Finding meaning in the clouds: Illusory pattern perception predicts receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit

Finding meaning in the clouds: Illusory pattern perception predicts receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit. Alexander C. Walker et al. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 2, March 2019, pp. 109-119. http://journal.sjdm.org/18/181212a/jdm181212a.html

Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception.

Keywords: pseudo-profound bullshit, bullshit receptivity, illusory pattern perception, irrational belief

1  Introduction

    “Bullshit is everywhere.” – George Carlin

This statement may be truer today than ever before, as technological advances have allowed for information to spread faster and farther than ever before. Included in this expansion of information is likely an increase in peoples’ exposure to bullshit. While many people may believe that they can reliably detect and resist bullshit, empirical findings suggest otherwise (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2015a; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling, Jost & Pennycook, 2016). For example, an initial investigation of people’s receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit by Pennycook and colleagues (2015a) demonstrated how people frequently rate these superficially impressive yet vacuous statements as profound. Furthermore, studies have reported initial evidence for how receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit relates to real-world beliefs, such as beliefs about political ideologies and candidates (Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling, Jost & Pennycook, 2016), conspiracy and supernatural beliefs (Pennycook et al. 2015a), and beliefs about the accuracy of “fake news” (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). Despite bullshit representing a real, prevalent, and consequential phenomenon, little research has been conducted on the topic. The current article furthers the investigation of pseudo-profound bullshit in two ways: First, we propose that peoples’ susceptibility to pseudo-profound bullshit arises in part as an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive behaviour, that of pattern perception; second, congruent with this proposal, we investigate whether individuals susceptible to endorsing illusory patterns are more receptive to pseudo-profound bullshit.

1.1  Pseudo-profound bullshit

Initial investigations of bullshit, specifically of the pseudo-profound variety, have utilized Frankfurt’s (2005) conception of bullshit as an absence of concern for the truth. That is, according to Frankfurt, bullshit is not about falsity but rather fakery; bullshit may be true, false, or meaningless, what makes a claim bullshit is an implied yet artificial attention to the truth. Consistent with this description of bullshit, Pennycook and colleagues (2015a) generated a list of superficially impressive statements that implied yet did not contain either truth or meaning by having a computer program randomly arrange a set of profound-sounding words in a way that maintained proper syntactic structure (see Dalton, 2016, for a comment, and Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2016, for a response).

In addition to demonstrating peoples’ receptiveness to meaningless pseudo-profound bullshit statements, Pennycook and colleagues (2015a) revealed how various individual differences were associated with bullshit receptivity. Specifically, it was found that those more receptive to bullshit were less analytic thinkers (e.g., scored lower on the Cognitive Reflection Test), scored lower in measures of cognitive ability (e.g., the Wordsum test and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices), and were more likely to hold religious, conspiratorial, and paranormal beliefs. Two mechanisms were proposed to explain participants’ endorsement of pseudo-profound bullshit. First, some participants were shown to possess a general tendency to afford any and all statements some level of profundity (e.g., mundane statements such as “Some things have very distinct smells”). The results of Pennycook and colleagues suggest that this gullible tendency towards ascribing profoundness to even the most mundane of statements is one component of bullshit receptivity. Second, individual differences in analytic thinking (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test and a “Heuristics and Biases” battery) were found to be associated with bullshit receptivity. Specifically, those with a propensity for analytic (as opposed to intuitive) thinking were found to be less receptive to pseudo-profound bullshit. Thus, another explanation put forth by Pennycook and colleagues is that individuals differ with regards to their ability to detect bullshit, with more analytic thinkers being more likely to detect and critically reflect on the presented pseudo-profound bullshit statements leading to lower ratings of profundity. The primary goal of this paper is to propose a third compatible mechanism to explain individual differences in receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit: the illusory perception of patterns.

1.2  Illusory pattern perception

The ability to perceive patterns and form meaningful connections between stimuli in our environment is clearly evolutionarily advantageous (Beck & Forstmeier, 2007; Mattson, 2014; Shermer, 2011). For example, Mattson (2014) claims that superior pattern processing capabilities are essential for a variety of higher cognitive functions (e.g., imagination and invention) and likewise, credits these capabilities as fundamental to the technological progress humans have enjoyed. Relatedly, he argues that evolved superior pattern processing abilities are a primary reason why human cognition greatly exceeds the capabilities of lower species. Due to the adaptive nature of pattern perception, it has been claimed that we are the descendants of those best able to detect patterns (Shermer, 2011).

Nevertheless, our proclivity for detecting patterns comes with a cost, as we often find it difficult to distinguish between real and illusory patterns. Therefore, the same adaptive processes that allow us to perceive patterns and identify meaningful connections between stimuli in our environment also leads us to sometimes perceive illusory patterns and consequently endorse false beliefs about reality. However, when comparing the consequences of failing to detect a real and informative pattern with those of endorsing an illusory pattern, one of these errors may frequently loom larger than the other. For example, failing to connect a rustling in the grass with the presence of a dangerous predator has more dire consequences than mistakenly attributing movement in the grass to a predator and misguidedly escaping from a gust of wind. Using an evolutionary model, Biologist Foster and Kokko (2009) demonstrated how natural selection can favour strategies that involve the frequent endorsement of illusory patterns in order to ensure successful detection of meaningful patterns that offer large reproductive and survival benefits. Additionally, beliefs based on illusory patterns can even be advantageous if they disrupt aversive feelings, such as overwhelming thoughts of lacking control in an unpredictable world (Hogg, Adelman & Blagg, 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). This asymmetry of consequences between missing a real pattern and endorsing an illusory one is one reason humans are said to have evolved a “believing-brain” with a proclivity for pattern perception and a susceptibility to being fooled by illusory patterns (Beck & Forstmeier, 2007; Foster & Kokko, 2009; Shermer, 2011). Thus, not unlike the adaptive heuristics that guide decision-making, yet predictably lead to certain biases, pattern perception may represent an adaptive function at the heart of both rational and irrational beliefs about how stimuli are connected in the environments that we inhabit.

Illusory pattern perception includes the perception of connections between unrelated stimuli as well as the perception of patterns within random stimuli. One reason for the occurrence of illusory pattern perception is the fact that individuals often have difficulty accepting that ordered events can emerge from random processes. For example, when asked to produce random sequences, people often produce far more variation (and therefore fewer “runs”) than would be created by a truly random process (Falk & Konold, 1997). What follows, is that when people encounter random sequences that coincidentally maintain some order (e.g., symmetry in a series of coin tosses) they may ascribe a meaningful non-random process as its source (Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 1985).

People’s tendency to engage in illusory pattern perception has been shown to be associated with various irrational beliefs (Blackmore & Moore, 1994; Van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen & Keskinis, 2014; Van Prooijen, Douglas & Inocencio, 2018; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). For example, Van Prooijen, Douglas and Inocencio (2018), found that individuals who perceive more illusory patterns are also more likely to endorse conspiracy and supernatural beliefs. Related to this association between illusory pattern perception and irrational belief is the finding that lacking control increases illusory pattern perception (Van Harreveld et al., 2014; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Whitson and Galinsky (2008) demonstrate that those induced to feel a lack of control perceive more illusory patterns and engage in more conspiratorial and superstitious thinking. On the basis of this evidence they argue that feeling a lack of control in one’s environment is so aversive that individuals will often endorse illusory patterns and irrational beliefs in order to diminish feelings of lacking control and return to the more pleasant view that one’s environment is predictable. Consistent with this argument is additional evidence demonstrating that lacking control increases conspiracy (Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 2010; Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) and supernatural beliefs (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor & Nash, 2010; Laurin, Kay & Moscovitch, 2008). Therefore, irrational beliefs may not only arise as the result of a believing-brain with a proclivity towards pattern perception, but also as a compensatory strategy that seeks to endorse patterns (illusory or not) in order to alleviate aversive states, such as feeling a lack of control in an unpredictable environment.