The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Small Business. Michael D. Bordo, John V. Duca. NBER Working Paper No. 24501, www.nber.org/papers/w24501
There are concerns that the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) has impeded small business lending. By increasing the fixed regulatory compliance requirements needed to make business loans and operate a bank, the DFA disproportionately reduced the incentives for all banks to make very modest loans and reduced the viability of small banks, whose small-business share of [commercial and industrial loans, C&I loans] is generally much higher than that of larger banks. Despite an economic recovery, the small loan share of C&I loans at large banks and banks with $300 or more million in assets has fallen by 9 percentage points since the DFA was passed in 2010, with the magnitude of the decline twice as large at small banks. Controlling for cyclical effects and bank size, we find that these declines in the small loan share of C&I loans are almost all statistically attributed to the change in regulatory regime. Examining Federal Reserve survey data, we find evidence that the DFA prompted a relative tightening of bank credit standards on C&I loans to small versus large firms, consistent with the DFA inducing a decline in small business lending through loan supply effects. We also empirically model the pace of business formation, finding that it had downshifted around the time when the DFA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were announced. Timing patterns suggest that business formation has more recently ticked higher, coinciding with efforts to provide regulatory relief to smaller banks via modifying rules implementing the DFA. The upturn contrasts with the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which appears to persistently restrain business formation
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Monday, April 16, 2018
Current evidence does not support that losses tend to be any more impactful than gains; why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists?
The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger than Its Gain? David Gal, Derek D Rucker. Journal of Consumer Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1047
Abstract: Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.
Check also Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/acceptable-losses-debatable-origins-of.html
Abstract: Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.
Check also Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/acceptable-losses-debatable-origins-of.html
Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion
Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-018-1013-8
Abstract: It is often claimed that negative events carry a larger weight than positive events. Loss aversion is the manifestation of this argument in monetary outcomes. In this review, we examine early studies of the utility function of gains and losses, and in particular the original evidence for loss aversion reported by Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica 47:263–291, 1979). We suggest that loss aversion proponents have over-interpreted these findings. Specifically, the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it. These findings shed light both on the inability of modern studies to reproduce loss aversion as well as a second literature arguing strongly for it.
Abstract: It is often claimed that negative events carry a larger weight than positive events. Loss aversion is the manifestation of this argument in monetary outcomes. In this review, we examine early studies of the utility function of gains and losses, and in particular the original evidence for loss aversion reported by Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica 47:263–291, 1979). We suggest that loss aversion proponents have over-interpreted these findings. Specifically, the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it. These findings shed light both on the inability of modern studies to reproduce loss aversion as well as a second literature arguing strongly for it.
Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality; similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men; similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality
The effects of similarity in the dark triad traits on the relationship quality in dating couples. Igor Kardum et al. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 131, 1 September 2018, Pages 38–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.04.020
Highlights
• Similarities in Dark Triad were examined as predictors of relationship quality.
• Profile similarity and polynomial regression analysis were used.
• Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality.
• Similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men.
• Similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality.
Abstract: The study examined the effects of similarity in the Dark Triad (DT) traits on women and men's relationship quality (RQ) by using profile similarity (PS) and polynomial regression analysis (PRA) as the methods for the assessment of partners' similarity. Participants were 100 young adult heterosexual dating couples. The effects of similarity in the DT traits on RQ were somewhat different depending on different methods used as well as whether we considered women or men's RQ. PRA showed that dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's RQ, while similarity at high levels of Machiavellianism to lower RQ in women and men. Additionally, women's RQ decreased more sharply when partners were similar at high levels of Machiavellianism. PS in narcissism was associated with higher RQ in women and men. This study suggests that different methods of assessment of (dis)similarity could add to the more thorough understanding of the associations between personality traits and relationship outcomes.
Keywords: Dark Triad traits; Personality similarity; Relationship quality; Polynomial regression; Profile similarity
Highlights
• Similarities in Dark Triad were examined as predictors of relationship quality.
• Profile similarity and polynomial regression analysis were used.
• Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality.
• Similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men.
• Similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality.
Abstract: The study examined the effects of similarity in the Dark Triad (DT) traits on women and men's relationship quality (RQ) by using profile similarity (PS) and polynomial regression analysis (PRA) as the methods for the assessment of partners' similarity. Participants were 100 young adult heterosexual dating couples. The effects of similarity in the DT traits on RQ were somewhat different depending on different methods used as well as whether we considered women or men's RQ. PRA showed that dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's RQ, while similarity at high levels of Machiavellianism to lower RQ in women and men. Additionally, women's RQ decreased more sharply when partners were similar at high levels of Machiavellianism. PS in narcissism was associated with higher RQ in women and men. This study suggests that different methods of assessment of (dis)similarity could add to the more thorough understanding of the associations between personality traits and relationship outcomes.
Keywords: Dark Triad traits; Personality similarity; Relationship quality; Polynomial regression; Profile similarity
A leftward perceptual asymmetry when judging the attractiveness of visual patterns
A leftward perceptual asymmetry when judging the attractiveness of visual patterns. Paul Rodway, Astrid Schepman, Becky Crossley & Jennifer Lee. Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1080/1357650X.2018.1461897
ABSTRACT: Perceptual judgements concerning the magnitude of a stimulus feature are typically influenced more by the left side of the stimulus than by the right side. This research examined whether the leftward bias also applies to judgements of the attractiveness of abstract visual patterns. Across four experiments participants chose between two versions of a stimulus which either had an attractive left side or an attractive right side. Experiments 1 and 2 presented artworks and experiments 3 and 4 presented wallpaper designs. In each experiment participants showed a significant bias to choose the stimulus with an attractive left side more than the stimulus with an attractive right side. The leftward bias emerged at age 10/11, was not caused by a systematic asymmetry in the perception of colourfulness or complexity, and was stronger when the difference in attractiveness between the left and right sides was larger. The results are relevant to the aesthetics of product and packaging design and show that leftward biases extend to the perceptual judgement of everyday items. Possible causes of the leftward bias for attractiveness judgements are discussed and it is suggested that the size of the bias may not be a measure of the degree of hemispheric specialization.
KEYWORDS: Pseudoneglect, aesthetics, asymmetry, activation model, chimeric
ABSTRACT: Perceptual judgements concerning the magnitude of a stimulus feature are typically influenced more by the left side of the stimulus than by the right side. This research examined whether the leftward bias also applies to judgements of the attractiveness of abstract visual patterns. Across four experiments participants chose between two versions of a stimulus which either had an attractive left side or an attractive right side. Experiments 1 and 2 presented artworks and experiments 3 and 4 presented wallpaper designs. In each experiment participants showed a significant bias to choose the stimulus with an attractive left side more than the stimulus with an attractive right side. The leftward bias emerged at age 10/11, was not caused by a systematic asymmetry in the perception of colourfulness or complexity, and was stronger when the difference in attractiveness between the left and right sides was larger. The results are relevant to the aesthetics of product and packaging design and show that leftward biases extend to the perceptual judgement of everyday items. Possible causes of the leftward bias for attractiveness judgements are discussed and it is suggested that the size of the bias may not be a measure of the degree of hemispheric specialization.
KEYWORDS: Pseudoneglect, aesthetics, asymmetry, activation model, chimeric
Does Activism in Social Science Explain Conservatives’ Distrust of Scientists?
Does Activism in Social Science Explain Conservatives’ Distrust of Scientists? Nathan Cofnas, Noah Carl, Michael A. Woodley of Menie. The American Sociologist, March 2018, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp 135–148. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12108-017-9362-0
Abstract: Data from the General Social Survey suggest that conservatives have become less trustful of scientists since the 1970s. Gauchat argues that this is because conservatives increasingly see scientific findings as threatening to their worldview. However, the General Social Survey data concern trust in scientists, not in science. We suggest that conservatives’ diminishing trust in scientists reflects the fact that scientists in certain fields, particularly social science, have increasingly adopted a liberal-activist stance, seeking to influence public policy in a liberal direction.
Conclusion
Gauchat claimed that conservatives had less trust in "science" than liberals. We observed that he found only that they have less trust in scientists, not science, and that there is independent evidence that conservative distrust is directed toward what McCright et al. (2013) call "impact scientists" (e.g., social scientists) rather than "production scientists." We provided evidence that leading social scientists and social science organizations misrepresent research in order to influence public policy in a liberal direction, tolerate censorship of work that challenges liberal beliefs, uncritically accept dubious scientific findings that paint conservatives in an unflattering light, and practice a variety of forms of discrimination against conservative scholars. Conservatives’ recognition of this reality could explain why only 38% of conservatives in 2010, compared with 50% of liberals, said that they had "great deal of confidence" in "the scientific community" (Gauchat 2012).
Losing the trust of conservatives may not ne the only bad consequence of liberal activism in social science. Science itself is harmed. As Weber (2009:146) warned, "whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases." Today, social science is facing a "replication crisis" (Open Science Collaboration 2015): Many findings that were thought to be firmly established are turning out not to be replicable when tested more carefully. It is noteworthy that a significant number of the effects that are falling victim to the replication crisis either supported liberalism or were somehow unflattering to conservatives. "Stereotype threat" is perhaps the most striking example. Since stereotype threat was proposed to explain gaps in the test scores of blacks and Whites more than two decades ago (Steele and Aronson 1995), it has become one of the primary liberal explanations for group differences in performance and has spawned many thousands of follow-up studies. Yet it may turn out that it was all a mistake—a consequence of publication bias and questionable research methods (Ganley et al. 2013; Jussim 2015). Other studies that could not be replicated,while not being explicitly anti-conservative, subtly support liberal ideas or cast conservatives in a bad light. For example, studies that could not be replicated include one where people "increased their endorsement of a current social system after being exposed to money" and another where Americans became more conservative after seeing a U.S. flag (Yong 2013). The former makes money seem to be bad thing, in line with liberal skepticism of capitalism. The latter suggests that conservatism is a primal reaction to tribal symbols. Virtually none of the non-replicable effects were at all favorable to conservatism. This suggests that findings that might favor conservatism are scrutinized much more carefully than those that favor liberalism—if they are not censored or rejected for explicitly moral reasons (e.g., Gardner 2001; Sternberg 2005).
In the past few years, a number of social scientists, led by Jonathan Haidt, have called upon social scientists to diversify the field and make a conscious effort to root out liberal bias (Duarte et al. 2015). We conclude with a prediction: If social scientists begin counteracting liberal activism, the trend of lowering conservative trust in scientists will reverse.
Abstract: Data from the General Social Survey suggest that conservatives have become less trustful of scientists since the 1970s. Gauchat argues that this is because conservatives increasingly see scientific findings as threatening to their worldview. However, the General Social Survey data concern trust in scientists, not in science. We suggest that conservatives’ diminishing trust in scientists reflects the fact that scientists in certain fields, particularly social science, have increasingly adopted a liberal-activist stance, seeking to influence public policy in a liberal direction.
Conclusion
Gauchat claimed that conservatives had less trust in "science" than liberals. We observed that he found only that they have less trust in scientists, not science, and that there is independent evidence that conservative distrust is directed toward what McCright et al. (2013) call "impact scientists" (e.g., social scientists) rather than "production scientists." We provided evidence that leading social scientists and social science organizations misrepresent research in order to influence public policy in a liberal direction, tolerate censorship of work that challenges liberal beliefs, uncritically accept dubious scientific findings that paint conservatives in an unflattering light, and practice a variety of forms of discrimination against conservative scholars. Conservatives’ recognition of this reality could explain why only 38% of conservatives in 2010, compared with 50% of liberals, said that they had "great deal of confidence" in "the scientific community" (Gauchat 2012).
Losing the trust of conservatives may not ne the only bad consequence of liberal activism in social science. Science itself is harmed. As Weber (2009:146) warned, "whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases." Today, social science is facing a "replication crisis" (Open Science Collaboration 2015): Many findings that were thought to be firmly established are turning out not to be replicable when tested more carefully. It is noteworthy that a significant number of the effects that are falling victim to the replication crisis either supported liberalism or were somehow unflattering to conservatives. "Stereotype threat" is perhaps the most striking example. Since stereotype threat was proposed to explain gaps in the test scores of blacks and Whites more than two decades ago (Steele and Aronson 1995), it has become one of the primary liberal explanations for group differences in performance and has spawned many thousands of follow-up studies. Yet it may turn out that it was all a mistake—a consequence of publication bias and questionable research methods (Ganley et al. 2013; Jussim 2015). Other studies that could not be replicated,while not being explicitly anti-conservative, subtly support liberal ideas or cast conservatives in a bad light. For example, studies that could not be replicated include one where people "increased their endorsement of a current social system after being exposed to money" and another where Americans became more conservative after seeing a U.S. flag (Yong 2013). The former makes money seem to be bad thing, in line with liberal skepticism of capitalism. The latter suggests that conservatism is a primal reaction to tribal symbols. Virtually none of the non-replicable effects were at all favorable to conservatism. This suggests that findings that might favor conservatism are scrutinized much more carefully than those that favor liberalism—if they are not censored or rejected for explicitly moral reasons (e.g., Gardner 2001; Sternberg 2005).
In the past few years, a number of social scientists, led by Jonathan Haidt, have called upon social scientists to diversify the field and make a conscious effort to root out liberal bias (Duarte et al. 2015). We conclude with a prediction: If social scientists begin counteracting liberal activism, the trend of lowering conservative trust in scientists will reverse.