Orth, U., Erol, R. Y., & Luciano, E. C. (2018). Development of self-esteem from age 4 to 94 years: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000161
Abstract: To investigate the normative trajectory of self-esteem across the life span, this meta-analysis synthesizes the available longitudinal data on mean-level change in self-esteem. The analyses were based on 331 independent samples, including data from 164,868 participants. As effect size measure, we used the standardized mean change d per year. The mean age associated with the effect sizes ranged from 4 to 94 years. Results showed that average levels of self-esteem increased from age 4 to 11 years (cumulative d = 0.34; cumulative ds are relative to age 4), remained stable from age 11 to 15, increased strongly until age 30 (cumulative d = 1.05), continued to increase until age 60 (cumulative d = 1.30), peaked at age 60 and remained constant until age 70, declined slightly until age 90 (cumulative d = 1.15), and declined more strongly until age 94 (cumulative d = 0.76). Moderator analyses were conducted for the full set of samples and for the subset of samples between ages 10 to 20 years. Although the measure of self-esteem accounted for differences in effect sizes, the moderator analyses suggested that the pattern of mean-level change held across gender, country, ethnicity, sample type, and birth cohort. The meta-analytic findings clarify previously unresolved issues about the nature and magnitude of self-esteem change in specific developmental periods (i.e., childhood, adolescence, and old age) and draw a much more precise picture of the life span trajectory of self-esteem.
Bipartisan Alliance, a Society for the Study of the US Constitution, and of Human Nature, where Republicans and Democrats meet.
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
Mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups; agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution, and substantially lower in its presence; this effect was large and not moderated by a range of variables, including education and elaboration
The source attribution effect: Demonstrating pernicious disagreement between ideological groups on non-divisive aphorisms. Paul H.P.Hanel et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 79, November 2018, Pages 51-63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.002
Highlights
• We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups.
• Across four studies (N = 2182), agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution.
• Agreement was substantially lower in the presence of source attribution.
• For example, atheists agreed less, and Christians more, with brief aphorisms presented as Bible verses.
• This effect was large and not moderated by a range of variables, including education and elaboration.
Abstract: We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups, even on consensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N = 2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK) agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician belonging to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were presented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution effect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identification with the ingroup, trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources powerfully affects reasoning about their arguments.
Highlights
• We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups.
• Across four studies (N = 2182), agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution.
• Agreement was substantially lower in the presence of source attribution.
• For example, atheists agreed less, and Christians more, with brief aphorisms presented as Bible verses.
• This effect was large and not moderated by a range of variables, including education and elaboration.
Abstract: We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups, even on consensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N = 2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK) agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician belonging to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were presented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution effect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identification with the ingroup, trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources powerfully affects reasoning about their arguments.
In all technological fields, the number of patents per inventor has declined near-monotonically, except for large increases in inventor productivity in software and semiconductors in the late 1990s
Some Facts of High-Tech Patenting. Michael Webb, Nick Short, Nicholas Bloom, Josh Lerner. NBER Working Paper No. 24793, http://www.nber.org/papers/w24793
Patenting in software, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence has grown rapidly in recent years. Such patents are acquired primarily by large US technology firms such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, and HP, as well as by Japanese multinationals such as Sony, Canon, and Fujitsu. Chinese patenting in the US is small but growing rapidly, and world-leading for drone technology. Patenting in machine learning has seen exponential growth since 2010, although patenting in neural networks saw a strong burst of activity in the 1990s that has only recently been surpassed. In all technological fields, the number of patents per inventor has declined near-monotonically, except for large increases in inventor productivity in software and semiconductors in the late 1990s. In most high-tech fields, Japan is the only country outside the US with significant US patenting activity; however, whereas Japan played an important role in the burst of neural network patenting in the 1990s, it has not been involved in the current acceleration. Comparing the periods 1970-89 and 2000-15, patenting in the current period has been primarily by entrant assignees, with the exception of neural networks.
Patenting in software, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence has grown rapidly in recent years. Such patents are acquired primarily by large US technology firms such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, and HP, as well as by Japanese multinationals such as Sony, Canon, and Fujitsu. Chinese patenting in the US is small but growing rapidly, and world-leading for drone technology. Patenting in machine learning has seen exponential growth since 2010, although patenting in neural networks saw a strong burst of activity in the 1990s that has only recently been surpassed. In all technological fields, the number of patents per inventor has declined near-monotonically, except for large increases in inventor productivity in software and semiconductors in the late 1990s. In most high-tech fields, Japan is the only country outside the US with significant US patenting activity; however, whereas Japan played an important role in the burst of neural network patenting in the 1990s, it has not been involved in the current acceleration. Comparing the periods 1970-89 and 2000-15, patenting in the current period has been primarily by entrant assignees, with the exception of neural networks.
Beliefs in paranormal phenomena will lead to equal amounts of respondents identifying as democrats & republicans & these beliefs in paranormal phenomena correlate with respondents feeling more fearful when it comes to real-world threats
Ferrari, Tyler James, "Paranormal Beliefs and their Effect on American Fears and Political Identification" (2018). Political Science Student Papers and Posters. 7. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/polisci_student_work/7
Abstract: Urban legends and conspiracy theories have been a cornerstone of American culture for many years, and these stories and theories have permeated into many aspects of society, from tourism to pop culture, but how have these stories and theories affected politics? Conspiracy theories and urban legends all revolve around the distrust of institutions, ranging from governments to the media, but there is very little research to indicate how beliefs in these types of phenomena affect political self-identification, and fear in realworld disasters. This paper seeks to answer the following: How do paranormal and abnormal beliefs influence political identification? And how do these beliefs influence one's fear into "real-world" events like natural disasters and terrorism? While prominent scholars like Sunstein note the causes and solutions of conspiracy theories while noting the damage they can cause to a society, there is little work done to see what types of voters these people are, this is something this paper aims to find. This paper hypothesizes that beliefs in paranormal phenomena will lead to equal amounts of respondents identifying as democrats and republicans and these beliefs in paranormal phenomena correlate with respondents feeling more fearful when it comes to real-world threats. Using the Chapman Survey of American fears, this paper will analyze data involving beliefs in paranormal phenomena like bigfoot and aliens, beliefs that government is covering up the truth about certain events, along with respondent's political ideology and fear in real world events. It is expected that the results will match the hypotheses stated above, showing that even in an era of great partisanship, fear of the unknown and unexplained is a bipartisan affair.
Abstract: Urban legends and conspiracy theories have been a cornerstone of American culture for many years, and these stories and theories have permeated into many aspects of society, from tourism to pop culture, but how have these stories and theories affected politics? Conspiracy theories and urban legends all revolve around the distrust of institutions, ranging from governments to the media, but there is very little research to indicate how beliefs in these types of phenomena affect political self-identification, and fear in realworld disasters. This paper seeks to answer the following: How do paranormal and abnormal beliefs influence political identification? And how do these beliefs influence one's fear into "real-world" events like natural disasters and terrorism? While prominent scholars like Sunstein note the causes and solutions of conspiracy theories while noting the damage they can cause to a society, there is little work done to see what types of voters these people are, this is something this paper aims to find. This paper hypothesizes that beliefs in paranormal phenomena will lead to equal amounts of respondents identifying as democrats and republicans and these beliefs in paranormal phenomena correlate with respondents feeling more fearful when it comes to real-world threats. Using the Chapman Survey of American fears, this paper will analyze data involving beliefs in paranormal phenomena like bigfoot and aliens, beliefs that government is covering up the truth about certain events, along with respondent's political ideology and fear in real world events. It is expected that the results will match the hypotheses stated above, showing that even in an era of great partisanship, fear of the unknown and unexplained is a bipartisan affair.
Those on the left and right are equally narcissistic but differ in which dimensions drive it: the entitlement facet of narcissism is related to conservative positions, whereas exhibitionism is related to liberal values
Narcissism and Political Orientations. Peter K. Hatemi, Zoltán Fazekas. American Journal of Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12380
Abstract: The connections between narcissism and political orientations have been theorized by scholars and increasingly evoked by political parties, politicians, public intellectuals, and the media. Yet surprisingly little research has been undertaken to empirically asses the veracity of these claims. We address this lacuna by identifying the relationship between narcissism, political ideologies, and partisanship in a nationally representative sample taken days before the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Overall, we find those on the left and right are equally narcissistic. However, liberals and conservatives differ in which dimensions drive their narcissism. Specifically, we find that the entitlement facet of narcissism is uniformly related to more conservative positions, whereas exhibitionism is related to more liberal values, including political party identification. Narcissism, as a complex multidimensional construct, has an important role in understanding political ideology.
Abstract: The connections between narcissism and political orientations have been theorized by scholars and increasingly evoked by political parties, politicians, public intellectuals, and the media. Yet surprisingly little research has been undertaken to empirically asses the veracity of these claims. We address this lacuna by identifying the relationship between narcissism, political ideologies, and partisanship in a nationally representative sample taken days before the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Overall, we find those on the left and right are equally narcissistic. However, liberals and conservatives differ in which dimensions drive their narcissism. Specifically, we find that the entitlement facet of narcissism is uniformly related to more conservative positions, whereas exhibitionism is related to more liberal values, including political party identification. Narcissism, as a complex multidimensional construct, has an important role in understanding political ideology.
Questionable Research Practices prevalence in ecology: cherry picking statistically significant results 64%, p hacking 42%, and hypothesising after the results are known (HARKing) 51%. Such practices have been directly implicated in the low rates of reproducible results
Questionable research practices in ecology and evolution. Hannah Fraser et al. PLOS One, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200303
Abstract: We surveyed 807 researchers (494 ecologists and 313 evolutionary biologists) about their use of Questionable Research Practices (QRPs), including cherry picking statistically significant results, p hacking, and hypothesising after the results are known (HARKing). We also asked them to estimate the proportion of their colleagues that use each of these QRPs. Several of the QRPs were prevalent within the ecology and evolution research community. Across the two groups, we found 64% of surveyed researchers reported they had at least once failed to report results because they were not statistically significant (cherry picking); 42% had collected more data after inspecting whether results were statistically significant (a form of p hacking) and 51% had reported an unexpected finding as though it had been hypothesised from the start (HARKing). Such practices have been directly implicated in the low rates of reproducible results uncovered by recent large scale replication studies in psychology and other disciplines. The rates of QRPs found in this study are comparable with the rates seen in psychology, indicating that the reproducibility problems discovered in psychology are also likely to be present in ecology and evolution.
Abstract: We surveyed 807 researchers (494 ecologists and 313 evolutionary biologists) about their use of Questionable Research Practices (QRPs), including cherry picking statistically significant results, p hacking, and hypothesising after the results are known (HARKing). We also asked them to estimate the proportion of their colleagues that use each of these QRPs. Several of the QRPs were prevalent within the ecology and evolution research community. Across the two groups, we found 64% of surveyed researchers reported they had at least once failed to report results because they were not statistically significant (cherry picking); 42% had collected more data after inspecting whether results were statistically significant (a form of p hacking) and 51% had reported an unexpected finding as though it had been hypothesised from the start (HARKing). Such practices have been directly implicated in the low rates of reproducible results uncovered by recent large scale replication studies in psychology and other disciplines. The rates of QRPs found in this study are comparable with the rates seen in psychology, indicating that the reproducibility problems discovered in psychology are also likely to be present in ecology and evolution.
Predictors of Distinct Types of Solitude Experiences in Daily Life
By Myself and Liking It? Predictors of Distinct Types of Solitude Experiences in Daily Life. Jennifer C. Lay et al. Journal of Personality, https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12421
Abstract
Objective: Solitude is a ubiquitous experience, often confused with loneliness, yet sometimes sought out in daily life. This study aimed to identify distinct types of solitude experiences from everyday affect/thought patterns and to examine how and for whom solitude is experienced positively versus negatively.
Method: 100 community‐dwelling adults aged 50‐85 years (64% female, 56% East Asian, 36% European, 8% Other/Mixed heritage) and 50 students aged 18‐28 years (92% female, 42% East Asian, 22% European, 36% Other/Mixed) each completed approximately 30 daily life assessments over 10 days on their current and desired social situation, thoughts, and affect.
Results: Multilevel latent profile analysis identified two types of everyday solitude: one characterized by negative affect and effortful thought (negative solitude experiences) and one characterized by calm and the near‐absence of negative affect/effortful thought (positive solitude experiences). Individual differences in social self‐efficacy and desire for solitude were associated with everyday positive solitude propensity; trait self‐rumination and self‐reflection were associated with everyday negative solitude propensity.
Conclusions: This study provides a new framework for conceptualizing everyday solitude. It identifies specific affect/thought patterns that characterize distinct solitude experience clusters, and it links these clusters with well‐established individual differences. We discuss key traits associated with thriving in solitude.
Abstract
Objective: Solitude is a ubiquitous experience, often confused with loneliness, yet sometimes sought out in daily life. This study aimed to identify distinct types of solitude experiences from everyday affect/thought patterns and to examine how and for whom solitude is experienced positively versus negatively.
Method: 100 community‐dwelling adults aged 50‐85 years (64% female, 56% East Asian, 36% European, 8% Other/Mixed heritage) and 50 students aged 18‐28 years (92% female, 42% East Asian, 22% European, 36% Other/Mixed) each completed approximately 30 daily life assessments over 10 days on their current and desired social situation, thoughts, and affect.
Results: Multilevel latent profile analysis identified two types of everyday solitude: one characterized by negative affect and effortful thought (negative solitude experiences) and one characterized by calm and the near‐absence of negative affect/effortful thought (positive solitude experiences). Individual differences in social self‐efficacy and desire for solitude were associated with everyday positive solitude propensity; trait self‐rumination and self‐reflection were associated with everyday negative solitude propensity.
Conclusions: This study provides a new framework for conceptualizing everyday solitude. It identifies specific affect/thought patterns that characterize distinct solitude experience clusters, and it links these clusters with well‐established individual differences. We discuss key traits associated with thriving in solitude.