Human Cooperation When Acting Through Autonomous Machines. Celso M. de Melo, Stacy Marsella, and Jonathan Gratch. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, February 26, 2019 116 (9) 3482-3487. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1817656116
Significance: Autonomous machines that act on our behalf—such as robots, drones, and autonomous vehicles—are quickly becoming a reality. These machines will face situations where individual interest conflicts with collective interest, and it is critical we understand if people will cooperate when acting through them. Here we show, in the increasingly popular domain of autonomous vehicles, that people program their vehicles to be more cooperative than they would if driving themselves. This happens because programming machines causes selfish short-term rewards to become less salient, and that encourages cooperation. Our results further indicate that personal experience influences how machines are programmed. Finally, we show that this effect generalizes beyond the domain of autonomous vehicles and we discuss theoretical and practical implications.
Abstract: Recent times have seen an emergence of intelligent machines that act autonomously on our behalf, such as autonomous vehicles. Despite promises of increased efficiency, it is not clear whether this paradigm shift will change how we decide when our self-interest (e.g., comfort) is pitted against the collective interest (e.g., environment). Here we show that acting through machines changes the way people solve these social dilemmas and we present experimental evidence showing that participants program their autonomous vehicles to act more cooperatively than if they were driving themselves. We show that this happens because programming causes selfish short-term rewards to become less salient, leading to considerations of broader societal goals. We also show that the programmed behavior is influenced by past experience. Finally, we report evidence that the effect generalizes beyond the domain of autonomous vehicles. We discuss implications for designing autonomous machines that contribute to a more cooperative society.
Keywords: autonomous vehiclescooperationsocial dilemmas
Tuesday, February 26, 2019
Reconstructing meaning: Fragmented information is combined into a complete semantic representation of an object and to identify brain regions associated with object meaning
Reconstructing meaning from bits of information. Sasa L. Kivisaari, Marijn van Vliet, Annika Hultén, Tiina Lindh-Knuutila, Ali Faisal & Riitta Salmelin. Nature Communications, volume 10, Article number: 927 (2019). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-08848-0
Abstract: Modern theories of semantics posit that the meaning of words can be decomposed into a unique combination of semantic features (e.g., “dog” would include “barks”). Here, we demonstrate using functional MRI (fMRI) that the brain combines bits of information into meaningful object representations. Participants receive clues of individual objects in form of three isolated semantic features, given as verbal descriptions. We use machine-learning-based neural decoding to learn a mapping between individual semantic features and BOLD activation patterns. The recorded brain patterns are best decoded using a combination of not only the three semantic features that were in fact presented as clues, but a far richer set of semantic features typically linked to the target object. We conclude that our experimental protocol allowed us to demonstrate that fragmented information is combined into a complete semantic representation of an object and to identify brain regions associated with object meaning.
Abstract: Modern theories of semantics posit that the meaning of words can be decomposed into a unique combination of semantic features (e.g., “dog” would include “barks”). Here, we demonstrate using functional MRI (fMRI) that the brain combines bits of information into meaningful object representations. Participants receive clues of individual objects in form of three isolated semantic features, given as verbal descriptions. We use machine-learning-based neural decoding to learn a mapping between individual semantic features and BOLD activation patterns. The recorded brain patterns are best decoded using a combination of not only the three semantic features that were in fact presented as clues, but a far richer set of semantic features typically linked to the target object. We conclude that our experimental protocol allowed us to demonstrate that fragmented information is combined into a complete semantic representation of an object and to identify brain regions associated with object meaning.
The “Furry” Phenomenon: Characterizing Sexual Orientation, Sexual Motivation, and Erotic Target Identity Inversions in Male Furries
The “Furry” Phenomenon: Characterizing Sexual Orientation, Sexual Motivation, and Erotic Target Identity Inversions in Male Furries. Kevin J. Hsu, J. Michael Bailey. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Feb 26 2019, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1303-7
Abstract: Furries are individuals who are especially interested in anthropomorphic or cartoon animals (e.g., Bugs Bunny). They often strongly identify with anthropomorphic animals and create fursonas, identities of themselves as those anthropomorphic animals. Some practice fursuiting, or wearing costumes that resemble anthropomorphic animals. Furries have been portrayed as sexually motivated in the media and popular culture, although little empirical research has addressed this issue. If some furries are sexually motivated, they may be motivated by an erotic target identity inversion (ETII): sexual arousal by the fantasy of being the same kinds of individuals to whom they are sexually attracted. Furries with ETIIs would experience both sexual attraction to anthropomorphic animals and sexual arousal by fantasizing about being anthropomorphic animals, because they often change their appearance and behavior to become more like anthropomorphic animals. We surveyed 334 male furries recruited from the Internet about their sexual orientation, sexual motivation, and sexual interests. A large majority of our sample reported non-heterosexual identities (84%) and some degree of sexual motivation for being furries (99%). Male furries also tended to report a pattern of sexual interests consistent with an ETII involving anthropomorphic animals. Both sexual attraction to anthropomorphic animals and sexual arousal by fantasizing about being anthropomorphic animals were nearly universal. Furthermore, male furries tended to be sexually aroused by fantasizing about being the same kinds of anthropomorphic animals to whom they were sexually attracted, with respect to gender and species. This sexual motivation and these unusual sexual interests do not justify discrimination or stigmatization.
Keywords: Furries Sexual orientation Sexual motivation Erotic target identity inversions Autogynephilia Paraphilias
Abstract: Furries are individuals who are especially interested in anthropomorphic or cartoon animals (e.g., Bugs Bunny). They often strongly identify with anthropomorphic animals and create fursonas, identities of themselves as those anthropomorphic animals. Some practice fursuiting, or wearing costumes that resemble anthropomorphic animals. Furries have been portrayed as sexually motivated in the media and popular culture, although little empirical research has addressed this issue. If some furries are sexually motivated, they may be motivated by an erotic target identity inversion (ETII): sexual arousal by the fantasy of being the same kinds of individuals to whom they are sexually attracted. Furries with ETIIs would experience both sexual attraction to anthropomorphic animals and sexual arousal by fantasizing about being anthropomorphic animals, because they often change their appearance and behavior to become more like anthropomorphic animals. We surveyed 334 male furries recruited from the Internet about their sexual orientation, sexual motivation, and sexual interests. A large majority of our sample reported non-heterosexual identities (84%) and some degree of sexual motivation for being furries (99%). Male furries also tended to report a pattern of sexual interests consistent with an ETII involving anthropomorphic animals. Both sexual attraction to anthropomorphic animals and sexual arousal by fantasizing about being anthropomorphic animals were nearly universal. Furthermore, male furries tended to be sexually aroused by fantasizing about being the same kinds of anthropomorphic animals to whom they were sexually attracted, with respect to gender and species. This sexual motivation and these unusual sexual interests do not justify discrimination or stigmatization.
Keywords: Furries Sexual orientation Sexual motivation Erotic target identity inversions Autogynephilia Paraphilias
Acute stress: Considering one’s belief in God or science did not mitigate stress responses; under acutely stressful circumstances, reflecting on one’s beliefs may not confer immediate benefits
Farias, M., & Newheiser, A.-K. (2019). The effects of belief in God and science on acute stress. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000185
Abstract: It is widely assumed that belief in God allows people to better cope with life’s stresses. This stress-buffering effect is not limited to religion; when faced with stress, nonreligious people cling on to other belief systems, notably belief in science. We report an experimental test of whether people are able to down-regulate an acute stress experience by reflecting on their beliefs. We used the Trier Social Stress Test to induce stress in religious and scientist participants from the United Kingdom by having them discuss arguments for and against the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (“Brexit”). Prior to stress induction, participants were or were not reminded of their belief in God or science. We included subjective, cardiovascular, and cortisol stress measures at multiple time points. At both subjective and cardiovascular levels, participants reliably experienced stress. However, considering one’s belief in God or science did not mitigate stress responses. Religious participants were somewhat less reactive to stress induction than scientists. Despite the large correlational literature on the stress-buffering effects of faith, under acutely stressful circumstances, reflecting on one’s beliefs may not confer immediate benefits.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that belief in God allows people to better cope with life’s stresses. This stress-buffering effect is not limited to religion; when faced with stress, nonreligious people cling on to other belief systems, notably belief in science. We report an experimental test of whether people are able to down-regulate an acute stress experience by reflecting on their beliefs. We used the Trier Social Stress Test to induce stress in religious and scientist participants from the United Kingdom by having them discuss arguments for and against the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (“Brexit”). Prior to stress induction, participants were or were not reminded of their belief in God or science. We included subjective, cardiovascular, and cortisol stress measures at multiple time points. At both subjective and cardiovascular levels, participants reliably experienced stress. However, considering one’s belief in God or science did not mitigate stress responses. Religious participants were somewhat less reactive to stress induction than scientists. Despite the large correlational literature on the stress-buffering effects of faith, under acutely stressful circumstances, reflecting on one’s beliefs may not confer immediate benefits.
Bad Science May Banish Paper Receipts: California lawmakers seek a ban, based on a scare over BPA that was debunked two decades ago
Bad Science May Banish Paper Receipts. Steve Milloy. The Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/bad-science-may-banish-paper-receipts-11551137837
California lawmakers seek a ban, based on a scare over BPA that was debunked two decades ago
Having vanquished plastic straws, the California Legislature is now considering a bill to ban paper cash-register receipts. One reason offered for the ban is to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions. The other is to reduce public exposure to bisphenol A, or BPA, a chemical used to coat receipts.
Whatever one’s opinion about climate science, it’s clear that eliminating the carbon footprint of California’s paper receipts won’t affect the global climate. Some 1,200 new coal plants are being planned or built around the world, and oil and gas production and use are rising through the roof. Even a global ban on paper would have no significant impact on atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels.
The more interesting reason for the ban is the BPA argument, which is part of a broader trend of misuse of science in public policy. The alarm behind the California bill arises from the notion that BPA is an “endocrine disrupter”: a chemical that, even at low doses, can disrupt human hormonal systems. Such disruptions theoretically could cause a variety of ailments, from cancer to reproductive problems to attention-deficit disorder.
Like the panic over DDT that followed the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring,” the endocrine-disrupter scare made its public debut with a book, “Our Stolen Future” (1996). Written by three activist authors and including a foreword by Al Gore, the book lays out a case for regulating various pollutants.
“Our Stolen Future” was followed the same year by a highly publicized Tulane University study that reported certain combinations of pesticides and other chemicals in the environment were much more potent endocrine disrupters than the individual chemicals themselves. Within weeks, this study prompted Congress to pass a bill directing the Environmental Protection Agency to develop a program to test chemicals for their potential harm to hormonal systems.
In the months that followed, the Tulane study began to fall apart. Independent laboratories around the world reported that they could not replicate its results. By July 1997, the original study was retracted. Federal investigators concluded in 2001 that the Tulane researchers had committed scientific misconduct by falsifying their results.
Yet the law and regulatory programs spawned by the false study remained in place. The endocrine-disrupter scare gained steam through the 2000s, and BPA became its biggest villain. Generous federal funding led to the publication of hundreds of BPA studies. A movement to ban BPA was joined by several cities, states such as California, and foreign nations including Canada, resulting in the elimination of the substance from plastic bottles in those regions. Regulators at the Food and Drug Administration and the European Food Safety Authority pushed back against the scare, to little avail.
Finally in 2012, the FDA decided to launch Clarity, a large $8 million study of BPA to be conducted according to regulatory guidelines known as the Good Laboratory Practices standard. Researchers, including those who had published studies claiming that low-dose exposures to BPA posed health risks, were provided with coded, pre-dosed animals to avoid bias and cheating. Researchers were required to upload their raw data to a government database before the identity of each dose group was disclosed to them.
The results of Clarity were published in 2018. The FDA concluded that the study failed to demonstrate adverse health effects from exposure to BPA in low doses—like the amount one might be exposed to by handling a paper receipt.
Yet despite its birth in scientific misconduct, its dismissals along the way by international regulators and science and public-health groups like the National Academy of Sciences and the World Health Organization, and finally its debunking by the FDA’s Clarity study, the BPA scare survives. Thanks to Congress, it lives on at the EPA, where a 22-year-old endocrine-disrupter screening program peddles merrily along despite producing no results of interest.
It is a sad state of affairs when actual science cannot vanquish adjudicated science fraud in public policy.
Mr. Milloy publishes JunkScience.com, served on the Trump EPA transition team, and is author of “Scare Pollution: Why and How to Fix the EPA.”
California lawmakers seek a ban, based on a scare over BPA that was debunked two decades ago
Having vanquished plastic straws, the California Legislature is now considering a bill to ban paper cash-register receipts. One reason offered for the ban is to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions. The other is to reduce public exposure to bisphenol A, or BPA, a chemical used to coat receipts.
Whatever one’s opinion about climate science, it’s clear that eliminating the carbon footprint of California’s paper receipts won’t affect the global climate. Some 1,200 new coal plants are being planned or built around the world, and oil and gas production and use are rising through the roof. Even a global ban on paper would have no significant impact on atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels.
The more interesting reason for the ban is the BPA argument, which is part of a broader trend of misuse of science in public policy. The alarm behind the California bill arises from the notion that BPA is an “endocrine disrupter”: a chemical that, even at low doses, can disrupt human hormonal systems. Such disruptions theoretically could cause a variety of ailments, from cancer to reproductive problems to attention-deficit disorder.
Like the panic over DDT that followed the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring,” the endocrine-disrupter scare made its public debut with a book, “Our Stolen Future” (1996). Written by three activist authors and including a foreword by Al Gore, the book lays out a case for regulating various pollutants.
“Our Stolen Future” was followed the same year by a highly publicized Tulane University study that reported certain combinations of pesticides and other chemicals in the environment were much more potent endocrine disrupters than the individual chemicals themselves. Within weeks, this study prompted Congress to pass a bill directing the Environmental Protection Agency to develop a program to test chemicals for their potential harm to hormonal systems.
In the months that followed, the Tulane study began to fall apart. Independent laboratories around the world reported that they could not replicate its results. By July 1997, the original study was retracted. Federal investigators concluded in 2001 that the Tulane researchers had committed scientific misconduct by falsifying their results.
Yet the law and regulatory programs spawned by the false study remained in place. The endocrine-disrupter scare gained steam through the 2000s, and BPA became its biggest villain. Generous federal funding led to the publication of hundreds of BPA studies. A movement to ban BPA was joined by several cities, states such as California, and foreign nations including Canada, resulting in the elimination of the substance from plastic bottles in those regions. Regulators at the Food and Drug Administration and the European Food Safety Authority pushed back against the scare, to little avail.
Finally in 2012, the FDA decided to launch Clarity, a large $8 million study of BPA to be conducted according to regulatory guidelines known as the Good Laboratory Practices standard. Researchers, including those who had published studies claiming that low-dose exposures to BPA posed health risks, were provided with coded, pre-dosed animals to avoid bias and cheating. Researchers were required to upload their raw data to a government database before the identity of each dose group was disclosed to them.
The results of Clarity were published in 2018. The FDA concluded that the study failed to demonstrate adverse health effects from exposure to BPA in low doses—like the amount one might be exposed to by handling a paper receipt.
Yet despite its birth in scientific misconduct, its dismissals along the way by international regulators and science and public-health groups like the National Academy of Sciences and the World Health Organization, and finally its debunking by the FDA’s Clarity study, the BPA scare survives. Thanks to Congress, it lives on at the EPA, where a 22-year-old endocrine-disrupter screening program peddles merrily along despite producing no results of interest.
It is a sad state of affairs when actual science cannot vanquish adjudicated science fraud in public policy.
Mr. Milloy publishes JunkScience.com, served on the Trump EPA transition team, and is author of “Scare Pollution: Why and How to Fix the EPA.”
People believe that they are above average but also hold themselves to standards of comparison that are well above average due to the increased mental availability of such high-performing standards of comparison
Davidai, S., & Deri, S. (2019). The second pugilist’s plight: Why people believe they are above average but are not especially happy about it. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(3), 570-587. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000580
Abstract: People’s tendency to rate themselves as above average is often taken as evidence of undue self-regard. Yet, everyday experience is occasioned with feelings of inadequacy and insecurity. How can these 2 experiences be reconciled? Across 12 studies (N = 2,474; including 4 preregistered studies) we argue that although people do indeed believe that they are above average they also hold themselves to standards of comparison that are well above average. Across a host of domains, we find that people’s typical standards of comparison are significantly above the level of the “average” person (Studies 1A, 1B, 2A, and 3). We further show that people’s tendency to measure themselves against above-average others is due to the increased mental availability of such high-performing standards of comparison (Studies 4A and 4B). Finally, we present evidence that this is not simply the result of self-enhancement by showing that people measure themselves against above-average others even when they feel subjectively inadequate (Study 5A), receive objective information about their poor performance (Study 5B), or evaluate themselves on domains in which they chronically underperform (Study 5C). Even in domains where being above average is undesirable (e.g., rudeness), people bring to mind and compare themselves with above average targets (Studies 2B and 2C). We discuss the implications for self-enhancement research and the importance of examining who people compare themselves to in addition to how people believe they compare with others.
Abstract: People’s tendency to rate themselves as above average is often taken as evidence of undue self-regard. Yet, everyday experience is occasioned with feelings of inadequacy and insecurity. How can these 2 experiences be reconciled? Across 12 studies (N = 2,474; including 4 preregistered studies) we argue that although people do indeed believe that they are above average they also hold themselves to standards of comparison that are well above average. Across a host of domains, we find that people’s typical standards of comparison are significantly above the level of the “average” person (Studies 1A, 1B, 2A, and 3). We further show that people’s tendency to measure themselves against above-average others is due to the increased mental availability of such high-performing standards of comparison (Studies 4A and 4B). Finally, we present evidence that this is not simply the result of self-enhancement by showing that people measure themselves against above-average others even when they feel subjectively inadequate (Study 5A), receive objective information about their poor performance (Study 5B), or evaluate themselves on domains in which they chronically underperform (Study 5C). Even in domains where being above average is undesirable (e.g., rudeness), people bring to mind and compare themselves with above average targets (Studies 2B and 2C). We discuss the implications for self-enhancement research and the importance of examining who people compare themselves to in addition to how people believe they compare with others.
Who watches an ISIS beheading—and why
Redmond, S., Jones, N. M., Holman, E. A., & Silver, R. C. (2019). Who watches an ISIS beheading—and why. American Psychologist, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000438
Abstract: In the wake of collective traumas and acts of terrorism, media bring real graphic images and videos to TV, computer, and smartphone screens. Many people consume this coverage, but who they are and why they do so is poorly understood. Using a mixed-methods design, we examined predictors of and motivations for viewing graphic media among individuals who watched a beheading video created by the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A representative national sample of U.S. residents (N = 3,294) reported whether they viewed a video and why (or why not) via an anonymous survey administered during a 3-year longitudinal study. Accounting for population weights, about 20% of the sample reported watching at least part of a beheading video, and about 5% reported watching an entire video. Increased likelihood of watching a video was associated with demographics (male, unemployed, and Christian), frequency of typical TV watching, and both prior lifetime exposure to violence and fear of future terrorism. Watching at least part of a beheading video was prospectively associated with fear of future negative events and global distress approximately 2 years after the beheading videos went viral. The most common reasons respondents reported for watching a beheading video were information seeking and curiosity. Results suggest attentional vigilance: Preexisting fear and history of violent victimization appear to draw individuals to graphic coverage of violence. However, viewing this coverage may contribute to subsequent fear and distress over time, likely assisting terrorists in achieving their goals.
Abstract: In the wake of collective traumas and acts of terrorism, media bring real graphic images and videos to TV, computer, and smartphone screens. Many people consume this coverage, but who they are and why they do so is poorly understood. Using a mixed-methods design, we examined predictors of and motivations for viewing graphic media among individuals who watched a beheading video created by the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A representative national sample of U.S. residents (N = 3,294) reported whether they viewed a video and why (or why not) via an anonymous survey administered during a 3-year longitudinal study. Accounting for population weights, about 20% of the sample reported watching at least part of a beheading video, and about 5% reported watching an entire video. Increased likelihood of watching a video was associated with demographics (male, unemployed, and Christian), frequency of typical TV watching, and both prior lifetime exposure to violence and fear of future terrorism. Watching at least part of a beheading video was prospectively associated with fear of future negative events and global distress approximately 2 years after the beheading videos went viral. The most common reasons respondents reported for watching a beheading video were information seeking and curiosity. Results suggest attentional vigilance: Preexisting fear and history of violent victimization appear to draw individuals to graphic coverage of violence. However, viewing this coverage may contribute to subsequent fear and distress over time, likely assisting terrorists in achieving their goals.
Are People Trained in Economics “Different”? In certain situations, there appear differences between the behavior of people trained in economics & other groups, but as the existing evidence is mostly ambiguous
Are People Trained in Economics “Different,” and if so, Why? A Literature Review. Simon Niklas Hellmich. The American Economist, Feb 22, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519829433
Abstract: Some argue that frequent confrontation with the homo economicus actor-concept motivates economists to adjust their behavior to that paradigm. Another thesis is that economists are different because the discipline attracts individuals with preferences that differ from those of noneconomists. This article discusses survey, experimental, and field evidence collected during this debate. In certain situations, there appear differences between the behavior of people trained in economics and other groups, but as the existing evidence is mostly ambiguous, a comprehensive picture of the nature and sources of these differences has not yet emerged. The article concludes that economics teachers and researchers should pay more attention to the influence the normative statements inherent in basic neoclassical economics can have on cognitive frames and interindividual processes in moral decision making.
Keywords: education, economic man, preferences, self-interest
Abstract: Some argue that frequent confrontation with the homo economicus actor-concept motivates economists to adjust their behavior to that paradigm. Another thesis is that economists are different because the discipline attracts individuals with preferences that differ from those of noneconomists. This article discusses survey, experimental, and field evidence collected during this debate. In certain situations, there appear differences between the behavior of people trained in economics and other groups, but as the existing evidence is mostly ambiguous, a comprehensive picture of the nature and sources of these differences has not yet emerged. The article concludes that economics teachers and researchers should pay more attention to the influence the normative statements inherent in basic neoclassical economics can have on cognitive frames and interindividual processes in moral decision making.
Keywords: education, economic man, preferences, self-interest
That addictions are rooted in brain dysfunction is essentially unfalsifiable and devoid of scientific content; there is overwhelming scientific evidence that other key presuppositions of the brain disease model are false
Is addiction a brain disease? Scott O. Lilienfeld, Sally Satel. Chapter 2 in Casting Light on the Dark Side of Brain Imaging, 2019, Pages 13-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-816179-1.00014-1
Abstract: Over the past two decades the brain disease model has become the prevailing scientific narrative for explaining substance addictions. This model, buoyed by brain imaging data, posits that addictions are rooted in brain dysfunctions, and are chronic, relapsing conditions that largely eradicate individuals’ capacity to control substance use. We argue that the assertion that addictions are rooted in brain dysfunction is essentially unfalsifiable and devoid of scientific content. Further, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that other key presuppositions of the brain disease model are false. Finally, this model has been of questionable utility; there is minimal evidence that it leads to effective intervention, reduces stigma, or accounts for recent large-scale societal changes in the prevalence of addictions. It is high time to abandon this model and to adopt a pluralistic approach to addiction that acknowledges the value of neuroimaging evidence in conjunction with other lenses of analysis.
Abstract: Over the past two decades the brain disease model has become the prevailing scientific narrative for explaining substance addictions. This model, buoyed by brain imaging data, posits that addictions are rooted in brain dysfunctions, and are chronic, relapsing conditions that largely eradicate individuals’ capacity to control substance use. We argue that the assertion that addictions are rooted in brain dysfunction is essentially unfalsifiable and devoid of scientific content. Further, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that other key presuppositions of the brain disease model are false. Finally, this model has been of questionable utility; there is minimal evidence that it leads to effective intervention, reduces stigma, or accounts for recent large-scale societal changes in the prevalence of addictions. It is high time to abandon this model and to adopt a pluralistic approach to addiction that acknowledges the value of neuroimaging evidence in conjunction with other lenses of analysis.
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