Increased marriage age across these cohorts contributed to the assortative mating and thus to the rising inequality; the increase in marriage age can explain almost 80% of the increase in the assortative mating

Assortative Mating and Inequality. Alparslan Tuncay. Job Market Paper, Nov 19 2018. https://drive.google.com/file/d/165eaweyxlId9NcTYa5RxzfMEy8zoGJEY/view

Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of assortative mating based on the permanent wage (the individual-specific component of wage) in the U.S., its role in the increase in family wage inequality, and the factors behind this evolution. I first document a remarkable trend in the assortative mating, as measured by the permanent-wage correlation of couples, from 0.3 for families formed in the late 1960s to 0.52 for families formed in the late 1980s. I show that this trend accounts for more than one-third of the increase in family wage inequality across these family cohorts. I then argue that the increased marriage age across these cohorts contributed to the assortative mating and thus to the rising inequality. Individuals face a large degree of uncertainty about their permanent wages early in their careers. If they marry early, as most individuals in the late 1960s did, this uncertainty leads to weak marital sorting along permanent wage levels. But when marriage is delayed, as in the late 1980s, the sorting becomes stronger as individuals are more able to predict their likely future wages. After providing reduced-form evidence on the impact of marriage age, I build and estimate a marriage model with wage uncertainty, and show that the increase in marriage age can explain almost 80% of the increase in the assortative mating.

Body size estimation: Greater underestimation for self than other body size emerged; positive attitudes towards the self make young adults' own body size closer to the ideal body (thinner bodies were judged as more attractive)

Thinner than yourself: self-serving bias in body size estimation. Mara Mazzurega, Jlenia Marisa, Massimiliano Zampini, Francesco Pavani. Psychological Research, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-018-1119-z

Abstract: The self-serving bias is the tendency to consider oneself in unrealistically positive terms. This phenomenon has been documented for body attractiveness, but it remains unclear to what extent it can also emerge for own body size perception. In the present study, we examined this issue in healthy young adults (45 females and 40 males), using two body size estimation (BSE) measures and taking into account inter-individual differences in eating disorder risk. Participants observed pictures of avatars, built from whole body photos of themselves or an unknown other matched for gender. Avatars were parametrically distorted along the thinness–heaviness dimension, and individualised by adding the head of the self or the other. In the first BSE task, participants indicated in each trial whether the seen avatar was thinner or fatter than themselves (or the other). In the second BSE task, participants chose the best representative body size for self and other from a set of avatars. Greater underestimation for self than other body size emerged in both tasks, comparably for women and men. Thinner bodies were also judged as more attractive, in line with standard of beauty in modern western society. Notably, this self-serving bias in BSE was stronger in people with low eating disorder risk. In sum, positive attitudes towards the self can extend to body size estimation in young adults, making own body size closer to the ideal body. We propose that this bias could play an adaptive role in preserving a positive body image.

Much of theory in sociology consists of articles propounding theories that cannot be falsified, grounded in confirmation bias, crafted in a strange & inaccessible argot, appealing to pathos in the creation of a Moloch upon which to hang blame for the world’s ills

Avatars of the New Dark Age: Moloch, Magical Thinking, and the Anti-Scientific Spirit. Stanley Ridgley. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319112083

Abstract: Much of what is considered bleeding edge theory in sociology today consists of articles propounding theories that cannot be falsified, that are grounded in confirmation bias, that are crafted in a strange and inaccessible argot, and that appeal to pathos in the creation of a Moloch upon which to hang blame for the world’s ills. Any one of these contentions about modern sociological writing could and probably should be the subject of expanded study – taken together, they constitute a tendency in sociology toward a New Metaphysics. This tendency represents a profound change in the modern zeitgeist – a reversal, in fact. We are experiencing a reversal of the ascendancy of science and scientific thinking and a resurgence of medievalist magical thinking about society – how we live, how we exchange with each other, how we are governed. This essay ranges far in this regard and charts a course for further exploration. It examines the rise of the New Metaphysics and its primary means of communicating its ideas. It draws parallels between today’s new metaphysicians and those schoolmen of the middle ages, whose embrace of magic thinking was so complete that its straitened medieval orthodoxy not only hindered scientific, economic, and commercial progress, but also often punished such progress as heretical. Finally, this essay suggests that in its embrace of its own truth and with its “praxis-oriented” posture, the New Metaphysics poses a growing threat to the scholarly traditions of the university and itself constitutes a barbarous pseudo-science that begs unmasking.

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According to Popper, the central problem with “theories” of a metaphysical bent was their apparent strength – their explanatory power. This type of theory excites and impresses those exposed to it, and this can lead to a suspension of the critical faculties in favor of what we call today confirmation bias [41; 51]. Popper’s discussion of the matter:

These theories appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still ‘un-analysed’ and crying aloud for treatment. The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant stream of confirmations, of observations which ‘verified’ the theories in question; and this point was constantly emphasize by their adherents. A Marxist could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its presentation – which revealed the class bias of the paper – and especially of course in what the paper did not say.

[...]

The rebellion against scientific theory-testing has continued and, if anything, has worsened. The main problem with the path that social science has taken with regard to theory – sociology, in particular – is that theory construction is hamstrung by what we may call the “Popper Problem.” In the archipelago of niche sociological speculation, scholars have all but abandoned the notion that their theories ought to withstand the scrutiny of testing. Rather than a willingness to test rigorously various popular theories that emerged from the heyday of critical theory, which spawned a cottage industry of various “critical” subfields, we find a sort of enshrinement of verification, if not outright confirmation bias. Some subfields, such as “critical race theory,” are founded almost exclusively on confirmation bias.8 Modern theories in sociology spun from critical theory are largely not falsifiable. They are faith-based. As a method of exploration, this is not wholly objectionable. [...]

Check also comments on Irving Louis Horowitz's The Decomposition of Sociology. Article in Academic Questions 5(2):32-40. September 1994, DOI: 10.1007/BF02683271. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225367690

Cerebral blood flow changes after a day of wake, sleep, & sleep deprivation: There are morning-to-evening increases in cerebral blood flow, reversed by a night of sleep; a night of sleep deprivation is linked to further cerebral blood flow increases

Cerebral blood flow changes after a day of wake, sleep, and sleep deprivation. Torbjørn Elvsåshagen et al. NeuroImage, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.11.032

Highlights
•    How cerebral blood flow changes during the sleep-wake cycle remains to be clarified.
•    We examined cerebral blood flow after wake, sleep, and sleep deprivation.
•    There were morning-to-evening increases in cerebral blood flow.
•    These changes were reversed by a night of sleep.
•    A night of sleep deprivation was associated with further cerebral blood flow increases.

Abstract: Elucidating the neurobiological effects of sleep and wake is an important goal of the neurosciences. Whether and how human cerebral blood flow (CBF) changes during the sleep-wake cycle remain to be clarified. Based on the synaptic homeostasis hypothesis of sleep and wake, we hypothesized that a day of wake and a night of sleep deprivation would be associated with gray matter resting CBF (rCBF) increases and that sleep would be associated with rCBF decreases. Thirty-eight healthy adult males (age 22.1 ± 2.5 years) underwent arterial spin labeling perfusion magnetic resonance imaging at three time points: in the morning after a regular night's sleep, the evening of the same day, and the next morning, either after total sleep deprivation (n = 19) or a night of sleep (n = 19). All analyses were adjusted for hematocrit and head motion. rCBF increased from morning to evening and decreased after a night of sleep. These effects were most prominent in bilateral hippocampus, amygdala, thalamus, and in the occipital and sensorimotor cortices. Group × time interaction analyses for evening versus next morning revealed significant interaction in bilateral lateral and medial occipital cortices and in bilateral insula, driven by rCBF increases in the sleep deprived individuals and decreases in the sleepers, respectively. Furthermore, group × time interaction analyses for first morning versus next morning showed significant effects in medial and lateral occipital cortices, in anterior cingulate gyrus, and in the insula, in both hemispheres. These effects were mainly driven by CBF increases from TP1 to TP3 in the sleep deprived individuals. There were no associations between the rCBF changes and sleep characteristics, vigilant attention, or subjective sleepiness that remained significant after adjustments for multiple analyses. Altogether, these results encourage future studies to clarify mechanisms underlying sleep-related rCBF changes.

The Joy of Lottery Play: Lottery participation increased the happiness of participants before the draw; winning a small prize had no effect on happiness; it seems that people may not only care about the outcomes of the lottery, but also enjoy the game

The Joy of Lottery Play: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Martijn Burger, Martijn Hendriks, Emma Pleeging, Jan C. van Ours. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2018-078/V, October 23, 2018, http://papers.tinbergen.nl/18078.pdf

Abstract: We conducted a field experiment to increase our understanding of lottery participation. Using representative data for the Netherlands, we find that lottery participation increased the happiness of participants before the draw. Winning a small prize had no effect on happiness. Our results indicate that people may not only care about the outcomes of the lottery, but also enjoy the game. Accordingly, we conclude that lottery play has a utility value in itself and part of the lottery ticket is consumed before the draw.

Keywords:  lottery play, happiness, field experiment
JEL-codes:  C93, I31

Time Use and Happiness of Millionaires: Two large-scale surveys of millionaires and the general population show that millionaires spend their time in surprisingly similar ways as the general population

Time Use and Happiness of Millionaires. Paul Smeets, Rene Bekkers, Ashley V. Whillans, Michael Norton. Harvard Business School Working Paper 18-111. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/18-111_401aafe7-dede-4cf9-9d95-073eee6868da.pdf

Abstract: How do the wealthy spend their time, and does their time use relate to their greater well-being? Two large-scale surveys of millionaires and the general population show that millionaires spend their time in surprisingly similar ways as the general population. For example, millionaires spend the same amount of time as the general population cooking, shopping, and eating – and even spend more time on household chores. However, while millionaires and non-millionaires also spend the same amount of time engaging in leisure activities, a critical difference emerged: the wealthy engage in more active leisure (e.g., exercising and volunteering) and less passive leisure (e.g., watching TV and relaxing). Moreover, the extent to which wealthy individuals engage in greater active leisure helps to explain the gap in life satisfaction between millionaires and the general population. Together, these results further our unders tanding of when and how wealth translates into well-being.

Keywords: Time Use; Wealth; Life Satisfaction; Millionaires; Social Class

Touching narratives motivate to give to charity, and phylosophical arguments have difficulties in this task

Narrative but Not Philosophical Argument Motivates Giving to Charity. Eric Schwitzgebel and Christopher McVey. Provisional results, The Splintered Mind blog, Wednesday, November 21, 2018. schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2018/11/narrative-but-not-philosophical.html

We regard this as preliminary evidence that exposure to at least one type of narrative influences charitable giving, motivation, and opinion, while exposure to one common type of philosophical argument has little if any influence.