Some people share knowledge online, often without tangible compensation; they are motivated to signal general intelligence g; observers infer g from contributions' quality

The quality of online knowledge sharing signals general intelligence. Christian N.Yoder, Scott A.Reid. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 148, 1 October 2019, Pages 90-94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.05.013

Abstract: Some people share knowledge online, often without tangible compensation. Who does this, when, and why? According to costly signaling theory people use behavioral displays to provide observers with useful information about traits or states in exchange for fitness benefits. We tested whether individuals higher in general intelligence, g, provided better quality contributions to an information pool under high than low identifiability, and whether observers could infer signaler g from contribution quality. Using a putative online wiki (N = 98) we found that as individuals' scores on Ravens Progressive Matrices (RPM) increased, participants were judged to have written better quality articles, but only when identifiable and not when anonymous. Further, the effect of RPM scores on inferred intelligence was mediated by article quality, but only when signalers were identifiable. Consistent with costly signaling theory, signalers are extrinsically motivated and observers act as “naive psychometricians.” We discuss the implications for understanding online information pools and altruism.