I’m not the person I used to be: Bad actions that happened further in the past are more morally wrong than those that happened more recently

Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(6), 884-895. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317

Abstract: People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which other people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore, people judge those actions that happened further in the past to be more morally wrong than those that happened more recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they believed that they were very different people than they are now, participants judge their actions to be more morally wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of their pasts when they believed that they were very similar to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in relation to theories about the function of autobiographical memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving the self over time.


Check also The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations and response decision judgements. Beverley Garrigan, Anna L.R. Adlam, Peter E. Langdon. Brain and Cognition, Volume 108, October 2016, Pages 88-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.07.007

Corrigendum to “The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations and response decision judgements” in Brain and Cognition, Volume 111, February 2017, Pages 104-106

Highlights
•    We compared brain activation when making your own moral decision or when evaluating another’s decision.
•    We included 28 experiments and used activation likelihood estimate analysis.
•    The left middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and medial frontal gyrus was active for both types of decisions.
•    Making your own decision also activated the left and right middle temporal gyrus and the right precuneus.
•    Making a decision about yourself involves additional brain areas.

Abstract: The aims of this systematic review were to determine: (a) which brain areas are consistently more active when making (i) moral response decisions, defined as choosing a response to a moral dilemma, or deciding whether to accept a proposed solution, or (ii) moral evaluations, defined as judging the appropriateness of another’s actions in a moral dilemma, rating moral statements as right or wrong, or identifying important moral issues; and (b) shared and significantly different activation patterns for these two types of moral judgements. A systematic search of the literature returned 28 experiments. Activation likelihood estimate analysis identified the brain areas commonly more active for moral response decisions and for moral evaluations. Conjunction analysis revealed shared activation for both types of moral judgement in the left middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and medial frontal gyrus. Contrast analyses found no significant clusters of increased activation for the moral evaluations-moral response decisions contrast, but found that moral response decisions additionally activated the left and right middle temporal gyrus and the right precuneus. Making one’s own moral decisions involves different brain areas compared to judging the moral actions of others, implying that these judgements may involve different processes.