Passive Facebook-Nutzung, selektive Selbstdarstellung und negative Wahrnehmungen des eigenen Lebens: Mehrgruppen Cross-Lagged Panelanalysen zu differentiellen Effekten im Kontext psychologischen Wohlbefindens. Sebastian Scherr, Marlene Schmitt. In: M&K Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, Seite 58 - 74, Jahrgang 66 (2018), Heft 1, DOI 10.5771/1615-634X-2018-1-58
Abstract: We discuss findings from an online panel survey (n = 514) investigating the influence of symptoms of depression on the passive use of Facebook, as well as on selective self-presentation, and on negative perceptions of life over the course of one year. Drawing on multigroup cross-lagged panel analyses, the results of the study show that a depressive symptomatology is associated with negative perceptions of life that result from the viewing of other users’ photos. Contrary to many previous findings, selective self-presentation gained importance and increased passive forms of Facebook use as well as negative perceptions of life in the group of users with a severe depressive symptomatology. We discuss these findings in light of their implications for social media use in the course of a depression.
Friday, January 26, 2018
We explored crowdsourced ratings as a strategy to curb unrealistic optimism in advisors. Instead of calibrating expectations, these ratings propagated and exaggerated the unrealistic optimism
Leong, Y. C., & Zaki, J. (2018). Unrealistic optimism in advice taking: A computational account. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(2), 170-189. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000382
Abstract: Expert advisors often make surprisingly inaccurate predictions about the future, yet people heed their suggestions nonetheless. Here we provide a novel, computational account of this unrealistic optimism in advice taking. Across 3 studies, participants observed as advisors predicted the performance of a stock. Advisors varied in their accuracy, performing reliably above, at, or below chance. Despite repeated feedback, participants exhibited inflated perceptions of advisors’ accuracy, and reliably “bet” on advisors’ predictions more than their performance warranted. Participants’ decisions tightly tracked a computational model that makes 2 assumptions: (a) people hold optimistic initial expectations about advisors, and (b) people preferentially incorporate information that adheres to their expectations when learning about advisors. Consistent with model predictions, explicitly manipulating participants’ initial expectations altered their optimism bias and subsequent advice-taking. With well-calibrated initial expectations, participants no longer exhibited an optimism bias. We then explored crowdsourced ratings as a strategy to curb unrealistic optimism in advisors. Star ratings for each advisor were collected from an initial group of participants, which were then shown to a second group of participants. Instead of calibrating expectations, these ratings propagated and exaggerated the unrealistic optimism. Our results provide a computational account of the cognitive processes underlying inflated perceptions of expertise, and explore the boundary conditions under which they occur. We discuss the adaptive value of this optimism bias, and how our account can be extended to explain unrealistic optimism in other domains.
Abstract: Expert advisors often make surprisingly inaccurate predictions about the future, yet people heed their suggestions nonetheless. Here we provide a novel, computational account of this unrealistic optimism in advice taking. Across 3 studies, participants observed as advisors predicted the performance of a stock. Advisors varied in their accuracy, performing reliably above, at, or below chance. Despite repeated feedback, participants exhibited inflated perceptions of advisors’ accuracy, and reliably “bet” on advisors’ predictions more than their performance warranted. Participants’ decisions tightly tracked a computational model that makes 2 assumptions: (a) people hold optimistic initial expectations about advisors, and (b) people preferentially incorporate information that adheres to their expectations when learning about advisors. Consistent with model predictions, explicitly manipulating participants’ initial expectations altered their optimism bias and subsequent advice-taking. With well-calibrated initial expectations, participants no longer exhibited an optimism bias. We then explored crowdsourced ratings as a strategy to curb unrealistic optimism in advisors. Star ratings for each advisor were collected from an initial group of participants, which were then shown to a second group of participants. Instead of calibrating expectations, these ratings propagated and exaggerated the unrealistic optimism. Our results provide a computational account of the cognitive processes underlying inflated perceptions of expertise, and explore the boundary conditions under which they occur. We discuss the adaptive value of this optimism bias, and how our account can be extended to explain unrealistic optimism in other domains.
Moral Self-judgment Is Stronger for Future Than Past Actions
Sjastad, Hallgeir, and Roy Baumeister. 2018. “Moral Self-judgment Is Stronger for Future Than Past Actions”. PsyArXiv. January 26. psyarxiv.com/8dawm
Abstract: When, if ever, would a person want to be held responsible for his or her choices? Across four studies (N = 915), people assigned more moral responsibility to themselves for their future than their past actions. This included thinking that they should receive more blame and punishment for future misdeeds than for past ones, and more credit and reward for future good deeds than for past ones. The tendency to moralize the future more than the past was mediated by anticipating (one’s own) emotional reactions and concern about one’s reputation, which was stronger in the future as well. The findings fit the pragmatic view that people moralize the future more than the past partly to guide their choices and actions, such as by increasing their motivation to restrain selfish impulses and build long-term cooperative relationships with others. We conclude that the psychology of moral responsibility has a strong future component.
Abstract: When, if ever, would a person want to be held responsible for his or her choices? Across four studies (N = 915), people assigned more moral responsibility to themselves for their future than their past actions. This included thinking that they should receive more blame and punishment for future misdeeds than for past ones, and more credit and reward for future good deeds than for past ones. The tendency to moralize the future more than the past was mediated by anticipating (one’s own) emotional reactions and concern about one’s reputation, which was stronger in the future as well. The findings fit the pragmatic view that people moralize the future more than the past partly to guide their choices and actions, such as by increasing their motivation to restrain selfish impulses and build long-term cooperative relationships with others. We conclude that the psychology of moral responsibility has a strong future component.
Sexual Orientation and Leadership Suitability: How Being a Gay Man Affects Perceptions of Fit in Gender-Stereotyped Positions
Sexual Orientation and Leadership Suitability: How Being a Gay Man Affects Perceptions of Fit in Gender-Stereotyped Positions. Renzo J. Barrantes, A. Eaton. Sex Roles, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11199-018-0894-8
Abstract: The current set of studies examines perceptions of gay men’s fitness for leadership positions in the workplace. In two between-subjects experiments we examined the effect of a male employee’s sexuality on perceptions of his suitability for stereotypically feminine, masculine, and gender-neutral managerial positions, as well as potential mediators (perceptions of target agency and communion) and moderators (target out status) of these effects. In Study 1, 341 U.S. college student participants rated a gay male target as more communal and more suitable for feminine managerial positions than an otherwise identical heterosexual target, irrespective of his “out” status. Moreover, ratings of communion mediated the relationship between targets’ sexuality and suitability for feminine leadership. No differences between gay and heterosexual targets in targets’ agency or targets’ suitability for masculine or gender-neutral managerial positions were detected. Study 2 used a sample of 439 U.S. adults and an ambiguous target’s résumé to replicate and expand Study 1. This study provided participants with conflicting information on targets’ agency and communion, and it assessed the same dependent variables of targets’ agency, communion, and leadership suitability for various positions. Study 2 again found that ratings of communion significantly mediated the relationship between male targets’ sexuality and perceived suitability for feminine managerial roles. These findings extend previous research on perceptions of gay men in the workplace and have practical implications for being “out” at work.
Abstract: The current set of studies examines perceptions of gay men’s fitness for leadership positions in the workplace. In two between-subjects experiments we examined the effect of a male employee’s sexuality on perceptions of his suitability for stereotypically feminine, masculine, and gender-neutral managerial positions, as well as potential mediators (perceptions of target agency and communion) and moderators (target out status) of these effects. In Study 1, 341 U.S. college student participants rated a gay male target as more communal and more suitable for feminine managerial positions than an otherwise identical heterosexual target, irrespective of his “out” status. Moreover, ratings of communion mediated the relationship between targets’ sexuality and suitability for feminine leadership. No differences between gay and heterosexual targets in targets’ agency or targets’ suitability for masculine or gender-neutral managerial positions were detected. Study 2 used a sample of 439 U.S. adults and an ambiguous target’s résumé to replicate and expand Study 1. This study provided participants with conflicting information on targets’ agency and communion, and it assessed the same dependent variables of targets’ agency, communion, and leadership suitability for various positions. Study 2 again found that ratings of communion significantly mediated the relationship between male targets’ sexuality and perceived suitability for feminine managerial roles. These findings extend previous research on perceptions of gay men in the workplace and have practical implications for being “out” at work.
Drivers of Rising Housing Construction Costs: city permitting processes, design and building code requirements, workforce regulations and ordinances, procurement requirements, and environmental regulations
Perspectives: Practitioners Weigh in on Drivers of Rising Housing Construction Costs in San Francisco. Carolina Reid and Hayley Raetz | Terner Center for Housing Innovation Blog, January 2018. https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/archives/2018/01 > http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/San_Francisco_Construction_Cost_Brief_-_Terner_Center_January_2018.pdf
To provide just one example from a review of LIHTC cost certifications, in 2000, it cost approximately $265,000 per unit to build a 100-unit affordable housing building for families in the city, accounting for inflation. In 2016, a similar sized family building cost closer to $425,000 per unit, not taking into account other development costs (such as fees or the costs of capital) or changes in land values over this time period. As a result of these cost increases, developers need more subsidy for every unit, at a time when public resources for affordable housing have been dwindling.
[...]
[...] Macroeconomic conditions (including the cost of capital), labor market cycles and lack of skilled subcontractors, and trade policies (that influence the price of materials) all influence the cost of building.
But construction costs in San Francisco are also driven by local decisions and processes that are within the control of city agencies. Interviews and focus groups identified four local drivers of rising construction costs: city permitting processes, design and building code requirements, workforce regulations and ordinances, procurement (small and local business) requirements, and environmental regulations.
To provide just one example from a review of LIHTC cost certifications, in 2000, it cost approximately $265,000 per unit to build a 100-unit affordable housing building for families in the city, accounting for inflation. In 2016, a similar sized family building cost closer to $425,000 per unit, not taking into account other development costs (such as fees or the costs of capital) or changes in land values over this time period. As a result of these cost increases, developers need more subsidy for every unit, at a time when public resources for affordable housing have been dwindling.
[...]
[...] Macroeconomic conditions (including the cost of capital), labor market cycles and lack of skilled subcontractors, and trade policies (that influence the price of materials) all influence the cost of building.
But construction costs in San Francisco are also driven by local decisions and processes that are within the control of city agencies. Interviews and focus groups identified four local drivers of rising construction costs: city permitting processes, design and building code requirements, workforce regulations and ordinances, procurement (small and local business) requirements, and environmental regulations.
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