Self-reports of felt emotion were delayed relative to reports of event-directed moral judgments (e.g. badness) & were no faster than person-directed moral judgments (e.g. blame), challenging theories arguing that moral judgments are made on the basis of reflecting on affective states

Cusimano, Corey J., Stuti Thapa Magar and Bertram F. Malle. “Judgment Before Emotion: People Access Moral Evaluations Faster than Affective States.” CogSci (2017). http://research.clps.brown.edu/SocCogSci/Publications/Pubs/Cusimano%20ThapaMagar%20&%20Malle%202017%20CogSci.pdf

Abstract: Theories about the role of emotions in moral cognition make different predictions about the relative speed of moral and affective judgments: those that argue that felt emotions are causal inputs to moral judgments predict that recognition of affective states should precede moral judgments; theories that posit emotional states as the output of moral judgment predict the opposite. Across four studies, using a speeded reaction time task, we found that self-reports of felt emotion were delayed relative to reports of event-directed moral judgments (e.g. badness) and were no faster than person-directed moral judgments (e.g. blame). These results pose a challenge to prominent theories arguing that moral judgments are made on the basis of reflecting on affective states.

Keywords: affect, emotion, moral judgment, reaction time