Abstract: What impact does formal punishment have on antisocial conduct—does it deter or promote it? The findings from a long line of research on the labeling tradition indicate formal punishments have the opposite‐of‐intended consequence of promoting future misbehavior. In another body of work, the results show support for deterrence‐based hypotheses that punishment deters future misbehavior. So, which is it? We draw on a nationally representative sample of British adolescent twins from the Environmental Risk (E‐Risk) Longitudinal Twin Study to perform a robust test of the deterrence versus labeling question. We leverage a powerful research design in which twins can serve as the counterfactual for their co‐twin, thereby ruling out many sources of confounding that have likely impacted prior studies. The pattern of findings provides support for labeling theory, showing that contact with the justice system—through spending a night in jail/prison, being issued an anti‐social behaviour order (ASBO), or having an official record—promotes delinquency. We conclude by discussing the impact these findings may have on criminologists’ and practitioners’ perspective on the role of the juvenile justice system in society.
Keywords: delinquency family fixed effects labeling specific deterrence twins
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We sought to conduct a rigorous test between deterrence and labeling hypotheses. Drawing on data from a nationally representative and longitudinal birth cohort of British adolescent twins, we found that contact with the justice system—through spending a night in jail/prison, being issued an ASBO, or having an official crime record—promotes misbehavior, which supports the labeling hypothesis. With this in mind, we highlight four contributions from this study that warrant consideration. We then discuss some of the broader implications our findings might have for the justice system.4.1 Contributions
First, we followed the call of previous research (see, e.g., Farrington, 2003; Murray et al., 2009; Piquero et al., 2011; Pogarsky, 2002) and employed one of the most rigorous nonexperimental methodological designs capable of accounting for a wide range of selection effects and confounding influences. Using the family fixed‐effects model (Kohler et al., 2011), we leveraged nationally representative twin data to take advantage of the natural experiment that twins provide by the fact that they share their family environment and their genetic endowments. Such family effects work to make twins similar to one another. By focusing on within‐twin pair differences, then, we were able to rule out the effects of these family environments and genetic influences, providing us the opportunity to glean some of the most precise estimates for the impact of justice system contact on future behavior. In doing so, we have demonstrated that twin samples and methods have utility for criminological theory testing that reaches beyond the typical strategy of estimating heritability (see Moffitt & Beckley, 2015).A second feature of this study is that we drew on three separate measures—two that were self‐reported and one obtained from official Ministry of Justice records—of justice system contact. The pattern of findings was substantively consistent across these specifications, providing robust support for the labeling hypothesis. The findings across such forms of contact demonstrate that even sanctions that do not penetrate far into the justice system are potentially criminogenic, an outcome that has important implications for policy. Of interest to labeling theorists, the effect of ASBO was found to be a substantively strong predictor of later misbehavior. This is important because, in our opinion, the ASBO represented an archetypal label—recall that it was not intended to be punitive; rather, it was intended to be preventative by identifying those who were at risk of bad behavior. It was also intended to be a public label, and that is exactly the effect it seemed to have had. We believe the findings from the ASBO analysis are particularly revealing given this context even though ASBOs are no longer in use.
Third, we analyzed as an outcome broad‐spectrum delinquency rather than an official outcome (e.g., rearrest or reconviction) that is more commonly assessed in the deterrence and labeling literatures. The results for justice system outcomes like rearrest may be biased because individuals who experience such contact are often at an increased risk for future contact with the justice system simply because they are known by its actors, such as arresting police officers. An outcome variable such as delinquency, therefore, allowed for us to observe change in behavior that is not biased by the actions of justice system actors. Furthermore, by relying on self‐reported delinquency, we can capture delinquent and illegal acts done by the participants that may not be known to the justice system, which would not be captured if we were to rely on official records. For these reasons, we believe the focus on self‐reported delinquency represents an important contribution to the labeling literature.
Fourth, we relied on a sample of individuals who are within the primary age range for engaging in antisocial behavior (i.e., 18‐year‐olds). This is important as it captures the impact of justice system contact for those who are peaking in their criminal careers. The impact of such contact for this population is notable as the increase in problem behavior may lead to a downward spiral of cumulative continuity for certain youth (e.g., Caspi, Bem, & Elder, 1989; Moffitt, 1993; Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Sampson & Laub, 1992). Yet it should be noted that, at this time, we cannot observe how the increases in scores for delinquency will go on to affect participants’ criminal trajectories. Follow‐up analyses of this cohort with future phases of data collection will be better suited to answer that question.
4.3 Broader considerations
With the contributions of this study in mind, we now consider the broader substantive, theoretical, and ethical concerns that may stem from them. Particularly, we focus on the concerns revolving around the role of the justice system and its impact on juveniles. With evidence that the impact of contact with the justice system is a substantively negative one, an interesting question can be raised: Why would we have expected contact with the justice system to have a deterrent effect? Perhaps if justice system contact caused people to “fear their future self,” we would see deterrent effects (Paternoster & Bushway, 2009). But what we found is that justice system contact may have the opposite effect—rather than causing people to fear their future self, it may cause them to lose confidence in their future self. Therefore, the current system may work in a way that does not motivate individuals to conform to the norms of society. Instead, it leads young people to doubt their ability to get themselves out of the hole they have dug.This makes sense when we consider the real‐life consequences of spending time in jail—the event itself is often embarrassing and shameful. Typically, it consists of (at least) an overnight stay followed by a visit with a judge the next morning. The family often has to get involved for the young person to be released back into the community, which then causes anger, hostility, and embarrassment among family members. Given that family is an important part of the desistance process, weakening those social bonds is unlikely to have a crime‐reducing effect. Furthermore, these reactions are often extended out to other interpersonal relationships in different settings, and as these relationships are ruined, prosocial connections are further attenuated, pushing the labeled adolescent further away from conventional society.
What does this mean for the justice system as it is currently constructed? We do not believe our findings show support for a shift to nonintervention. Rather, we believe it is important for the justice system and its actors to recognize the potentially negative impact it has. The public should be aware that the system is for the purpose of justice and retribution and that a utilitarian outcome such as specific deterrence is unlikely. With this in mind, our findings can be used to extend two policy recommendations.
First, although not a test of these hypotheses, we believe our findings fall in line with the arguments of the principles of effective intervention (see Andrews, 1995; Bonta & Andrews, 2016; Gendreau, 1996), which propose low‐risk offenders should not be funneled through official justice system channels. There should be diversionary programs set up for these types of offenders so that they may be able to avoid the labeling process. A metaphor might help explain: Medical doctors do not send a patient suffering from a cold to the emergency room. Even though the patient can certainly get treatment there, the visit would likely be counterproductive as the patient would be exposed to far more harmful viruses and diseases that may ultimately result in worse health. Study findings have repeatedly shown that when low‐risk offenders are brought into the justice system, the outcome is almost exclusively iatrogenic (e.g., Gatti, Tremblay, & Vitaro, 2009; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006; Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009; Sperber, Latessa, & Makarios, 2013).
Second, our findings do not show support for fewer (or more) juvenile arrests. But they do indicate that if arrest rates are going to be maintained at their current level (or if they are to be heightened), then there should be a concerted effort toward offsetting the negative pathways that they create. If policy makers gain an understanding of these processes and pathways, they can develop and implement strategies to prevent labeling effects. Only then will the system have a chance of deterring criminal activity by way of contact with the offender.
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