Participants compete individually or in teams, arbitrarily assigned, or based on their political party, Democrats against Republicans. People shirked on both teams: Participants exerted less effort in teams than in individual competition

Pulling for the team: Competition between political partisans. Lingbo Huang, Peter DeScioli, Zahra Murad. http://pdescioli.com/papers/huang.descioli.murad.political.tug.of.war.draft.2018.pdf

Abstract: At every level of politics, people form groups to compete for power and resources, including political parties, special interest groups, and international coalitions. Here we use economic experiments to investigate how people balance the desire for their group’s victory versus their own expenditure of effort. We design an economic tug of war in which the side that exerts greater effort wins a reward. In Experiment 1, participants compete individually or in teams, which were assigned arbitrarily. In Experiment 2, participants compete individually or in teams based on their political party, Democrats against Republicans. In both experiments, we find that people shirked on teams: Participants exerted less effort in teams than in individual competition. The results support theories about free-riding in groups, and they depart from theories about the automatic potency of partisan motives. We discuss why it is difficult for groups, including political partisans, to mobilize toward a common goal.

Keywords: group competition, political partisanship, contest theory, shirking, free-riding