Conversion To Buddhism Has Brought Literacy, Gender Equality And Well-Being To Dalits. Manu Moudgil, IndiaSpend, July 1, 2017. www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/conversion-to-buddhism-has-brought-literacy-gender-equality-and-well-being-to-dalits-18224
There are more than 8.4 million Buddhists in India and 87% of them are converts from other religions, mostly Dalits who changed religion to escape Hindu caste oppression. The remaining 13% of Buddhists belong to traditional communities of the north-east and northern Himalayan regions.
Today, these converts to Buddhism–also called neo-Buddhists–enjoy better literacy rates, greater work participation and sex ratio than Scheduled Caste Hindus, the group from which most converts emerge, according to an IndiaSpend analysis of 2011 Census data.
Given that converts make for 87% of the Buddhist population in India and most of them are Dalits, our analysis goes with the assumption that the benefits of growth in the community accrue mostly to the Dalits.
Buddhists have a literacy rate of 81.29%, higher than the national average of 72.98%, according to Census data [http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html]. The literacy rate among Hindus is 73.27% while Scheduled Castes have a lower literacy rate of 66.07%.
“Most Dalits at the senior levels of administration are Buddhists,” said Satpal Tanwar, a leader of Bhim Army, the activist organisation accused of the Saharanpur violence of May 5, 2017, and now mulling mass conversion of Dalits to Buddhism. “This is because Buddhism lends them self-confidence as compared to the caste system which tends to rationalise their low social status through vague concepts like bad karma.”
Better literacy rates
It is only in the traditional communities of the northeast, especially in Mizoram (48.11%) and Arunachal Pradesh (57.89%), that Buddhists have a lower literacy rate than the population average.
On the other hand, Chhattisgarh (87.34%), Maharashtra (83.17%) and Jharkhand (80.41%) have the most number of literate Buddhists. The conversion movement has been the strongest in Maharashtra, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh.
[full article with maps and links in the URL above]
h/ t: anonymous contributor
Friday, September 14, 2018
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning): Acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies)
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning), in Smart Is asStupid Does: Exploring bases of erroneous reasoning of smart people regarding learning and other disabilities. Elena L. Grigorenko & Donna Lockery, chp 8 in Why smart people can be so stupid, Robert J. Sternberg (ed.). Cambridge, MA: Yale University, 2002.
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning). Excerpt.
This fallacy refers to a type of reasoning, the structure and content of which changes depending on the position from which the arguing is done. The fallacy invokes the acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies). As an illustration of this fallacy, consider the following.
The City of Manchester Democratic Party Committee endorsed Peter Leonard, a fifty-three-year-old man with a specific reading disability who had an IQ of 80 and reading skills at a third-grade level (Good Morning America, Mar. 19, 1998). Mr. Leonard had won a seat on the Manchester school board. The city’s Republican leader, Marc Pappas, said that Leonard was a nice man who had the best intentions, but he questioned whether Leonard would be able to represent his constituents adequately. What is noteworthy, however, is that Pappas admitted that if Leonard had been a Republican with this same learning disability, the Republicans would have supported him (Union Leader, Nov. 12, 1999).
Here, while reasoning as a Republican opposing a Democratic Party candidate, Mr. Pappas questioned the quality of the candidate—the concern being not whether Mr. Leonard did or did not have a learning disability, but whether he could represent his constituents adequately. Mr. Pappas’s reasoning changed, however, when he was asked what he and his party colleagues would do were Mr. Leonard a Republican. Put in this conditional position, Mr. Pappas did not bring up the question of Mr. Leonard’s personal qualities but concentrated instead on his group membership. This kind of reasoning, which stresses the importance of being correctly a≈liated politically rather than of making justified and consistent inferences following common sense, is quite e√ective in creating the stereotype according to which people with learning disabilities will be given special considerations.
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning). Excerpt.
This fallacy refers to a type of reasoning, the structure and content of which changes depending on the position from which the arguing is done. The fallacy invokes the acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies). As an illustration of this fallacy, consider the following.
The City of Manchester Democratic Party Committee endorsed Peter Leonard, a fifty-three-year-old man with a specific reading disability who had an IQ of 80 and reading skills at a third-grade level (Good Morning America, Mar. 19, 1998). Mr. Leonard had won a seat on the Manchester school board. The city’s Republican leader, Marc Pappas, said that Leonard was a nice man who had the best intentions, but he questioned whether Leonard would be able to represent his constituents adequately. What is noteworthy, however, is that Pappas admitted that if Leonard had been a Republican with this same learning disability, the Republicans would have supported him (Union Leader, Nov. 12, 1999).
Here, while reasoning as a Republican opposing a Democratic Party candidate, Mr. Pappas questioned the quality of the candidate—the concern being not whether Mr. Leonard did or did not have a learning disability, but whether he could represent his constituents adequately. Mr. Pappas’s reasoning changed, however, when he was asked what he and his party colleagues would do were Mr. Leonard a Republican. Put in this conditional position, Mr. Pappas did not bring up the question of Mr. Leonard’s personal qualities but concentrated instead on his group membership. This kind of reasoning, which stresses the importance of being correctly a≈liated politically rather than of making justified and consistent inferences following common sense, is quite e√ective in creating the stereotype according to which people with learning disabilities will be given special considerations.
How Does the World Google the Internet, Anxiety, and Happiness?
How Does the World Google the Internet, Anxiety, and Happiness? Snehasish Banerjee. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Vol. 21, No. 9, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2018.0206
Abstract: This article investigates how the world uses Google, the most popular search engine, to look for information about the “Internet” as well as two symptoms of emotional well-being, namely “anxiety” and “happiness.” Data corresponding to 202 countries were collected for a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2017 using Google Trends, a free surveillance tool that reports data from the search engine. The search volume of “Internet” was positively correlated with that of “anxiety” as well as “happiness.” Furthermore, the article analyzed if the search volumes correlated with actual emotional well-being measured using the World Happiness Index provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Life Satisfaction Index provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The search volume of “anxiety” showed positive correlations with both the indices. The results are discussed, and new directions for future research are identified.
Abstract: This article investigates how the world uses Google, the most popular search engine, to look for information about the “Internet” as well as two symptoms of emotional well-being, namely “anxiety” and “happiness.” Data corresponding to 202 countries were collected for a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2017 using Google Trends, a free surveillance tool that reports data from the search engine. The search volume of “Internet” was positively correlated with that of “anxiety” as well as “happiness.” Furthermore, the article analyzed if the search volumes correlated with actual emotional well-being measured using the World Happiness Index provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Life Satisfaction Index provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The search volume of “anxiety” showed positive correlations with both the indices. The results are discussed, and new directions for future research are identified.
Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares & unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer; diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions
Cognitions in Dreams. Patrick McNamara et al. Journal of Cognition and Culture, Volume 18, Issue 3-4, pages 428 – 450. DOI: 10.1163/15685373-12340038
Purpose: To test the hypothesis that supernatural agents (SAs) appear in nightmares and dreams in association with evidence of diminished agency within the dreamer/dream ego.
Methods: Content analyses of 120 nightmares and 71 unpleasant control dream narratives.
Results: We found that SAs overtly occur in about one quarter of unpleasant dreams and about half of nightmares. When SAs appear in a dream or nightmare they are reliably associated with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency within the dreamer occurs in over 90% of dreams (whether nightmares or unpleasant dreams) that have overt SAs. In about half of nightmare reports the SA appears suddenly with no clear emergence pattern. In some two thirds of unpleasant dreams, however, the SA emerged from a human character. The SA’s gender was indeterminate in most dreams with SAs but the SA communicated with the dreamer in 24% of nightmares and only 13% of unpleasant dreams. In most nightmares, the SA intended to harm the dreamer and in one third of nightmares the dreamer was the victim of physical agression by the SA. SA intentions in unpleasant dreams were more varied and actually benign in 13% of cases.
Conclusion: Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares and unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions.
Keywords: dreams; religious cognition; nightmares; supernatural agents; agency
Purpose: To test the hypothesis that supernatural agents (SAs) appear in nightmares and dreams in association with evidence of diminished agency within the dreamer/dream ego.
Methods: Content analyses of 120 nightmares and 71 unpleasant control dream narratives.
Results: We found that SAs overtly occur in about one quarter of unpleasant dreams and about half of nightmares. When SAs appear in a dream or nightmare they are reliably associated with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency within the dreamer occurs in over 90% of dreams (whether nightmares or unpleasant dreams) that have overt SAs. In about half of nightmare reports the SA appears suddenly with no clear emergence pattern. In some two thirds of unpleasant dreams, however, the SA emerged from a human character. The SA’s gender was indeterminate in most dreams with SAs but the SA communicated with the dreamer in 24% of nightmares and only 13% of unpleasant dreams. In most nightmares, the SA intended to harm the dreamer and in one third of nightmares the dreamer was the victim of physical agression by the SA. SA intentions in unpleasant dreams were more varied and actually benign in 13% of cases.
Conclusion: Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares and unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions.
Keywords: dreams; religious cognition; nightmares; supernatural agents; agency
Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width: The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes
My true face: Unmasking one's own face representation. Laura Mora et al. Acta Psychologica, Volume 191, November 2018, Pages 63-68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.08.014
Highlights
• Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width.
• Self-face length perception is compartmentalised into upper and bottom regions.
• The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes.
• There is an asymmetrical representation of the face, with over representation of the right hemispace.
• Face representation relies on influences from visual experience, typical body posture, frequency of use and functionality.
Abstract: Face recognition has been the focus of multiple studies, but little is still known on how we represent the structure of one's own face. Most of the studies have focused on the topic of visual and haptic face recognition, but the metric representation of different features of one's own face is relatively unknown. We investigated the metric representation of the face in young adults by developing a proprioceptive pointing task to locate face landmarks in the first-person perspective. Our data revealed a large overestimation of width for all face features which resembles, in part, the size in somatosensory cortical representation. In contrast, face length was compartmentalised in two different regions: upper (underestimated) and bottom (overestimated); indicating size differences possibly due to functionality. We also identified shifts of the location judgments, with all face areas perceived closer to the body than they really were, due to a potential influence of the self-frame of reference. More importantly, the representation of the face appeared asymmetrical, with an overrepresentation of right side of the face, due to the influence of lateralization biases for strong right-handers. We suggest that these effects may be due to functionality influences and experience that affect the construction of face structural representation, going beyond the parallel of the somatosensory homunculus.
Highlights
• Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width.
• Self-face length perception is compartmentalised into upper and bottom regions.
• The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes.
• There is an asymmetrical representation of the face, with over representation of the right hemispace.
• Face representation relies on influences from visual experience, typical body posture, frequency of use and functionality.
Abstract: Face recognition has been the focus of multiple studies, but little is still known on how we represent the structure of one's own face. Most of the studies have focused on the topic of visual and haptic face recognition, but the metric representation of different features of one's own face is relatively unknown. We investigated the metric representation of the face in young adults by developing a proprioceptive pointing task to locate face landmarks in the first-person perspective. Our data revealed a large overestimation of width for all face features which resembles, in part, the size in somatosensory cortical representation. In contrast, face length was compartmentalised in two different regions: upper (underestimated) and bottom (overestimated); indicating size differences possibly due to functionality. We also identified shifts of the location judgments, with all face areas perceived closer to the body than they really were, due to a potential influence of the self-frame of reference. More importantly, the representation of the face appeared asymmetrical, with an overrepresentation of right side of the face, due to the influence of lateralization biases for strong right-handers. We suggest that these effects may be due to functionality influences and experience that affect the construction of face structural representation, going beyond the parallel of the somatosensory homunculus.
People’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of the event: They were more upset about events that were unexpected (a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (a robbery at a convenience store)
Powell, Derek, and Zachary Horne. 2018. “Expectations Bias Moral Evaluations.” PsyArXiv. September 13. doi:10.31234/osf.io/s7fu2
Abstract: People’s expectations play an important role in their reactions to events. There is often disappointment when events fail to meet expectations and a special thrill to having one’s expectations exceeded. We propose that expectations influence evaluations through information-theoretic principles: less expected events do more to inform us about the state of the world than do more expected events. An implication of this proposal is that people may have inappropriately muted responses to morally significant but expected events. In two preregistered experiments, we found that people’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of that event. People were more upset about events that were unexpected (e.g., a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (e.g., a robbery at a convenience store). We argue that this bias has pernicious moral consequences, including leading to reduced concern for victims in most need of help.
Abstract: People’s expectations play an important role in their reactions to events. There is often disappointment when events fail to meet expectations and a special thrill to having one’s expectations exceeded. We propose that expectations influence evaluations through information-theoretic principles: less expected events do more to inform us about the state of the world than do more expected events. An implication of this proposal is that people may have inappropriately muted responses to morally significant but expected events. In two preregistered experiments, we found that people’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of that event. People were more upset about events that were unexpected (e.g., a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (e.g., a robbery at a convenience store). We argue that this bias has pernicious moral consequences, including leading to reduced concern for victims in most need of help.
Cross-national gender differences in the enrollment in & completion of science, technology, engineering, & mathematics M. Open Online Courses: Females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, but were equally likely to complete them
Cross-national comparison of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics Massive Open Online Courses. Suhang Jiang et al. PLOS One, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202463
Abstract: Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have the potential to democratize education by providing learners with access to high-quality free online courses. However, evidence supporting this democratization across countries is limited. We explored the question of MOOC democratization by conducting cross-national comparisons of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) MOOCs. We found that while females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, they were equally likely to complete them. Further, a higher probability to enroll in STEM MOOCs and smaller gender gaps in STEM MOOC enrollment and completion were found in less gender-equal and less economically developed countries.
Abstract: Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have the potential to democratize education by providing learners with access to high-quality free online courses. However, evidence supporting this democratization across countries is limited. We explored the question of MOOC democratization by conducting cross-national comparisons of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) MOOCs. We found that while females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, they were equally likely to complete them. Further, a higher probability to enroll in STEM MOOCs and smaller gender gaps in STEM MOOC enrollment and completion were found in less gender-equal and less economically developed countries.
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