Foundations of Arrogance: We contend that humankind can benefit from a better understanding of the cognitive limitations and motivational biases that, operating together, appear to contribute to arrogance

Foundations of Arrogance: A Broad Survey and Framework for Research. Nelson Cowan et al. Review of General Psychology, September 19, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019877138

Abstract: We consider the topic of arrogance from a cross-disciplinary viewpoint. To stimulate further research, we suggest three types of arrogance (individual, comparative, and antagonistic) and six components contributing to them, each logically related to the next. The components progress from imperfect knowledge and abilities to an unrealistic assessment of them, an unwarranted attitude of superiority over other people, and related derisive behavior. Although each component presumably is present to some degree when the next one operates, causality might flow between components in either direction. The classification of components of arrogance should reduce miscommunication among researchers, as the relevant concepts and mechanisms span cognitive, motivational, social, and clinical domains and literatures. Arrogance is an important concept warranting further study for both theoretical and practical reasons, in both psychopathology and normal social interaction. Everyone seems to have qualities of arrogance to some degree, and we consider the importance of arrogance on a spectrum. We contend that humankind can benefit from a better understanding of the cognitive limitations and motivational biases that, operating together, appear to contribute to arrogance. We bring together information and questions that might lead to an invigorating increase in the rate and quality of cross-disciplinary research on arrogance.

Keywords: arrogance, narcissism, hubris, overconfidence, overplacement, humility

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How Do the Components Relate to the Origins and Purposes of Arrogance?

Next, we examine arrogance with an eye toward the purposes it may serve for the individual and the group, which may help explain why varieties of arrogance seem so prevalent.  In evolution, some traits that serve no apparent or useful function (referred to as byproducts) can be inextricably linked to other adaptations (Lewis, Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2017). It is an open question whether extreme arrogance in some people is a byproduct of certain adaptive traits, which might include self-enhancing optimism and overconfidence, or whether extreme arrogance is, in itself, a useful adaptation that promotes survival and reproduction in some contexts. Possible benefits of different types of arrogance that we consider are the personal value of an illusion of control, the personal value of high self-esteem, and society.s need for leaders; for this last category, we consider associated costs also. Moreover, benefits and costs depend on the type of arrogance, with Component 2 sometimes being helpful to all, but later components rarely helpful, at least to society. (It is not known whether the later components of arrogance sometimes assist in personal gains, which seems possible, for example, in the case of intrasexual competition for mates; see Buss, 1988).


Personal Value of an Illusion of Control

The imperfect knowledge of the environment (Component 1) could emerge simply because perfect knowledge (e.g., with no perceptual illusions or false memories) would be computationally too costly for the brain. It is therefore not surprising that our brains are designed to operate often with place of complete information. That incomplete information does mean, however, that our control of the environment is not always what we believe it is (Component 2). An illusion of greater control of the environment would be one outcome that could be of use.

Individual and comparative arrogance might originate because the feeling of controlling the environment and being competent energizes the individual, protecting and furthering that individual more than a feeling of being out of control or incompetent. People therefore sometimes believe that good things will happen to them and bad things will only happen to those who deserve it (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Exemplifying the illusion of control, Langer (1975) conducted a series of studies showing that when elements usually associated with control were introduced into games of chance, participants responded as if they had some control over the outcome. They bet more on their own hand when competing against what appeared to be a less confident opponent, when given a choice as compared with no choice, when the choice they were given was familiar, and when their involvement in the game was personal rather than by proxy. All of these influences occurred even though none of them had any effect on the chances of winning.  Weinstein (1982) found that students thought positive events were more likely to happen to them compared with peers, and negative events, less likely. These views proved to be modifiable by exposing participants to information about other individuals' risk-avoiding behaviors. Thus, as the authors suggested, such views could occur because of an initial dearth of perspective-taking, our Component 4 (Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003).

A sense of control, whether warranted or illusory, may be important for health. Lachman and Weaver (1998) found that more control was felt in people of higher social class, who also lived longer; but the sense of control had an important effect, and individuals from the lowest income group who had a high sense of control had commensurate health and well-being, like people in higher-income groups.  Whether illusions of control per se foster health, however, may remain controversial (Randall & Block, 1994) and in need of further study. It is possible that some degree of the illusion of control is healthy, whereas too great an illusion places a person in a range in which the accompanying components of comparative and antagonistic arrogance exceed what is optimal.

Personal Value of High Self-Esteem

An individual might become arrogant in individual and comparative senses to produce positive self-esteem based on Components 2 through 5. To our knowledge, there has been little work on this topic per se but there has been some related work on narcissism, for which the conclusion is still unclear. One can imagine that self-esteem might be low but may be supported by thoughts and actions that at least attempt to counteract low self-esteem (e.g., in the use of social media; see Andreassen, Pallesen, & Griffiths, 2017).  This kind of thinking has led to suggestions of a mask model, in which low self-esteem at an implicit, unconscious level is overridden (or masked) by a high level of selfesteem at an explicit level, together producing arrogant behavior. It is difficult to evaluate the mask model, however, because it is unfortunately difficult to measure self-esteem at an implicit level, so this field is still in the process of growth and change (e.g., Brummelman, Thomaes, & Sedikides, 2016), without unambiguous support for the mask model (Brown & Brunell, 2017). It is far from clear whether arrogance indicates that the individual hates himself or herself .deep down,. loves himself or herself, some combination of these, or neither; it is an important topic for future research.

Higgins (1987) took a different approach to self-esteem, showing that there are physiological effects and feelings resulting from discrepancies between a person.s self-concept and how the person ideally would like to be, and ought to be. Discrepancy with the former tended to produce depression, whereas discrepancy with the latter tended to lead to agitation and anxiety. In our tentative appraisal, the difference could be that how one would like to be is a personal concept that interacts with Component 2, whereas how one ought to be is a social comparison on which one hopes for superiority (Component 5).

One possibility for further study is that especially arrogant people of any variety may have a large discrepancy between how they would like to be and how they ought to be, perhaps tending to act as they like (reducing one discrepancy) and inventing rationalizations to stave off the feeling of agitation arising from how they ought to be.  Alternatively, the arrogant people may do less comparison than most people of the actual, ideal, and ought-to self-concepts, or may not perceive much discrepancy (consistent with Components 2-4). However, NPD can be comorbid with depression (Dawood & Pincus, 2018), suggesting that a grandiose stance that includes arrogance might occur along with comparison of the actual and ideal. Note that what is called ideal in this case could be a selfish motive (e.g., becoming ultra-rich or acknowledged as superior to others). The relation between self-esteem and components of arrogance certainly requires further study.

Society's Need for Leaders

Types of arrogance may have evolved as a mechanism to fulfill society.s need for leaders, at least in some types of societies. It could be that finding a good leader is like walking a fine line; one wants a person with enough confidence (related to Component 2) to be highly motivated and (Components 3-6) that can demotivate everyone who is not included in the favored group. Authoritative leaders can help create ties between people, settle disagreements, and make decisions for the group (King, Johnson, & van Vugt, 2009). Research suggests that people tend to favor overconfident leaders over their lesser confident counterparts (Reuben, Rey-Biel, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2012). An overconfident individual may envision success in the future, and this may prompt the individual to expend more effort toward achievement (Lockhart, Goddu, & Keil, 2017).

Overconfidence may also help individuals reach leadership status (Reuben et al., 2012) and feel inspired to take on opportunities that are presented to them (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). Reuben et al. examined how group members identified leaders while completing a task. They found that overconfidence was beneficial for those interested in becoming group leaders (who tended to be men). Research on characteristics of CEOs shows that they often possess a high level of overconfidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2008).  The drawbacks of some varieties of arrogant leadership, however, are clear. Hiller and Hambrick (2005) reviewed the concept of core self-evaluations (CSEs), an amalgam of self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability. They posited that excessive levels of the CSE traits may lead to arrogant behaviors and decisions from executives and other high-ranking businessmen and businesswomen.  It is believed that these hyper-CSE executives typically have extreme performance records (e.g., great successes or terrible failures) due in part to their arrogant behaviors, such as risky initiatives and hasty, centralized decision making (Component 4, ignoring the perspectives of others). Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, and Hiller (2009) also examined the high end of CSE and found that such high levels of self-confidence are necessary to lead high-stakes endeavors. According to Resick et al. (2009), though, some of these leaders have these views due to high self-confidence, whereas others have a more fragile self-view that they attempt to mask with arrogance. They found that CEOs who displayed the positive traits associated with CSE were more comfortable sharing the success with others; CEOs who displayed the negative traits associated with hyper- CSE were less likely to provide special recognition for other members of the organization (with Component 5 sometimes at least implicitly leading into Component 6, denigrating others). Arrogance thus can result in positive group benefits, but some varieties of it can produce risk for the group or a cost for some people in the group.  Johnson et al. (2010) provided some of the first empirical data confirming a negative relationship between workplace arrogance in self-rating and other ratings and job performance. Their first two studies involved developing the WARS. The scale was based on coworkers. judgment of the degree to which 26 generalizations fit the individual in question (e.g., "Believes that s/he knows better than everyone else in any given situation"; "Makes decisions that impact others without listening to their input"). Their third and fourth studies used the scale to explore the relationship between arrogance and task performance. There was a significant, negative relationship between arrogance and task performance and cognitive ability. Because the arrogance of these employees did not result in heightened ability at work or positive perception by others, it seems unlikely that arrogance was of instrumental use. Other studies also support the conclusion that arrogance has overall negative effects, rather than beneficial uses. Arrogant people often suffer socially as a result of being disliked by others (Hareli & Weiner, 2000) and are more likely to induce harm and loss for their businesses as a result of risk-taking behaviors, jeopardizing their health through overconfidence and unrealistic optimism (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). They perform poorly on exams while being overly confident (Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000). There are relevant studies also on harm caused by counterproductive workplace behavior (e.g., Sackett, Berry, Wiemann, & Laczo, 2006) and the "dark triad" of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002), consistent with our Components 4 through 6.

Relevant evidence may also come from investigations of grandiose narcissism which, like our fourth through sixth components of arrogance, can include behaviors of self-inflation at the expense of others. Using multiple sources of evidence regarding the level of grandiose narcissism of all past presidents of the United States, Watts et al. (2012) found that those who had more of this quality were more effective politically, but at the cost of being more unethical, much more likely to provoke reactions such as impeachment, and less likely to win a second term. Their arrogance may also have a negative effect on the group. For example, Matthews, Reinerman-Jones, Burke, Teo, and Scribner (2018) stated on the basis of several studies that "Nationalism is socially harmful when associated with chauvinistic arrogance, bellicosity, and prejudice towards foreigners and other out-groups" (p. 91).