From 2017... Opiate of the Masses? Inequality, Religion, and Political Ideology in the U.S.

Schnabel, Landon. 2017. “Opiate of the Masses? Inequality, Religion, and Political Ideology in the United States.” SocArXiv. July 18. doi:10.31235/osf.io/dnz2w

Abstract: This study considers the assertion that religion is the opiate of the masses. Using a special module of the General Social Survey, I first demonstrate that religion functions as a compensatory resource for structurally-disadvantaged groups—women, racial minorities, those with lower incomes, and, to a lesser extent, sexual minorities. I then demonstrate that religion—operating as both palliative resource and values-shaping schema—suppresses what would otherwise be larger group differences in political ideology. This study provides empirical support for the general “opiate” claim that religion is the “sigh of the oppressed creature” and suppressor of emancipatory political values. I expand and refine the theory, however, showing religion provides (1) compensatory resources for lack of social, and not just economic, status, and (2) traditional-values-oriented schemas that impact social attitudes more than economic attitudes.


Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.
                     -Karl Marx (1970 [1843])

Whenever a candidate or policy that advantages the few while disadvantaging the many wins an election, pundits assume people voted against their own self-interests and then wonder why. For example, after the 2016 U.S. presidential election many wondered why women did not vote more consistently for the first woman nominated by a major party. Status and positionality theories of politics excel at predicting why structurally-disadvantaged groups often support and vote for progressive candidates and policies, but these theories break down in the not infrequent cases when disadvantaged groups are not liberal. For example, as I will show, men are more supportive of a woman’s right to choose abortion than are women. Are disadvantaged groups simply irrational, or is there a missing piece or overlapping identity that, when added to positionality theories of politics, explains otherwise unexpected attitudes and voting behavior?

Marx, Du Bois, Weber, and other classical social theorists said religion appeals to the disenfranchised and helps them through suffering. But, according to these theorists, negatives accompany the positives, with religion legitimating subordination and/or distracting people from the root causes of their suffering. Marx’s “opiate of the masses” argument would predict that religion constrains revolution by suppressing political engagement. Yet, in the contemporary United States and many other countries, the most intensely religious people are often the most politically engaged, having an outsized impact on politics (Bolzendahl, Schnabel, and Sagi 2019). Although religion does not seem to make people apolitical, it is still possible that religion legitimates the status quo. Applying and synthesizing several theoretical traditions—including structuration (Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992), system justification (Jost and Hunyady 2002), compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), and related cultural and social psychological approaches to the study of religion (Edgell 2012; Hoffmann and Bartkowski 2008; Willer 2009)—I explore, expand upon, and refine the classic “opiate” argument.

In the process of exploring the “opiate” argument, this study answers, at least in part, two broader social scientific questions: (1) Why are some groups consistently more religious than others? (2) Why do attitudes toward certain social issues, such as abortion and same-sex relationships, seem to contradict the positionality principle of disadvantage promoting progressive values? I conclude that, as Marx and others have argued, religion can legitimate inequality. But I propose a new mechanism: Rather than suggesting that religions make people less political, less agentic, or more irrational, I argue that religions shape political ideology in accordance with the deeply-held identities, interests, and values of agentic people with multiple overlapping identities seeking meaning and wellbeing in the face of uncertainty and injustice. By acting as a compensatory resource that disproportionately provides comfort and strength to the disadvantaged and a schema that disproportionately shapes their political ideology according to traditional religious values, contemporary American religion—and Christianity in particular—suppresses what would otherwise be larger group differences in political ideology.