From February 2017: Christian Self-Enhancement. Jochen E Gebauer, Constantine Sedikides, Alexandra Schrade. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 113(5), 10.1037/pspp0000140
Abstract> People overestimate themselves in domains that are central to their self-concept. Critically, the psychological status of this “self-centrality principle” remains unclear. One view regards the principle as an inextricable part of human nature and, thus, as universal and resistant to normative pressure. A contrasting view regards the principle as liable to pressure (and subsequent modification) from self-effacement norms, thus questioning its universality. Advocates of the latter view point to Christianity’s robust self-effacement norms, which they consider particularly effective in curbing self-enhancement, and ascribe Christianity an ego-quieting function. Three sets of studies examined the self-centrality principle among Christians. Studies 1A and 1B (N = 2,118) operationalized self-enhancement as better-than-average perceptions on the domains of commandments of faith (self-centrality: Christians ≫ nonbelievers) and commandments of communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers). Studies 2A–2H (N = 1,779) operationalized self-enhancement as knowledge overclaiming on the domains of Christianity (self-centrality: Christians ≫ nonbelievers), communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers), and agency (self-centrality: Christians ≈ nonbelievers). Studies 3A–3J (N = 1,956) operationalized self-enhancement as grandiose narcissism on the domains of communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers) and agency (self-centrality: Christians ≈ nonbelievers). The results converged across studies, yielding consistent evidence for Christian self-enhancement. Relative to nonbelievers, Christians self-enhanced strongly in domains central to the Christian self-concept. The results also generalized across countries with differing levels of religiosity. Christianity does not quiet the ego. The self-centrality principle is resistant to normative pressure, universal, and rooted in human nature.
Bipartisan Alliance, a Society for the Study of the US Constitution, and of Human Nature, where Republicans and Democrats meet.
Monday, May 21, 2018
Rational Learners or Biased Believers: How do children form beliefs in a motivated reasoning context?
Rational Learners or Biased Believers: How do children form beliefs in a motivated reasoning context? Prachi Solanki, Zachary Horne. https://www.cognitionasu.org/s/Evidence-Assimilation-CogSci2018.pdf
Abstract: We often believe what we want, regardless of the available evidence. When evidence confirms our beliefs, we are ready to accept it, but we are skeptical of new evidence when it impugns our beliefs. Researchers have examined the factors that influence how people integrate evidence into their existing beliefs; however, it is unclear what the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation is. This may be particularly true in situations in which evidence runs contrary to a child’s motivations. In this study, we examined the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation with children between the ages of 4 and 12 years old. Using a simple judgment task, we tested how children responded to different distributions of evidence for a proposition when they were motivated to believe that proposition was not true. Our results suggest that children accurately tracked the available evidence, even when it was incongruent with what they were motivated to believe.
Keywords: evidence assimilation; motivated reasoning, development, cognition
Abstract: We often believe what we want, regardless of the available evidence. When evidence confirms our beliefs, we are ready to accept it, but we are skeptical of new evidence when it impugns our beliefs. Researchers have examined the factors that influence how people integrate evidence into their existing beliefs; however, it is unclear what the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation is. This may be particularly true in situations in which evidence runs contrary to a child’s motivations. In this study, we examined the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation with children between the ages of 4 and 12 years old. Using a simple judgment task, we tested how children responded to different distributions of evidence for a proposition when they were motivated to believe that proposition was not true. Our results suggest that children accurately tracked the available evidence, even when it was incongruent with what they were motivated to believe.
Keywords: evidence assimilation; motivated reasoning, development, cognition