Democrat coalition partner, author of Germany's original green energy law, whose spokesman now says: "We need to ensure that renewable energy is affordable. And we need to put an end to the idea that we can pull out of nuclear and coal simultaneously. This won't work."
It's tempting to assume Europe's politicians were praying in the church of global warming. But more important is their subscription to resource-depletion ideology, which convinced them they'd picked a political winner because rising fossil fuel prices were guaranteed to make green energy look cheap in comparison.
"When more people consume oil and coal, the price will go up, but when more people consume renewable energy, the price of it will go down," explained Ms. Merkel's top energy adviser.
We have here an idea seemingly impervious to experience and part of the mental baggage of every politician likely to get elected in our world. "It is absolutely certain that [fossil energy] demand will go up a lot faster than supply. It's just a fact," President Obama explained in 2011. The U.S. "cannot afford to bet our long-term prosperity on a resource that will eventually run out."
Mr. Obama mentioned shale exactly once in his speech—and only to say shale would run out too.
If all this were true, Europe wouldn't be in its present fix. Here's the real truth: The shale revolution is less revolutionary than it seems. It has shocked settled misconceptions only because it happened under the noses of Americans, in populated areas where the casual assumption was that "resources" would long ago have been dug out and carted away.
In fact, the world's store of fossil hydrocarbons is truly vast, including almost unimaginable quantities of methane hydrates. The challenge is the technological and economic one of getting access to a given resource at an affordable price—a challenge ever since men used rags to soak up oil from natural seeps. For 150 years, the price of a barrel of oil has fluctuated between $10 and $100 (in 2011 dollars), a range that has been sufficient to call forth new reserves and feedstocks whenever needed to maintain hydrocarbons as a source of competitively priced energy.
Europe's energy crisis is a lot like ours of 40 years ago—self- inflicted. Europe's dream was untenable the minute energy prices began falling in a major trade competitor like the United States. The big question now is how far will the political upheaval go when an entire elite is implicated in an unsatisfactory energy experiment, which inevitably has become wrapped up in public disappointment with another failed elite project, the European Union itself.
Fascinating too will be the fate of Europe's shale. In Europe, government, not landowners, controls and benefits from mineral resources, creating the zero-sum resource politics that have made the Mideast a paragon of stability and civil progress. What about global warming? At least that answer is easier. European voters are coming out where Americans have, realizing that foreswearing cheap energy will do nothing for CO2 levels (and even less for climate) as long as others aren't foreswearing cheap energy too.
Rules of Thumb for Bank Solvency Stress Testing. By Daniel C. Hardy and Christian Schmieder
IMF Working Paper No. 13/232
November 11, 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41047.0
Summary: Rules of thumb can be useful in undertaking quick, robust, and readily interpretable bank stress tests. Such rules of thumb are proposed for the behavior of banks’ capital ratios and key drivers thereof—primarily credit losses, income, credit growth, and risk weights—in advanced and emerging economies, under more or less severe stress conditions. The proposed rules imply disproportionate responses to large shocks, and can be used to quantify the cyclical behaviour of capital ratios under various regulatory approaches.
Motivated by the usefulness of rules of thumb,
this paper concentrates on the formulation of rules of thumb for key factors affecting bank solvency, namely credit losses, pre-impairment income and credit growth during crises, and illustrates their use in the simulation of the evolution of capital ratios under stress.4 We thereby seek to provide answers to the following common questions in stress testing:
How much do credit losses usually increase in case of a moderate, medium and severe macroeconomic downturn and/or financial stress event, e.g., if cumulative real GDP growth turns out to be, say, 4 or 8 percentage points below potential (or average or previous years') growth?
How typically do other major factors that affect capital ratios, such as profitability, credit growth, and risk-weighted assets (RWA), react under these circumstances?
Taking these considerations together, how does moderate, medium, or severe macro-financial stress translate into (a decrease in) bank capital, and thus, how much capital do banks need to cope with different levels of stress?
IMF Working Paper No. 13/232
November 11, 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41047.0
Summary: Rules of thumb can be useful in undertaking quick, robust, and readily interpretable bank stress tests. Such rules of thumb are proposed for the behavior of banks’ capital ratios and key drivers thereof—primarily credit losses, income, credit growth, and risk weights—in advanced and emerging economies, under more or less severe stress conditions. The proposed rules imply disproportionate responses to large shocks, and can be used to quantify the cyclical behaviour of capital ratios under various regulatory approaches.
Motivated by the usefulness of rules of thumb,
this paper concentrates on the formulation of rules of thumb for key factors affecting bank solvency, namely credit losses, pre-impairment income and credit growth during crises, and illustrates their use in the simulation of the evolution of capital ratios under stress.4 We thereby seek to provide answers to the following common questions in stress testing:
How much do credit losses usually increase in case of a moderate, medium and severe macroeconomic downturn and/or financial stress event, e.g., if cumulative real GDP growth turns out to be, say, 4 or 8 percentage points below potential (or average or previous years') growth?
How typically do other major factors that affect capital ratios, such as profitability, credit growth, and risk-weighted assets (RWA), react under these circumstances?
Taking these considerations together, how does moderate, medium, or severe macro-financial stress translate into (a decrease in) bank capital, and thus, how much capital do banks need to cope with different levels of stress?
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