The present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts

What is ‘mental action’? Yair Levy. Philosophical Psychology , Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 969-991. Jul 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427

ABSTRACT: There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.

KEYWORDS: Mental action, embodied cognition, extended mind, covert action, overt action