Is Accurate, Positive, or Inflated Self-perception Most Advantageous for Psychological Adjustment? Better Inflated

Humberg, Sarah, Michael Dufner, Felix D Schönbrodt, Katharina Geukes, Roos Hutteman, Albrecht Kuefner, Maarten van Zalk, Jaap J Denissen, Steffen Nestler, and Mitja Back 2018. “Preprint of "is Accurate, Positive, or Inflated Self-perception Most Advantageous for Psychological Adjustment? A Competitive Test of Key Hypotheses"”. PsyArXiv. April 15. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/9W3BH. Final version: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116(5), 835-859. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000204

Abstract: Empirical research on the (mal-)adaptiveness of favorable self-perceptions, self-enhancement, and self-knowledge has typically applied a classical null-hypothesis testing approach and provided mixed and even contradictory findings. Using data from five studies (laboratory and field, total N = 2,823), we employed an information-theoretic approach combined with Response Surface Analysis to provide the first competitive test of six popular hypotheses: that more favorable self-perceptions are adaptive versus maladaptive (Hypotheses 1 and 2: Positivity of self-view hypotheses), that higher levels of self-enhancement (i.e., a higher discrepancy of self-viewed and objectively assessed ability) are adaptive versus maladaptive (Hypotheses 3 and 4: Self-enhancement hypotheses), that accurate self-perceptions are adaptive (Hypothesis 5: Self-knowledge hypothesis), and that a slight degree of self-enhancement is adaptive (Hypothesis 6: Optimal margin hypothesis). We considered self-perceptions and objective ability measures in two content domains (reasoning ability, vocabulary knowledge) and investigated six indicators of intra- and interpersonal psychological adjustment. Results showed that most adjustment indicators were best predicted by the positivity of self-perceptions, there were some specific self-enhancement effects, and evidence generally spoke against the self-knowledge and optimal margin hypotheses. Our results highlight the need for comprehensive simultaneous tests of competing hypotheses. Implications for the understanding of underlying processes are discussed.

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Altogether, the SK Hypothesis (Self-Knowledge H.) was unable to compete against the other hypotheses for any of the regarded outcome categories: Each analysis suggested that it was unlikely that SK effects underlie the empirical data.19 That is, persons with accurate knowledge of their intelligence did not seem to be better adjusted than persons with less accurate self-perceptions (Allport, 1937; Higgins, 1996; Jahoda, 1958). Similarly, our findings did not support the conjecture that persons who see their intelligence slightly more positively than it really is are better adjusted (OM Hypothesis; Baumeister, 1989).


Conclusions
In the present article, we theoretically disentangled all central hypotheses on the adaptiveness of self-perceptions, highlighted the need for a simultaneous empirical evaluation of these hypotheses, presented a methodological framework to this aim, and employed it to five substantive datasets. With some exceptions, the rule “the higher self-perceived intelligence, the better adjusted” seemed to hold for most outcomes we considered. By contrast, we found that individual differences in neither the accuracy of self-perceptions nor an optimal margin of self-viewed versus real ability predicted intra- or interpersonal adjustment. Similarly, intellectual self-enhancement was largely found to be unrelated to the considered adjustment indicators, with two exceptions (i.e., SE concerning reasoning ability seemed detrimental for peer-perceived communal attributes; SE concerning vocabulary knowledge seemed beneficial for some self-perceived adjustment indicators). We hope that future research will make use of the approach outlined here to replicate and extend our results, thereby shedding more light on the intra- and interpersonal consequences of self-perceptions.