Again, "no evidence of loss aversion": Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation

Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation. Gary Charness, Celia Blanco-Jimenez, Lara Ezquerra, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara. Experimental Economics, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-018-9584-1

Abstract: We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports determine financial gains or losses (in different treatments). We find no evidence of loss aversion in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings, we find evidence of less cheating, particularly in the loss setting; in fact, there is no significant difference in behavior between the non-incentivized case and the loss setting with money manipulation. We interpret our findings in terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust and beliefs in the gain and the loss frames.

h/t: Rolf Degen https://twitter.com/DegenRolf