Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs

Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs. BastienTrémolière, Hakim Djeriouat. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 145, July 15 2019, Pages 119-131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.03.025

Abstract: Recent research has highlighted the importance of people's cognitive style on the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., beliefs in paranormal). The present studies extend that tradition of research to another form of epistemically suspect beliefs, that is, romantic beliefs. Using different cognitive style measures, we observed that an analytical cognitive style was associated with a decreased endorsement of romantic beliefs (Studies 1a–b) and the effect is qualified by conflict detection sensitivity (Studies 2a–b). Study 3 tested a structural equation model showing that cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs just as it predicts traditional epistemically suspect beliefs. Finally, an exploratory study (Study 4) unsuccessfully tested the possibility that differences in belief in the value of science might explain the association between cognitive style and romantic beliefs. Results are discussed in the light of the literature regarding the everyday consequences of cognitive style and the proposed psychological mechanisms underlying these associations.

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In their 2015's Current Directions in Psychological Science paper, Pennycook and colleagues (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) reviewed evidence of the consequential nature of reasoning: the fact that differences in cognitive style predict a vast range of people's everyday beliefs and behaviors. Hence, cognitivestyle was found to predict reasoning activities (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011;Trippas,Pennycook, Verde, & Handley, 2015), but it also extends beyond the reasoning domain: it predicts paranormal beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs, beliefs in ghosts, superstition), beliefs in conspiracy theories, beliefs in alternative medicine, moral values, prosociality, and also receptivity to non sensical sentences intended to convey the appearance of depth and sophistication (also known as ‘pseudo-profound bullshit’). In the present research, we focusonanother aspect of people's daily life that maybe associated with cognitive style, that is, romantic beliefs. Although romantic beliefs have never been given consensual definition, some of their dimensions are clearly to be thought of as epistemically suspect. Should it be the case, cognitive style is likely to predict these beliefs as well.1. Cognitive style and (some of) its everyday consequences. The definition of cognitive style (or thinking disposition) commonly draws on the distinction made by the dual process theories of thinking about the way people reason, judge, and decide (Evans,2008;Evans&Stanovich,2013;Kahneman, 2011). Although there are different dual process models (Epstein, 1994;Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Kahneman,2011;  Sloman,1996),they all share the core idea that human thinking consists of two fundamentally different types of processing. Type 1 processing is assumed to be fast and almost effortless (i.e., it does not require much cognitive resources). By contrast, Type 2 processing is slow and greedy in cognitive resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Many clever tasks are designed in such a way that an incorrect intuitive (Type 1) response springs immediately to mind, at the expense of a correct reflective (Type 2) response. In such cases, people need tooverridethatincorrectType1responsesoastocalculateandreachthecorrect Type 2 response. This disposition to rely on either of the twotypes of processing is labelled as cognitive style, defined as people'spropensity and willingness to think rather intuitively (Type 1 proces-sing)oranalytically(Type2processing).Importantly, cognitivestyleis not reducible to cognitive (or rea-soning)ability, although both dimensions positively correlate(Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). Let us consider, for instance, the fa-mousbatandballbrainteasing(Frederick,2005)whichhasbeenus asaproxyofcognitivestyleincountlessstudies.Inthisproblem,a bat and ball cost $1.10 in total, and the bat costs $1 morethanball. Whenasked to indicate the price of the ball, a majority of people answer $0.10. Although that response springs rapidly to mind, it is incorrect. The correct, reflective response is $0.05. In this problem, the correct solving does not necessarily reflect differences in people's cognitive abilities (e.g., numerical, mathematical skills) as the calculation is very basic. Rather, the problem reflects people's cognitive style, and itscorrect solving captures primarily people's propensity to think analy-
tically (Toplak et al., 2011). In brief, cognitive style refers to an in-dividual's tendencyto rely on fast, automatic, and intuitivereasoning(Type 1 processing) versus slower, reflective, and analytic reasoning(Type 2 processing) in situations in which a misleading intuitive re-sponse cue is present. By contrast, cognitive ability captures people'sabilitytorelyonlogicandnormativereasoning(i.e.,toengageType2processing),intheabsenceofamisleadingintuitiveresponse.The fact that people who rely the most on Type 2 processing arethose who perform the best on reasoning tasks might not sound sur-prising,sincereasoningsuccessisabyproductofreflectivethinkinginsuch cases. Yet, it was recently found that cognitive style had con-sequencesthatextendbeyondthereasoningfield.Althoughitpredictsbeliefs and behaviors in a vast range of domains, such as morality(Garvey&Ford,2014;Pennycook,Cheyne,Barr,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2014b) or prosociality (Rand et al., 2014;Rand, Greene, & Nowak,2012), we focus, in regard to the present research, on the predictivevalueofcognitivestyleonbeliefslabelledasepistemicallysuspect.Epistemically suspect (or unwarranted)beliefs refer to beliefs thatconflict with common naturalistic conceptions of the world, and thatcannotbeexplainedviascienceorempirically-basedexplanations(seeLobato,Mendoza,Sims,&Chin,2014;Pennycooketal.,2015).Thesebeliefsareunfalsifiablestatements,ortheystandincontradictionwiththeconsensuallyadmittedprinciplesofreasonanddemonstrability.Forinstance,beliefsinghosts,afterlife,astrology,allbelongtothecategoryof epistemically suspect beliefs; and these beliefs have been recentlyshown tobe predictedbypeople's cognitivestyle(for ameta-analysisdevoted to exploring the relationship between cognitive style and re-ligiousbeliefs,seePennycook,Ross,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2016).Itwasshown,forinstance,thatmoreanalyticalpeople,whoscoredhighontheCognitiveReflectionTest(CRT;ashortmeasurecapturingpeople's cognitive style; that includes the bat and ball problem we il-lustratedpreviously;seeFrederick,2005)endorsedreligiousbeliefslessthan less analytic participants (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook,Cheyne,Seli,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2012;Shenhav,Rand,& Greene, 2012). Similar conclusions were obtained using differentclassicreasoningtasksdesignedtomakeanintuitiveresponseconflictwith an analytic response: less religious people endorsed the analyticresponsethemostinabase-ratetask(Pennycooketal.,2014b,2012;Pennycook,Cheyne,Barr,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2014a)andinabelief-bias task (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013). By con-trast, analytic cognitive style predicts endorsement of evolutionaryaccountsofhumanorigins(Gervais,2015).Comparable measures and manipulations have led to similar con-clusions for other beliefs cast supernatural and/or epistemically un-warranted:analyticcognitivestylewasassociatedwithlowerlevelsofbeliefs in conspiracy theories (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, &Furnham, 2014) and paranormal beliefs (e.g., beliefs in ghosts, tele-pathy,omens)(Pennycooketal.,2012;Svedholm&Lindeman,2013).In that vein, less analytic people are more likely to attribute super-natural causation to experimentally controlled, but at first glance un-cannyexperiences(Bouvet&Bonnefon,2015;seealsoRoss,Hartig,&McKay,2017).Whetheritbetranscendentalorimmanent,allthesebeliefsshareacommonfeature:theyfallintothedomainofunfalsifiableassumptions.In thepresent paper, we areinterested in another type ofbeliefs thathavethepotentialtobecastasepistemicallysuspect,thatis,romanticbeliefs. The interest of examining cognitive style in relation to thesebeliefsisthat,albeitbaseless,theprocessunderlyingthemanifestationsoflovecanbeelucidatedbyscientificorempiricalobservations(e.g.,attachment in mammals;neurochemistry of attraction). Noteworthily,thereisadiscrepancybetweentheunderlyingprocessbywhichpeopleexperienceloveontheonehandandthesocio-culturalconstructionofthese experienceson theotherhand.Importantly,romantic love,per-tainstothelatter.Further,itisacategoryofbeliefswhichalmostev-erybody has ever experienced, by contrast to other epistemically sus-pect beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs, conspiracy theories, etc.). Thiscategory of beliefs is part of personal phenomenal experience, whichexcludesanyreferencetoexternalpowerfulentitiesonwhichtoinvestdevotion,admiration,orfear.Inthisperspective,thepresentresearchquestions the possibility that cognitive style is also associated withdifferencesintheendorsementofbaselessbeliefsofintrinsicnature.2. RomanticloveandconflictdetectionAlthough there is no consensual definition, it is proposed that ro-mantic love includes but is not reducible to passion (i.e., the physio-logicalarousalunderlyingattraction;Sternberg,1986).Itisthoughttobeaculturaluniversal(Hatfield&Rapson,2006;Jankowiak&Fischer,1992),anditservesanevolutionaryfunctionofsexualselection(Buss,2003) and pair-bond attachment (Miller, 2001). Beyond basic biolo-gicalneeds,romanticlovealsoseemstoservesocialfunctions,amongwhichcreatingandmaintainingmaritalbondsandunitingkingroupsofrespectivepartners(Rosenblatt,1967).Romanticloveisinthesocialrealm mostly expressed in terms of a set of beliefs rather than as abiological phenomenon (Weaver & Ganong, 2004). Understandably,romantictales,songs,andpoetriesaredeeplyrootedinhumancultures,and people daily life is filled with romantic narratives (Weaver &Ganong,2004).Culturalportrayalofromanticloverecurrentlyreferstothenotionsof love predestination (Franiuk, Cohen, & Pomerantz, 2002), love atfirstsight(Tanner,Haddock,Zimmerman,&Lund,2003)andtherightone mate (Signorielli, 1997). Consistent with these notions,SprecherandMetts(1999)haveproposedthatromanticbeliefsrefertotheideathat‘loveatfirstsightispossible,thattherecanbeonlyonetruelove,thattruelovelastsforever,thatthebelovedisperfectineveryrespect,and that true love can overcome all obstacles’ (p. 835;Sprecher &Metts, 1999), see also (Cunningham & Antill, 1981;Knox Jr &Sporakowski,1968;Peplau&Gordon,1985).1People, especially young ones, rely proactively on cultural trans-mission of romantic narratives to educate themselves about love(Bachen & Illouz, 1996). For instance, classic western fairy tales orromantic movies create prescriptive models structuring widespreadrelationships schemas and scripts (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979;Holmberg & MacKenzie, 2002). Accordingly, people become ac-quainted with what to be expected in events related to romantic re-lationshipsandthenecessarystagesfromitsinitiationtoitsprojectedpleasing outcomes (e.g., marriage, children; seeHolmberg &MacKenzie, 2002). These internalized scripts have been evidenced toframetheenactmentofrelationship-relevantbehaviorsandtofacilitaterelational construction in a friendly manner as well as relationshipswell-being when personal scripts dovetail with normative scripts(Wilson&Capitman,1982).Theculturally-shapedstructurationofro-mantic beliefs generates various consequences on love, commitmentandrelationshipssatisfaction.Thereisevidencethatromanticbeliefs,fostered by unrealistic optimism and positive illusions, strengthen re-lationshipsdurationandquality(Knee,1998;Murray&Holmes,1997);and this trend has been longitudinally evidenced (Sprecher & Metts, 1989).Alternatively,someresearchhasemphasizedthedysfunctionalcharacter of these beliefs as they create a gap between preconceivedstandardsof‘perfectrelationship’andreality.Thisexpectationgaphasthepotentialtodecreaserelationshipquality(Baucom&Epstein,1990)and can be associated with inadequate problem-solving responses inrelationships (Metis & Cupach, 1990). These beliefs may lead to anelevated incidence of marital distress (N.Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming,1987) and decreased expectations that any dialogue designed to fixrelationshipsproblemsormaritaltherapycanbesuccessful(Epstein&Eidelson,1981).Importantly,thereisnoscientificevidencefortheexactitudeofthegeneral claims as depicted bySprecher and Metts (1999). Examiningromanticlovethroughtheperspectiveofrationalityhasoccupiedalargesegmentofthephilosophicaldebates.ThephilosopherPascalinPensées(Pascal,1670/1976)advocatedthatlovedoesnotpertaintothecategoryofreasonallowingthediscoveryofdemonstrabletruth.Bycontrast,loveis thought of as a class of sentiments related to a form of universalknowledgewhichdispenseswithrationalthought.Muchmorerecently,some authors have even considered some of unrealistic beliefs aboutrelationships as irrational (Ellis, 1986;Gündogdu, Yavuzer, & Karatas,2018),partlybecausetheystemfromrigidandpreconceivedunrealisticschemes (e.g., “partners cannot change”, “mindreading is expected”)(Epstein&Eidelson,1981).Itisthenpossiblethatsomeromanticbeliefsqualifyasunwarrantedorepistemicallysuspectbeliefs.Thequestionremains astowhysomepeople hold thesebeliefs.Apromising way of addressing this issue is to rely on a cognitive ex-planation.Romanticnarrativesmightderivefromcognitivebiasessuchasoptimismbias(seeWeinstein&Klein,1996)orwishfulthinking(seeBastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011). Perhaps, some people nurture thehope of experiencing an ethereal love story or think that love dis-appointment would not concern them. If these beliefs is rooted incognitivebiases,thenpeoplemorepronetobiasesandfallacieswouldbe more likely to endorse romantic beliefs. In this perspective, thecognitivemechanismspromptingpeopletosubscribeorrejectromanticbeliefsmighthavetodowithcognitiveconflictdetection(forareviewonconflictdetection,seeDeNeys,2014).Inanutshell,conflictemergeswhenever Type 2 processing (necessary to correctly endorse logico-probabilistic principles) stands in contradiction to Type 1 processing(whichreliesonpersonalexperienceandbeliefs).Insuchsituations,theType 2 processing system is needed to overcome the belief-based re-sponse generated by the Type 1 processing system.2Multiple studieshave shown, however, that people regularly fail to override this cog-nitive conflict (e.g.,De Neys & Glumicic, 2008;Evans, 2003, 2008;Kahneman, 2011), just as it is the case in the bat and ball problemwhich we discussed earlier; further, it was recently found individualdifferencesinthepropensitytodetectconflictduringreasoningactiv-ities(Frey,Johnson,&DeNeys,2018).Thatis,somepeoplearemorelikelytodetectthenoverridecognitiveconflictthanothers.There is evidence that analytical cognitive style predicts lowerepistemicallysuspectbeliefs,inthecontextreligiousbeliefs,becauseofahigherpropensitytodetectconflict(Pennycooketal.,2014a,2013).Within the context of religion, conflict refers to the incompatibilitybetween the way human cognitive armature is designed to grasp thephysical world and the presence of supernatural entities or presumedhidden forces that transcend them (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Forexample,acknowledgingtheexistenceofectoplasmscapableofpassingindiscriminately through physical objects escape universal cognitiveprinciples(Pennycooketal.,2014a),andwouldreflectfailureincon-flict detection. Consistent with this possibility, Pennycook and collea-gues observed that performance on conflict reasoning problems (inwhichaType1responseisconflictingwithaType2response)predictsendorsementofreligiousbeliefs,withparticipantsperformingwellonthe problems being those who endorsed religious beliefs the least.Consistent with the conflict detection account, performance on noconflict problems (in which a Type 1 and a Type 2 response are con-gruent)wasnotassociatedwithreligiousbeliefs.Theseresultsarealsosupportedbyneuroimagingstudies.Activationoftheanteriorcingulatecortex (ACC), a critical brain region for conflict detection (Botvinick,Cohen, & Carter, 2004), has been shown to be negatively associatedwithreligiousbeliefs(Inzlicht&Tullett,2010).Conflict,inthecontextofromanticism,wouldresideintherationalreluctance to acknowledge the notions of soul mate, perfect mate,eternallove,andtheideathatloveisimbuedwithamysticalforcethathelps alleviate obstacles or conquer all. Essentially, conflict detectionhas itsimportanceregardingromantic narrativesbecauseoftheir ste-reotypical nature (Dion & Dion, 1973). For instance, the belief thatthere is ‘one and only one’ love is conflicting with the scientific evi-dence that polygyny is a natural component of mammals (includinghumanbeings;seeBarash&Lipton,2002).Besides,thebeliefthatlovelastsforevermaybeconsideredasaformofbaserateneglect.Forin-stance, some single and married people tend to rate their divorcelikelihood as considerably lower than population base rates (Fowers,Lyons,Montel,&Shaked,2001).Itwasevenobservedthansomepeopleheldthatthereisnochanceofdivorcedespitetheevidencethatatleasthalf of marriages terminated in divorce at the time of the study (seeFowersetal.,2001).3. ThecurrentresearchStudying the psychological processes associated with the endorse-mentofromanticnarrativesisofimportanceastheyareapivotalde-terminant of the relational construction, with important societal im-plications regarding intimate relations; further, their endorsement issometimesconducivetonegativeoutcomes.Romanticbeliefsalsoseemtosharesimilitudeswithmoretraditionalepistemicallysuspectbeliefs(e.g.,beliefsinparanormal)whichbringstraightforwardexplanationsof the world (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), and are thus easilyspreadableinthesocialsphere(Mercier,Majima,&Miton,2018).The current literature linking people's cognitive style to traditionalepistemically suspect beliefs has demonstrated that a more analyticthinking activity was the price for disqualifying these beliefs(Norenzayan&Gervais,2013).Romanticbeliefs,asepistemicallysuspectbeliefs,areintuitivelyappealingbecausetheymatchculturalvaluesre-garding romantic relational construction (schema, scripts and rituals)andbecausetheyserveahopeful,palliativepurpose.Becauseromanticnarrativesarewell-knownandmostpeoplehavealreadyexperiencedorhope to experience a romantic relationship, we seek to understand ifmore analytic people disregard these beliefs more than less analyticpeople,justastheywouldrejectanyotherepistemicallysuspectbeliefs.Suchaninvestigationwouldbeagoodtesttoseewhetherpeoplewithhigher rational dispositions would resist these powerful, universallywidespread beliefs. If this is the case, then we would observe that,whatever the differential nature of these specific beliefs, a rationalmindsetisassociatedwithareluctanceofthesebeliefs.Intheend,weseethepresentstudyasarelevantcomplementarytestoftheconsequencesof reasoning style, affording a sharper examination of the dual processaccountofepistemicallysuspect(dis)beliefs.Straightforwardpredictionsarederivableregardingtheassociationbetween cognitive style and endorsement of romantic beliefs, in thesamewayascognitivestylepredictsanyepistemicallysuspectbeliefs:the more analytical (intuitive) people are, the less (more) they sub-scribetoromanticbeliefs.Inasetof6studies,weexplorethepossibleassociationofcognitivestyleandromanticbeliefs.Importantly,wewilluse multiple, different measures (performance tests, self-report mea-sures)soastoensureboththerobustnessofthepredictedassociationandtheinternalvalidityofourstudies.Studies1aand1btestdiffer measures of cognitive style, which have been extensively used in thefieldofreasoningpsychology,toexplorethepredictedassociationwithromanticbeliefs.Studies2aand2btestthepossibilitythatthisexpectedassociation between cognitive style and romantic beliefs is primarilyexplained by individual differences in conflict detection. Study 3 ex-ploresthepossibilitythattherelationshipsbetweencognitivestyleandromantic beliefs on the one hand, and between cognitive style andparanormal beliefs on the other hand, are concomitant. Study 4 ex-ploresapotentialexplanationoftheassociationbetweencognitivestyleandromanticbeliefs,thatis,theroleofbeliefsinthevalueofscience.

11. GeneraldiscussionIn the vein of the recent studies investigating everyday con-sequences of people's cognitive style, we explored the way it affectsanotheryetunexploredepistemicallysuspectbelief,romanticbeliefs.Ina set of experiments, we showed that cognitive style impacted onpeople'sendorsementofromanticbeliefs:lessanalyticpeopleendorsethesebeliefsmore.Thisresultwasreplicatedusingdifferentmeasures andtests,providingrobustevidenceofthephenomenon.Importantly,our results showed that the predictive power of cognitive style heldeven after controlling for cognitive ability (Studies 2a–b), putting thelightonthedecisiveroleofconflictdetection.Study3showedparalleleffects of cognitive style on romantic beliefs and paranormal beliefs.Study 4 explored a possible explanation of the relationship betweencognitive style and romantic beliefs, that is, that intuitive people be-lieve more in romanticism because they trust less scientific evidence.Theobtainedpatternofcorrelations,however,wasdifficulttodecipher,in particular regarding the positive association between belief in sci-ence and belief in romanticism (when cognitive style was positivelyassociated with belief in science, and negatively associated with ro-manticism). Because that study was exploratory, we refrained fromspeculating too much about the possible candidate explanations thatwouldfitthispatternofresults.ItisworthnotingthatNeedForCognition(NFC),usedasaproxyforcognitivestyle(Studies1band2),wasneverassociatedwithromanticbeliefs (and additional unreported analyses showed that NFC neverpredictedromanticbeliefsevenwhenexcludingFIfromtheanalyses).Faith in Intuition, the other subscale of the Rational-Experientialthinkingmeasure(S.Epsteinetal.,1996)didmuchbetter,beingsys-tematically positively associated with the endorsement of romanticbeliefs.Onabrighternote,theActivelyOpen-mindedThinking(AOT)measure showed strong and consistent associations with romantic be-liefs.Takentogether,theseresultssupporttheimportantroleofcognitivestyleindifferentsetsofeverydaybeliefs.Theimportanceofcognitivestyle lies initsincremental valueaboveandbeyond cognitive ability.Cognitive ability, however, was consistently proven to be much lesspredictivethancognitivestyle(inthreeoutfourofourstudies,cogni-tive ability did not predict romantic beliefs when cognitive style wascontrolled,similarlytotheobservationofPennycooketal.,2012).Although secondary in regard to our current purpose, one wouldpossibly find surprising that we systematically distinguished betweenperformance tests (CRT) and self-report measures of cognitive style(e.g.,AOT).Inouranalyses,wealmostalwaysexploredonefacetwhilecontrolling for the other (Studies 2–4). For instance, one may haveexpected that the CRT (which captures both cognitive style and cog-nitive ability;Pennycook & Ross, 2016) loses its predictive valuewhenever AOT (which captures cognitive style) and Numeracy/BRN(whichcapturecognitiveability)areincludedascovariates(andvice-versawithAOT,leavingNumeracy/BRNaside).Ourresultsshowed,bycontrast,thatthetwofacetsofcognitivestyledonotcompletelyoverlapandremainsignificantwhencontrollingforeachother.Itsuggeststhatthese classic measures of cognitive style, although part of a uniformconcept, each explain a proportion of unshared variance to a givencommonphenomenon.Additional remarks would concern the tasks we used to infer theroleofconflictdetection.Weacknowledgethattheasymmetrybetweenthe Cognitive Reflection Test and the tasks used to assess cognitiveability (numeracy and Base Rate neutral) may lead us to nuance ourclaim regarding conflict detection. This issue was also addressed byPennycooketal.(2014b)whonotedthatpossiblyanyofthetasksusedin the field purely captures either cognitive style or cognitive ability.Possibly,allthetaskscapturebothcognitivestyleandcognitiveability,buttodifferentextents(beingdisposedtothinkanalyticallywillnotbeefficient if one does not have therequisite cognitive abilities, and, si-milarly,beingcognitivelyabletofindasolutionwillbeuselessifonedoesnothavethewillingnesstoengageanalyticthinking).Intheend,one will ultimately never know whether one fully controlled the cog-nitive ability dimension. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of the mea-sures we used, as well as the consistency of our results, both providerobustevidencethatweisolated,atleasttoacertaindegree,thecon-flictdetectionmechanism.Atanotherlevel,onemayworryaboutthereliability of theCognitive ReflectionTest, asit has been heavilyem-ployed on online crowdsourcing platforms, making the search andfindingofparticipantsnaivetothetestdifficult.Althoughwedidnotcontrol for familiarity, there is recent evidence showing that the pre-dictive validity of the CRT is robust to multiple exposure (Bialek &Pennycook,2017),rulingoutthatpotentialissue.Romanticloveisapeculiar andcomplexintrinsicsensationthat amajority of people, including analytic people, have already experi-enced. In this perspective, a possible explanation of the associations we found might be that romanticism calls for a different kind of knowledge, a sort of intuitionistic truth,whichdoesnotfitwiththerationalmindset, hence its rejection in people who adopt a rational mode of apprehension of the world.Romanticloveoffersagoodavenueofre-search for understanding the role cognitive style plays on people's endorsementof irrationalbeliefs.It is worth noting that we are not making any value judgment re-gardingwhetherpeople shouldorshould not favor ananalytic cognitive style over an intuitive one. Although many reasoning researcheswould pointtotheneedofrelyingonanalyticprocessingoverintuitiveone,thereisevidencethatintuitiondoesbetterthanreflectionincer-taincontexts (see Dijksterhuis,2004;Kruglanski&Gigerenzer,2011),raising the need to consider intuition as a useful psychological pro-cessing as well. We are not making any value judgments, either, regardingwhetherpeopleshouldorshouldnotendorseromanticbeliefs.Regardless the negative associations between cognitive style and romantic beliefsweobservedinourstudies,onehastonotethatromanticbeliefs have important functions in partnership. Romanticism is considered a cultural universal (Hatfield&Rapson,2006), suggesting that it has possibly evolved across cultures to facilitate pair-bonding (Fisher,2012). Romanticbeliefs(measuredvia the same romantic beliefs scale weusedinthepresentresearch),forinstance, were found to be highly associated with relationship quality (love, satisfaction, and commit-mentSprecher&Metts,1999).The study of the consequences of cognitive style on real-world attitudes and behaviors are still very recent and as a consequence scarce. As Pennycook et al. (2015)stated, research is needed to identify themany domains in which cognitive style may operate; our study is di-rectly aligned with that purpose. Undoubtedly, any belief or attitude cast supernatural or epistemically unwarranted may be associated with cognitive style, as was the case with paranormal beliefs (Pennycooket al., 2012;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), beliefs in conspiracy theories (Swamietal.,2014) or the attribution of supernatural causation of uncanny experiences (Bouvet&Bonnefon,2015). Of great importance is that cognitive style does not merely predictasetofeverydaybeliefs, but it also extends to the explanationofpublicutility behaviors, such as in the domain of prosociality and cooperation(Randetal.,2012,2014).Suchrecentdiscoveriesconfirmtheneedtodeisolatethefieldofrea-soning psychology so at to put it at the service of humanity (seeBonnefon, 2013), and promote, in parallel, the usefulness to deeperexplore the beliefs, attitudes, and everyday behaviors that are asso-ciated with reasoning, many of which are undoubtedly yet to be dis-covered.