Refutations of Equivocal Claims: No Evidence for an Ironic Effect of Counterargument Number. K.H.Ecker et al. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.07.005
Abstract: This study investigated the refutation of equivocal claims using counterarguments. Common sense suggests that more counterarguments should be more effective at inducing belief change. However, some researchers have argued that in persuasive reasoning, using too many arguments might lead to counterproductive skepticism and reactance. Thus, there have been calls to actively curtail the number of counterarguments used in refutations to avoid risking an “overkill backfire effect”—an ironic strengthening of beliefs from too many counterarguments. In three experiments, we tested whether calls to limit the number of counterarguments are justified. We found that a larger number of counterarguments (between four and six) led to as much or more belief reduction compared to a smaller number of (two) counterarguments. This was not merely an effect arising from a simple numerosity heuristic, as counterarguments had to be relevant to affect beliefs: irrelevant counterarguments failed to reduce beliefs even though perceived as moderately persuasive.
Refutations of Equivocal Claims: No Evidence for an Ironic Effect of
Counterargument Number.
Thursday, September 13, 2018
People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices (confirmation bias); choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention
Confirmation Bias through Selective Overweighting of Choice-Consistent Evidence. Bharath Chandra Talluri et al. Current Biology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.07.052
Highlights
• People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices
• Talluri, Urai et al. developed a new task for probing the underlying mechanisms
• Evidence consistent with an observer’s initial choice is processed more efficiently
• This “choice-induced gain change” affects both perceptual and numerical decisions
Summary: People’s assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people’s own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5, 6, 7, 8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants’ sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.
Highlights
• People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices
• Talluri, Urai et al. developed a new task for probing the underlying mechanisms
• Evidence consistent with an observer’s initial choice is processed more efficiently
• This “choice-induced gain change” affects both perceptual and numerical decisions
Summary: People’s assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people’s own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5, 6, 7, 8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants’ sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.
People with higher IQs not only being unable to solve problems unresolved, but are in some cases unwilling to address them; higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems
Why Real-World Problems Go Unresolved and What We Can Do about It: Inferences from a Limited-Resource Model of Successful Intelligence. Robert J. Sternberg. J. Intell. 2018, 6(3), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence6030044
Abstract: In this article I suggest why a symposium is desirable on the topic of why, despite worldwide increases in IQ since the beginning of the 20th century, there are so many unresolved and dramatic problems in the world. I briefly discuss what some of these problems are, and the paradox of people with higher IQs not only being unable to solve them, but in some cases people being unwilling to address them. I suggest that higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems. I present a limited-resource model as an adjunct to the augmented theory of successful intelligence. The model suggests that increasing societal emphases on analytical abilities have displaced development and utilization of other skills, especially creative, practical, and wisdom-based ones, that better could be applied to serious world problems. I also discuss the importance of cognitive inoculation against unscrupulous and sometimes malevolent attempts to change belief systems.
Keywords: components; creativity; inoculation; intelligence; limited-resource model; wisdom
Abstract: In this article I suggest why a symposium is desirable on the topic of why, despite worldwide increases in IQ since the beginning of the 20th century, there are so many unresolved and dramatic problems in the world. I briefly discuss what some of these problems are, and the paradox of people with higher IQs not only being unable to solve them, but in some cases people being unwilling to address them. I suggest that higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems. I present a limited-resource model as an adjunct to the augmented theory of successful intelligence. The model suggests that increasing societal emphases on analytical abilities have displaced development and utilization of other skills, especially creative, practical, and wisdom-based ones, that better could be applied to serious world problems. I also discuss the importance of cognitive inoculation against unscrupulous and sometimes malevolent attempts to change belief systems.
Keywords: components; creativity; inoculation; intelligence; limited-resource model; wisdom
Deception detection advances: From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; from differences in levels of arousal to detection of cognitive processes or strategies adopted to be convincing; & from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them
Deception and truth detection when analyzing nonverbal and verbal cues. Aldert Vrij. Applied Cognitive Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3457
Summary: In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.
Summary: In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.
Brain and psychological determinants of placebo pill response in chronic pain patients
Brain and psychological determinants of placebo pill response in chronic pain patients. Etienne Vachon-Presseau, Sara E. Berger, Taha B. Abdullah, Lejian Huang, Guillermo A. Cecchi, James W. Griffith, Thomas J. Schnitzer & A. Vania Apkarian. Nature Communications, volume 9, Article number: 3397 (2018). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05859-1
Abstract: The placebo response is universally observed in clinical trials of pain treatments, yet the individual characteristics rendering a patient a ‘placebo responder’ remain unclear. Here, in chronic back pain patients, we demonstrate using MRI and fMRI that the response to placebo ‘analgesic’ pills depends on brain structure and function. Subcortical limbic volume asymmetry, sensorimotor cortical thickness, and functional coupling of prefrontal regions, anterior cingulate, and periaqueductal gray were predictive of response. These neural traits were present before exposure to the pill and most remained stable across treatment and washout periods. Further, psychological traits, including interoceptive awareness and openness, were also predictive of the magnitude of response. These results shed light on psychological, neuroanatomical, and neurophysiological principles determining placebo response in RCTs in chronic pain patients, and they suggest that the long-term beneficial effects of placebo, as observed in clinical settings, are partially predictable.
Abstract: The placebo response is universally observed in clinical trials of pain treatments, yet the individual characteristics rendering a patient a ‘placebo responder’ remain unclear. Here, in chronic back pain patients, we demonstrate using MRI and fMRI that the response to placebo ‘analgesic’ pills depends on brain structure and function. Subcortical limbic volume asymmetry, sensorimotor cortical thickness, and functional coupling of prefrontal regions, anterior cingulate, and periaqueductal gray were predictive of response. These neural traits were present before exposure to the pill and most remained stable across treatment and washout periods. Further, psychological traits, including interoceptive awareness and openness, were also predictive of the magnitude of response. These results shed light on psychological, neuroanatomical, and neurophysiological principles determining placebo response in RCTs in chronic pain patients, and they suggest that the long-term beneficial effects of placebo, as observed in clinical settings, are partially predictable.
Social conformity: Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private; acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public; the magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases
Quantifying compliance and acceptance through public and private social conformity. Sophie Sowden et al. Consciousness and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.08.009
Highlights
• Most measures of social conformity conflate compliance and acceptance.
• Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private.
• Acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public.
• Our task reveals the presence of compliance and acceptance on a within-subject basis.
• The magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases.
Abstract: Social conformity is a class of social influence whereby exposure to the attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and beliefs towards those of the group. Compliance and acceptance are varieties of social influence distinguished on the basis of the attitude change brought about. Compliance involves public, but not private conformity, while acceptance occurs when group norms are internalised and conformity is demonstrated both in public and in private. Most contemporary paradigms measuring conformity conflate compliance and acceptance, while the few studies to have addressed this issue have done so using between-subjects designs, decreasing their sensitivity. Here we present a novel task which measures compliance and acceptance on a within-subjects basis. Data from a small sample reveal that compliance and acceptance can co-occur, that compliance is increased with an increasing majority, and demonstrate the usefulness of the task for future studies of conformity.
Highlights
• Most measures of social conformity conflate compliance and acceptance.
• Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private.
• Acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public.
• Our task reveals the presence of compliance and acceptance on a within-subject basis.
• The magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases.
Abstract: Social conformity is a class of social influence whereby exposure to the attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and beliefs towards those of the group. Compliance and acceptance are varieties of social influence distinguished on the basis of the attitude change brought about. Compliance involves public, but not private conformity, while acceptance occurs when group norms are internalised and conformity is demonstrated both in public and in private. Most contemporary paradigms measuring conformity conflate compliance and acceptance, while the few studies to have addressed this issue have done so using between-subjects designs, decreasing their sensitivity. Here we present a novel task which measures compliance and acceptance on a within-subjects basis. Data from a small sample reveal that compliance and acceptance can co-occur, that compliance is increased with an increasing majority, and demonstrate the usefulness of the task for future studies of conformity.
The truth about tattoos: The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks
The truth about tattoos. Bradley J. Ruffle, Anne E. Wilson. Economics Letters, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.024
Highlights
• The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks.
• Results are robust to controls for socio-demo and number and placement of tattoos.
• Few subjects cheat maximally in either the low-or high-stakes task.
• Strategic cheating is limited to a small minority of subjects.
Abstract: Despite their ubiquity, tattoos continue to be associated with dishonesty. Notwithstanding, we find few differences in the reporting behavior of tattooed and non-tattooed individuals in either a low-stakes or a high-stakes honesty-detection task.
Highlights
• The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks.
• Results are robust to controls for socio-demo and number and placement of tattoos.
• Few subjects cheat maximally in either the low-or high-stakes task.
• Strategic cheating is limited to a small minority of subjects.
Abstract: Despite their ubiquity, tattoos continue to be associated with dishonesty. Notwithstanding, we find few differences in the reporting behavior of tattooed and non-tattooed individuals in either a low-stakes or a high-stakes honesty-detection task.
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