Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger? NATO is too slow of thought, decision, & foot to fight a contemporary war; on the eve of a short war, the US would put together a high-end coalition to do the fighting

Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger? Judy Dempsey. Carnegie Europe, Jan 31 2019. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78254

The same stale judgement of every single day:

Jan Techau. Senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at the German Marshal Fund of the United States
It increasingly seems so. Let’s leave the militarily weak Europeans aside for a moment. For NATO’s deterrence to be credible, only one question really matters: Is the United States fully behind its commitments? This depends on two factors. First, how much of a military footprint does the United States have in the countries it has vowed to defend? Only troops on the ground give real-life meaning to the stipulation that “an attack on one is an attack on all.” Second, how much confidence do the allies have in the U.S. president’s strategic reliability? The commander in chief matters because only he (or she) can commit troops to combat or trigger America’s nuclear arsenal.

The first metric is the smaller problem. America’s footprint in Europe is much smaller than it was twenty years ago. But Washington has recently reinvested in Europe; troop numbers are slightly up. It is the second factor that causes the headache. The current U.S. president has publicly questioned NATO’s usefulness and has had to be talked out of leaving the alliance altogether. Few people are convinced that he would go to war for Europe if need be. This lack of trust in Donald Trump is hugely corrosive for NATO’s credibility. It makes the allies nervous, and it emboldens the adversaries. Should Trump’s unreliability become a full certainty, NATO’s deterrent could soon look like a paper tiger indeed.

The reality:

Julian Lindley-French. Member of the George C. Marshall Centre-Munich Security Conference U.S.-German Loisach Group, senior fellow at the Institute for Statecraft in London, director of Europa Analytica in the Netherlands, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, and a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Paper tiger? No, more cardboard elephant. Thomas Schelling said that deterrence is the power to hurt as bargaining and best held in reserve. NATO has become a collective deterrent rather than a collective defender. On the eve of a short but violent war NATO would be the last place the Americans would turn to. Rather, as NATO continued to talk deterrence, Washington would put together a high-end coalition under its command to do the fighting.

NATO is too slow of thought, decision, and foot to fight a contemporary war. The conduct of war will become far faster with new technologies appearing in a battlespace that will stretch across air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The Russians understand this and have built a thirty-day “wham, bam, thank you Vlad” war machine that would exploit NATO’s slowness of force generation and military mobility. NATO assumes at least thirty days of warning. Adaptation is thus buttressing deterrent value by accelerating NATO’s speed of response and extending its power to hurt.  NATO could fight a short war if it had the warning, or a long war if it was given the chance. Hmmm . . .