Subjects are more willing to lie through a delegate than to lie directly

Lying Through Others: Does Delegation Promote Deception? Glynis Gawn RobertInnes. Journal of Economic Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.08.005

Highlights
•    Studies how delegation affects lie aversion.
•    Controls for other economic channels by which delegation can affect deception.
•    Presents classroom experiments involving black and white lies.
•    Finds that subjects are more willing to lie through a delegate than to lie directly.

Abstract: How do agency relationships affect an individual’s willingness to lie for monetary advantage? Does lie aversion decline if a lie (or truth) is sent through an agent, rather than sent directly by the individual? In a recent paper, Erat (2013) shows that a significant proportion of his subjects prefer to delegate a deception decision. We present experiments designed to focus on one of several possible explanations for this intriguing behavior – that delegation reduces lie aversion. The experiments reveal that subjects are more willing to lie through a delegate than to lie directly despite controlling for potential effects of delegated decision-making on preferences over payoffs, probabilities of actions, and/or the desire to avoid taking a decision.