Do post-menopausal women provide more care to their kin?: evidence of grandparental caregiving from two large-scale national surveys. Marlise K. Hofer et al. Evolution and Human Behavior, April 4 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2019.04.002
Abstract: Drawing on the logical principles of life-history theory, it may be hypothesized that—compared to pre-menopausal women—post-menopausal women will spend more time caring for grandchildren and other kin. This hypothesis was tested in two studies, on results obtained from two large datasets documenting altruistic behaviors of pre-menopausal and post-menopausal women in the United States (N = 7, 161) and Australia (N = 25, 066). Results from both studies revealed that (even when controlling statistically for age, health, financial resources, and other pertinent variables), post-menopausal women devoted more time to grandparental caregiving. This effect was specific to kin care: Menopause status was not as strongly related to a measure of non-kin-directed altruistic behavior (time spent volunteering). These results provide the first empirical support for a previously-untested behavioral implication of menopause.
Bipartisan Alliance, a Society for the Study of the US Constitution, and of Human Nature, where Republicans and Democrats meet.
Thursday, April 4, 2019
Young Norway students in college: No indication of women playing hard-to-get, or of strategically downplaying signals of sexual attraction; little evidence of male sexual overperception
Bendixen, M., Kennair, L. E. O., Biegler, R., & Haselton, M. G. (2019). Adjusting signals of sexual interest in the most recent naturally occurring opposite-sex encounter in two different contexts. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Mar 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000162
Abstract: Sexual signaling is subject to manipulation, and miscommunication may occur because of biased interpretations of signals, or because of strategical downplaying of sexual interest (playing hard-to-get). In this article, we examined initial perceptions of cues from opposite sex partners along with participant reported own sexual attraction and signaled attraction in their most recent naturally occurring potentially sexual opposite sex encounter. Data on heterosexual Norwegian male and female students were collected in two largely different social contexts (during Regular Study Period, Spring 2015: N = 224; during Freshmen Weeks, Early Fall 2015: N = 211). Results show no indication of women playing hard-to-get, or of strategically downplaying signals of sexual attraction. There was evidence of male sexual overperception in Study 1, but this effect was not replicated in Study 2 mainly due to increased levels of sexual attraction in single, freshmen women in that particular social context. For both sexes, reported levels of signaled attraction strongly reflected reports of own sexual attraction. Predictors for who ended up having sex after the encounter differed for women and men. For women, ending up having sex was predicted by the other’s short-term mate value, being freshman, and level of perceived sexual interest from the other after the encounter. For men, ending up having sex was predicted merely by their history of casual sex. It is concluded that women and men adjust their signals of sexual attraction upward or downward relative to their felt attraction to prompt further communication and to gain more information.
Abstract: Sexual signaling is subject to manipulation, and miscommunication may occur because of biased interpretations of signals, or because of strategical downplaying of sexual interest (playing hard-to-get). In this article, we examined initial perceptions of cues from opposite sex partners along with participant reported own sexual attraction and signaled attraction in their most recent naturally occurring potentially sexual opposite sex encounter. Data on heterosexual Norwegian male and female students were collected in two largely different social contexts (during Regular Study Period, Spring 2015: N = 224; during Freshmen Weeks, Early Fall 2015: N = 211). Results show no indication of women playing hard-to-get, or of strategically downplaying signals of sexual attraction. There was evidence of male sexual overperception in Study 1, but this effect was not replicated in Study 2 mainly due to increased levels of sexual attraction in single, freshmen women in that particular social context. For both sexes, reported levels of signaled attraction strongly reflected reports of own sexual attraction. Predictors for who ended up having sex after the encounter differed for women and men. For women, ending up having sex was predicted by the other’s short-term mate value, being freshman, and level of perceived sexual interest from the other after the encounter. For men, ending up having sex was predicted merely by their history of casual sex. It is concluded that women and men adjust their signals of sexual attraction upward or downward relative to their felt attraction to prompt further communication and to gain more information.
The reasons that prevent people from cheating on their partners: An evolutionary account of the propensity not to cheat
The reasons that prevent people from cheating on their partners: An evolutionary account of the propensity not to cheat. Menelaos Apostolou, Rafaella Panayiotou. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 146, 1 August 2019, Pages 34-40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.03.041
Highlights
• Finds 47 reasons that prevent people from cheating
• Classifies reasons for not cheating in broader factors and domains
• Finds that women have a higher propensity not to cheat than men
• Finds that conscientiousness and openness predict the propensity not to cheat
Abstract: Infidelity is a widespread phenomenon across different cultures. Yet, not all people are unfaithful to their partners, and the current study aims to identify the reasons that motivate individuals to hold back from cheating. For this purpose, we developed an evolutionary theoretical framework which could enable a better understanding of the ultimate reasons that motivate people not to cheat on their partners. Furthermore, using a combination of qualitative research methods, we have identified 47 proximate reasons that could prevent people from cheating. By using quantitative research methods in a sample of 576 Greek-speaking participants, we classified these reasons in eight broad factors and two broader domains. One domain reflected considerations about the potential costs of cheating, and the other, considerations about the benefits of the current relationship. Women indicated a higher propensity not to cheat than men, especially if they were satisfied with their relationship, and because they would feel guilty. We also found that, the higher participants scored in conscientiousness the lower their propensity to cheat was, while the higher participants scored in openness the higher their propensity to cheat was.
Highlights
• Finds 47 reasons that prevent people from cheating
• Classifies reasons for not cheating in broader factors and domains
• Finds that women have a higher propensity not to cheat than men
• Finds that conscientiousness and openness predict the propensity not to cheat
Abstract: Infidelity is a widespread phenomenon across different cultures. Yet, not all people are unfaithful to their partners, and the current study aims to identify the reasons that motivate individuals to hold back from cheating. For this purpose, we developed an evolutionary theoretical framework which could enable a better understanding of the ultimate reasons that motivate people not to cheat on their partners. Furthermore, using a combination of qualitative research methods, we have identified 47 proximate reasons that could prevent people from cheating. By using quantitative research methods in a sample of 576 Greek-speaking participants, we classified these reasons in eight broad factors and two broader domains. One domain reflected considerations about the potential costs of cheating, and the other, considerations about the benefits of the current relationship. Women indicated a higher propensity not to cheat than men, especially if they were satisfied with their relationship, and because they would feel guilty. We also found that, the higher participants scored in conscientiousness the lower their propensity to cheat was, while the higher participants scored in openness the higher their propensity to cheat was.
Human Ingenuity and the Search of Prosperity Ended Drought and Famine in India, despite the doomsayers saying we are all going to die due to El Nino–Southern Oscillation and other events
Drought and Famine in India, 1870–2016. Vimal Mishra et al. Geophysical Research Letters, Jan 22 2019. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018GL081477
Abstract: Millions of people died due to famines in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; however, the relationship of historical famines with drought is complicated and not well understood. Using station‐based observations and simulations, we reconstruct soil moisture (agricultural) drought in India for the period 1870–2016. We show that over this century and a half period, India experienced seven major drought periods (1876–1882, 1895–1900, 1908–1924, 1937–1945, 1982–1990, 1997–2004, and 2011–2015) based on severity‐area‐duration analysis of reconstructed soil moisture. Out of six major famines (1873–74, 1876, 1877, 1896–97, 1899, and 1943) that occurred during 1870–2016, five are linked to soil moisture drought, and one (1943) was not. The three most deadly droughts (1877, 1896, and 1899) were linked with the positive phase of El Niño–Southern Oscillation. Five major droughts were not linked with famine, and three of those five nonfamine droughts occurred after Indian independence in 1947.
Plain Language Summary: India witnessed some of the most famous famines during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These famines caused millions of deaths primarily due to widespread crop failure. However, the role of agricultural drought in these famines remains unrecognized. Using station‐based observations and simulations from a hydrological model, we reconstructed agricultural droughts and established a linkage between famines and droughts over India. We find that a majority of famines were caused by large‐scale and severe soil moisture droughts that hampered the food production. However, one famine was completely due to the failure of policy during the British era. Expansion of irrigation, better public distribution system, rural employment, and transportation reduced the impact of drought on the lives of people after the independence.
Abstract: Millions of people died due to famines in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; however, the relationship of historical famines with drought is complicated and not well understood. Using station‐based observations and simulations, we reconstruct soil moisture (agricultural) drought in India for the period 1870–2016. We show that over this century and a half period, India experienced seven major drought periods (1876–1882, 1895–1900, 1908–1924, 1937–1945, 1982–1990, 1997–2004, and 2011–2015) based on severity‐area‐duration analysis of reconstructed soil moisture. Out of six major famines (1873–74, 1876, 1877, 1896–97, 1899, and 1943) that occurred during 1870–2016, five are linked to soil moisture drought, and one (1943) was not. The three most deadly droughts (1877, 1896, and 1899) were linked with the positive phase of El Niño–Southern Oscillation. Five major droughts were not linked with famine, and three of those five nonfamine droughts occurred after Indian independence in 1947.
Plain Language Summary: India witnessed some of the most famous famines during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These famines caused millions of deaths primarily due to widespread crop failure. However, the role of agricultural drought in these famines remains unrecognized. Using station‐based observations and simulations from a hydrological model, we reconstructed agricultural droughts and established a linkage between famines and droughts over India. We find that a majority of famines were caused by large‐scale and severe soil moisture droughts that hampered the food production. However, one famine was completely due to the failure of policy during the British era. Expansion of irrigation, better public distribution system, rural employment, and transportation reduced the impact of drought on the lives of people after the independence.
There is a significant gap in happiness levels between religious and nonreligious individuals when they are diagnosed with a disability; it reduces happiness for nonreligious people more than that for religious people
The Effect of Becoming Disabled on the Subjective Well-Being of Religious and Nonreligious People. DaeHwan Kim. Journal of Religion and Health, April 4 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-019-00808-8
Abstract: Positive associations between religiosity and subjective well-being (SWB) have been found in a multitude of studies. However, there has been little effort in documenting the role that religion plays in helping people during the onset of adverse circumstances in their lives. This study investigates the effect of religion on the SWB of the disabled. We utilized secondary data from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging from 2006 to 2016 with a sample size of 36,484. Starting with nondisabled participants, we applied a difference-in-differences approach to a fixed-effects model and compared the magnitude of the decrease in SWB resulting from disability between religious individuals and their nonreligious counterparts. The empirical results show that following a religion increased SWB by 0.94 (p < 0.01) and the onset of a disability reduced SWB by 3.57 (p < 0.01) out of 100. Furthermore, there is a significant gap in happiness levels between religious and nonreligious individuals when they are diagnosed with a disability. Becoming disabled reduces SWB for nonreligious people more than that for religious people by 2.62 (p < 0.01). This study confirms that following a religion helps people cope with adverse circumstances such as the onset of a disability.
Keywords: Religion Disability Subjective well-being Happiness Difference-in-differences estimation
Abstract: Positive associations between religiosity and subjective well-being (SWB) have been found in a multitude of studies. However, there has been little effort in documenting the role that religion plays in helping people during the onset of adverse circumstances in their lives. This study investigates the effect of religion on the SWB of the disabled. We utilized secondary data from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging from 2006 to 2016 with a sample size of 36,484. Starting with nondisabled participants, we applied a difference-in-differences approach to a fixed-effects model and compared the magnitude of the decrease in SWB resulting from disability between religious individuals and their nonreligious counterparts. The empirical results show that following a religion increased SWB by 0.94 (p < 0.01) and the onset of a disability reduced SWB by 3.57 (p < 0.01) out of 100. Furthermore, there is a significant gap in happiness levels between religious and nonreligious individuals when they are diagnosed with a disability. Becoming disabled reduces SWB for nonreligious people more than that for religious people by 2.62 (p < 0.01). This study confirms that following a religion helps people cope with adverse circumstances such as the onset of a disability.
Keywords: Religion Disability Subjective well-being Happiness Difference-in-differences estimation
National identification (strength of association with the nation state in which an individual resides) predicts lower anxiety and improved health
Opium of the people? National identification predicts well‐being over time. Sammyh S. Khan et al. British Journal of Psychology, April 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12398
Abstract: Social group membership and its social‐relational corollaries, for example, social contact, trust, and support, are prophylactic for health. Research has tended to focus on how direct social interactions between members of small‐scale groups (i.e., a local sports team or community group) are conducive to positive health outcomes. The current study provides evidence from a longitudinal cross‐cultural sample (N = 6,748; 18 countries/societies) that the prophylactic effect of group membership is not isolated to small‐scale groups, and that members of groups do not have to directly interact, or in fact know of each other to benefit from membership. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that national identification (strength of association with the nation state in which an individual resides) predicts lower anxiety and improved health; national identification was in fact almost as positively predictive of health status as anxiety was negatively predictive. The findings indicate that identification with large‐scale groups, like small‐scale groups, is palliative, and are discussed in terms of globalization and banal nationalism.
Abstract: Social group membership and its social‐relational corollaries, for example, social contact, trust, and support, are prophylactic for health. Research has tended to focus on how direct social interactions between members of small‐scale groups (i.e., a local sports team or community group) are conducive to positive health outcomes. The current study provides evidence from a longitudinal cross‐cultural sample (N = 6,748; 18 countries/societies) that the prophylactic effect of group membership is not isolated to small‐scale groups, and that members of groups do not have to directly interact, or in fact know of each other to benefit from membership. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that national identification (strength of association with the nation state in which an individual resides) predicts lower anxiety and improved health; national identification was in fact almost as positively predictive of health status as anxiety was negatively predictive. The findings indicate that identification with large‐scale groups, like small‐scale groups, is palliative, and are discussed in terms of globalization and banal nationalism.
As economic profits grow larger, so do economic losses at the other end of the distribution; the vast majority of the world’s largest companies (the middle 60 pct of the power curve), record near-zero economic profit, on average
What every CEO needs to know about ‘superstar’ companies. Sree Ramaswamy, Michael Birshan, James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, and Jonathan Woetzel. McKinsey Global Institute, April 2019. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-and-growth/what-every-ceo-needs-to-know-about-superstar-companies
The superstar effect is real
The distribution of economic profit along the power curve has gotten more skewed over the past 20 years. After adjusting for inflation, today’s superstar companies have 1.6 times more economic profit, on average, than the superstar companies of 20 years ago. It is not just economic profit that qualifies these companies as superstars: they are among the world’s most sought-after employers, most valuable brands, and most valuable equity listings.
As economic profits grow larger, so do economic losses at the other end of the distribution. The bottom 10 percent of companies destroy as much value as the top 10 percent create, and today’s bottom-decile companies have 1.5 times more economic loss, on average, than their counterparts of 20 years ago (Exhibit 1). That means for every company that creates economic value, there is another company that destroys economic value. Yet these value-destroying companies continue to survive, holding on to their resources for increasingly longer durations and continuing to attract capital. A growing number are turning into “zombie” companies (June 2017: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-walking-dead_180d80ad-en), unable to generate enough cash flow even to sustain interest payments on their debts. The impact of these economic losses goes beyond these companies’ investors, managers, and workers: it drives down the returns for healthy companies that compete for the same resources or profits.
For the vast majority of the world’s largest companies, those making up the middle 60 percent of the power curve, economic profit is hard to retain. They record near-zero economic profit, on average. For these companies, market forces are powerful constraints on creating and retaining value, forcing them to compete away whatever advantages they may have in the marketplace. For the average company, the skew of economic profit means that it becomes relatively more painful to be in the middle of the pack, and strategy becomes even more relevant.
The bottom 10 percent of companies destroy as much value as the top 10 percent create, and today’s bottom-decile companies have 1.5 times more economic loss, on average, than their counterparts of 20 years ago (Exhibit 1). That means for every company that creates economic value, there is another company that destroys economic value. Yet these value-destroying companies continue to survive, holding on to their resources for increasingly longer durations and continuing to attract capital. A growing number are turning into “zombie” companies (June 2017: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-walking-dead_180d80ad-en), unable to generate enough cash flow even to sustain interest payments on their debts. The impact of these economic losses goes beyond these companies’ investors, managers, and workers: it drives down the returns for healthy companies that compete for the same resources or profits.
The superstar effect is real
The distribution of economic profit along the power curve has gotten more skewed over the past 20 years. After adjusting for inflation, today’s superstar companies have 1.6 times more economic profit, on average, than the superstar companies of 20 years ago. It is not just economic profit that qualifies these companies as superstars: they are among the world’s most sought-after employers, most valuable brands, and most valuable equity listings.
As economic profits grow larger, so do economic losses at the other end of the distribution. The bottom 10 percent of companies destroy as much value as the top 10 percent create, and today’s bottom-decile companies have 1.5 times more economic loss, on average, than their counterparts of 20 years ago (Exhibit 1). That means for every company that creates economic value, there is another company that destroys economic value. Yet these value-destroying companies continue to survive, holding on to their resources for increasingly longer durations and continuing to attract capital. A growing number are turning into “zombie” companies (June 2017: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-walking-dead_180d80ad-en), unable to generate enough cash flow even to sustain interest payments on their debts. The impact of these economic losses goes beyond these companies’ investors, managers, and workers: it drives down the returns for healthy companies that compete for the same resources or profits.
For the vast majority of the world’s largest companies, those making up the middle 60 percent of the power curve, economic profit is hard to retain. They record near-zero economic profit, on average. For these companies, market forces are powerful constraints on creating and retaining value, forcing them to compete away whatever advantages they may have in the marketplace. For the average company, the skew of economic profit means that it becomes relatively more painful to be in the middle of the pack, and strategy becomes even more relevant.
The bottom 10 percent of companies destroy as much value as the top 10 percent create, and today’s bottom-decile companies have 1.5 times more economic loss, on average, than their counterparts of 20 years ago (Exhibit 1). That means for every company that creates economic value, there is another company that destroys economic value. Yet these value-destroying companies continue to survive, holding on to their resources for increasingly longer durations and continuing to attract capital. A growing number are turning into “zombie” companies (June 2017: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-walking-dead_180d80ad-en), unable to generate enough cash flow even to sustain interest payments on their debts. The impact of these economic losses goes beyond these companies’ investors, managers, and workers: it drives down the returns for healthy companies that compete for the same resources or profits.