Morality Is for Choosing Sides. Peter DeScioli, Robert Kurzban. descioli.com/papers/descioli.kurzban.morality.choosing.sides.atlas18.pdf
Arguably still worse for altruism theories are moral rules that guarantee welfare losses. Across cultures, moral rules prohibit any number of victimless, mutually profitable transactions. Historically, an obvious example is the prohibition against charging interest, which preventts mutuaally profitable loans. In India, the prohibition against killing cows has long caused substantial harms (Suri, 2015). Any number of similar rules con. tinue to undermine potential welfare gains.
We suggest that the tremendous array of data showing that people's judgments are deontological, along witlh the ubiquity of welfare-destroying moral rules, all constitute serious evidence against welfare-based theories of morality. The side-taking hypothesis does not run afoul of these problems. This theory requires that a rule is known and that its violation can be recognized by observers; because rules are for coordinated side-taking rather than welfare-enhancement, they can include a wide range of contents, including welfare-destroying contents. In short, deontological judgment is a set of observations that is, we think, fatal for welfare theories but consistent with the side-taking theory. There are several other areas of active research that provide evidence relevant to the side-taking hypothesis. First, research has found that people's tendency to moralize an issue depends on their power and alliances [...]. This evidence supports the idea that moral judgernent is a strategy that people selectively deploy depending on whether they are m1ost advantaged when others choose sides according to moral judgment, power, or alliances. Second, the side-taking theory points to impartiality as a core feature of moral judgment because it is designed as an alternative to partial alliances. Recent work on fairness judgments points to a similar role for impartiality in suppressing alliances in the context of allocating resources (Shaw, 2013). Third, the side-taking hypothesis emphasizes variability in moral rules and also people's debates and arguments about which moral rules will structure side-taking in their community. Consistent with this idea, research shows that people actively advocate for the moral rules that most advantage them over other people [...].
Thursday, July 5, 2018
Self-reports of felt emotion were delayed relative to reports of event-directed moral judgments (e.g. badness) & were no faster than person-directed moral judgments (e.g. blame), challenging theories arguing that moral judgments are made on the basis of reflecting on affective states
Cusimano, Corey J., Stuti Thapa Magar and Bertram F. Malle. “Judgment Before Emotion: People Access Moral Evaluations Faster than Affective States.” CogSci (2017). http://research.clps.brown.edu/SocCogSci/Publications/Pubs/Cusimano%20ThapaMagar%20&%20Malle%202017%20CogSci.pdf
Abstract: Theories about the role of emotions in moral cognition make different predictions about the relative speed of moral and affective judgments: those that argue that felt emotions are causal inputs to moral judgments predict that recognition of affective states should precede moral judgments; theories that posit emotional states as the output of moral judgment predict the opposite. Across four studies, using a speeded reaction time task, we found that self-reports of felt emotion were delayed relative to reports of event-directed moral judgments (e.g. badness) and were no faster than person-directed moral judgments (e.g. blame). These results pose a challenge to prominent theories arguing that moral judgments are made on the basis of reflecting on affective states.
Keywords: affect, emotion, moral judgment, reaction time
Abstract: Theories about the role of emotions in moral cognition make different predictions about the relative speed of moral and affective judgments: those that argue that felt emotions are causal inputs to moral judgments predict that recognition of affective states should precede moral judgments; theories that posit emotional states as the output of moral judgment predict the opposite. Across four studies, using a speeded reaction time task, we found that self-reports of felt emotion were delayed relative to reports of event-directed moral judgments (e.g. badness) and were no faster than person-directed moral judgments (e.g. blame). These results pose a challenge to prominent theories arguing that moral judgments are made on the basis of reflecting on affective states.
Keywords: affect, emotion, moral judgment, reaction time
Why are animate dishes so disturbing?
Why are animate dishes so disturbing? Charles Spence. International Journal of Gastronomy and Food Science, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijgfs.2018.07.001
Abstract: Most foods are relatively static on the plate. Food that moves, especially if it does so in an animate manner, captures our attention in a way that would seem to play to society's growing interest with ‘food porn’. At the same time, however, most diners appear to find such movement on the plate or in the bowl rather disconcerting to say the very least. Such animacy may be aversive, ‘horrifying’, in fact, being a term that one sometimes sees used in this context. According to one suggestion, this may be because of a primordial fear of asphyxiation on eating food that still has the capacity to move of its own volition. According to others, however, there may also be something of a taboo around harming living things that many meat eaters try to mitigate by, for example, not calling the animals they eat by the name of the beast: Think steak or beef for cow and pork chop or bacon for pig. It may simply be that it is harder to suppress such thoughts related to the life that was lost, what some call the ‘meat paradox’, when food is animate. The breaking of some sort of taboo might also help to explain the excitement that some feel when they think about eating something that moves. In this article, I provide a brief historical overview of the diner's / chef's / advertiser's fascination with the visual transformation of food on the plate or in food advertising. I take a look at movement, both animate and inanimate, as well as other kinds of transformations, such as foods that change colour before the diner's very eyes. I also look at how technological advances are increasingly starting to offer the creative chef/food designer the opportunity to bring food to life in a way that doesn’t necessarily trigger any concerns with animal welfare, nor threaten the diner with asphyxiation.
Abstract: Most foods are relatively static on the plate. Food that moves, especially if it does so in an animate manner, captures our attention in a way that would seem to play to society's growing interest with ‘food porn’. At the same time, however, most diners appear to find such movement on the plate or in the bowl rather disconcerting to say the very least. Such animacy may be aversive, ‘horrifying’, in fact, being a term that one sometimes sees used in this context. According to one suggestion, this may be because of a primordial fear of asphyxiation on eating food that still has the capacity to move of its own volition. According to others, however, there may also be something of a taboo around harming living things that many meat eaters try to mitigate by, for example, not calling the animals they eat by the name of the beast: Think steak or beef for cow and pork chop or bacon for pig. It may simply be that it is harder to suppress such thoughts related to the life that was lost, what some call the ‘meat paradox’, when food is animate. The breaking of some sort of taboo might also help to explain the excitement that some feel when they think about eating something that moves. In this article, I provide a brief historical overview of the diner's / chef's / advertiser's fascination with the visual transformation of food on the plate or in food advertising. I take a look at movement, both animate and inanimate, as well as other kinds of transformations, such as foods that change colour before the diner's very eyes. I also look at how technological advances are increasingly starting to offer the creative chef/food designer the opportunity to bring food to life in a way that doesn’t necessarily trigger any concerns with animal welfare, nor threaten the diner with asphyxiation.
Higher IQ in adolescence was related to a younger subjective age 50 years later; this association was mediated by higher openness to experience
Higher IQ in adolescence is related to a younger subjective age in later life: Findings from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study. Yannick Stephan et al. Intelligence, Volume 69, July–August 2018, Pages 195-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2018.06.006
Highlights
• Higher IQ in adolescence was related to a younger subjective age 50 years later.
• This association was mediated by higher openness to experience.
• Higher intelligence in adolescence is a resource that promotes subjective aging.
Abstract: Subjective age predicts consequential outcomes in old age, including risk of hospitalization, dementia, and mortality. Studies investigating the determinants of subjective age have mostly focused on aging-related factors measured in adulthood and old age. Little is known about the extent to which early life factors may contribute to later life subjective age. The present study examined the prospective association between IQ in adolescence and subjective age in later life and tested education, disease burden, adult cognition, and personality traits as potential mediators. Participants (N = 4494) were drawn from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study. Data on IQ were obtained in 1957 when participants were in high school. Education, disease burden, cognition, and personality were assessed in 1992–1993, and subjective age was measured in 2011 at age 71 (SD = 0.93). Accounting for demographic factors, results revealed that higher IQ in adolescence was associated with a younger subjective age in late life. Bootstrap analysis further showed that this association was mediated by higher openness. The present study suggests that how old or young individuals feel is partly influenced by lifespan developmental processes that may begin with early life cognitive ability.
Highlights
• Higher IQ in adolescence was related to a younger subjective age 50 years later.
• This association was mediated by higher openness to experience.
• Higher intelligence in adolescence is a resource that promotes subjective aging.
Abstract: Subjective age predicts consequential outcomes in old age, including risk of hospitalization, dementia, and mortality. Studies investigating the determinants of subjective age have mostly focused on aging-related factors measured in adulthood and old age. Little is known about the extent to which early life factors may contribute to later life subjective age. The present study examined the prospective association between IQ in adolescence and subjective age in later life and tested education, disease burden, adult cognition, and personality traits as potential mediators. Participants (N = 4494) were drawn from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study. Data on IQ were obtained in 1957 when participants were in high school. Education, disease burden, cognition, and personality were assessed in 1992–1993, and subjective age was measured in 2011 at age 71 (SD = 0.93). Accounting for demographic factors, results revealed that higher IQ in adolescence was associated with a younger subjective age in late life. Bootstrap analysis further showed that this association was mediated by higher openness. The present study suggests that how old or young individuals feel is partly influenced by lifespan developmental processes that may begin with early life cognitive ability.
Momentary increases in deprivation, hunger, and boredom increased likelihood of diatary lapse types; eating at an unintended time was the only lapse type that predicted worse weight loss outcomes
Using ecological momentary assessment to better understand dietary lapse types. Stephanie P.Goldstein et al. Appetite, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2018.07.003
Abstract: Frequency of lapsing from a diet predicts weight loss failure, however previous studies have only utilized one definition of dietary lapse. No study has examined different types of lapse behaviors among individuals with overweight/obesity. The current study uses ecological momentary assessment (EMA) to examine predictors of three lapse types—eating a larger portion than intended, eating an unintended type of food, and eating at an unplanned time—in adults (N = 189; MBMI = 36.93 ± 5.83 kg/m2; 82.0% female; Mage = 51.81 ± 9.76 years) enrolled in a 12-month randomized controlled trial of two behavioral weight loss treatments. Participants completed 14 days of EMA at the start of treatment during which they indicated types of lapses that occurred with time and location of the lapse. Participants also responded to questions assessing current physical (e.g., hunger, tiredness), environmental (e.g., presence of “delicious” foods), and affective (e.g., loneliness, sadness) states at each prompt. Weight change was assessed at post-treatment. Separate generalized estimating equations were used to examine whether states prospectively predicted lapse occurrence at the next survey. Results indicated that lapse types differed significantly across time and location. Momentary increases in deprivation, hunger, and boredom increased likelihood of different lapse types. Lastly, we examined the prospective association between lapse type and weight loss. Eating at an unintended time was the only lapse type that predicted worse weight loss outcomes. Results support the theory that distinct lapse types exist, and that lapse types can be predicted by both momentary conditions and individual tendencies toward certain physical and affective states. However, not all lapse types may impact weight outcomes. Future research on behaviors that constitute dietary lapse is warranted and could inform personalized weight loss treatments.
Abstract: Frequency of lapsing from a diet predicts weight loss failure, however previous studies have only utilized one definition of dietary lapse. No study has examined different types of lapse behaviors among individuals with overweight/obesity. The current study uses ecological momentary assessment (EMA) to examine predictors of three lapse types—eating a larger portion than intended, eating an unintended type of food, and eating at an unplanned time—in adults (N = 189; MBMI = 36.93 ± 5.83 kg/m2; 82.0% female; Mage = 51.81 ± 9.76 years) enrolled in a 12-month randomized controlled trial of two behavioral weight loss treatments. Participants completed 14 days of EMA at the start of treatment during which they indicated types of lapses that occurred with time and location of the lapse. Participants also responded to questions assessing current physical (e.g., hunger, tiredness), environmental (e.g., presence of “delicious” foods), and affective (e.g., loneliness, sadness) states at each prompt. Weight change was assessed at post-treatment. Separate generalized estimating equations were used to examine whether states prospectively predicted lapse occurrence at the next survey. Results indicated that lapse types differed significantly across time and location. Momentary increases in deprivation, hunger, and boredom increased likelihood of different lapse types. Lastly, we examined the prospective association between lapse type and weight loss. Eating at an unintended time was the only lapse type that predicted worse weight loss outcomes. Results support the theory that distinct lapse types exist, and that lapse types can be predicted by both momentary conditions and individual tendencies toward certain physical and affective states. However, not all lapse types may impact weight outcomes. Future research on behaviors that constitute dietary lapse is warranted and could inform personalized weight loss treatments.
Individuals higher in gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to be reincarnated as the other sex; those older, more religious, more negative towards gays, & high higher gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to experience being the other sex even for a week
Factors Influencing Cisgender Individuals’ Interest in Experiencing Being the Other Sex. E. Sandra Byers, Kaitlyn M. Goldsmith, Amanda Miller. Gender Issues, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12147-018-9219-z
Abstract: In this study we asked people about their hypothetical interest in experiencing being the other sex as a possible means to capture their implicit gender-related attitudes and assumptions. As such, we sought to identify the extent to which gender self-confidence, openness to experience, and conservative attitudes are associated with hypothetically having this experience permanently (i.e., through reincarnation) and temporarily (i.e., for 1 week). Participants were 208 cisgender individuals (107 men, 101 women) who completed an on-line survey. A logistic regression analysis demonstrated that individuals higher in gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to be reincarnated as the other sex. A multiple regression analysis demonstrated that individuals who were older, more religious, had more negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbians, and high higher gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to experience being the other sex for a week. Gender identity, age, religiosity, and openness were not related to interest in being the other sex permanently or temporarily. These results demonstrate the potential utility of this approach for assessing implicit gender-related attitudes. They are discussed in terms of the multiple factors associated with these attitudes.
Abstract: In this study we asked people about their hypothetical interest in experiencing being the other sex as a possible means to capture their implicit gender-related attitudes and assumptions. As such, we sought to identify the extent to which gender self-confidence, openness to experience, and conservative attitudes are associated with hypothetically having this experience permanently (i.e., through reincarnation) and temporarily (i.e., for 1 week). Participants were 208 cisgender individuals (107 men, 101 women) who completed an on-line survey. A logistic regression analysis demonstrated that individuals higher in gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to be reincarnated as the other sex. A multiple regression analysis demonstrated that individuals who were older, more religious, had more negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbians, and high higher gender self-confidence were less likely to choose to experience being the other sex for a week. Gender identity, age, religiosity, and openness were not related to interest in being the other sex permanently or temporarily. These results demonstrate the potential utility of this approach for assessing implicit gender-related attitudes. They are discussed in terms of the multiple factors associated with these attitudes.
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