Cass Sunstein ask for firms, universities, and government agencies to regularly conduct Sludge Audits to catalogue the costs of sludge, instead of the reactive audits like GAO currently performs

Sunstein, Cass R., Sludge Audits (April 27, 2019). SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379367

Abstract: Consumers, employees, students, and others are often subjected to “sludge”: excessive or unjustified frictions, such as paperwork burdens, that cost time or money; that may make life difficult to navigate; that may be frustrating, stigmatizing, or humiliating; and that might end up depriving people of access to important goods, opportunities, and services. Because of behavioral biases and cognitive scarcity, sludge can have much more harmful effects than private and public institutions anticipate. To protect consumers, investors, employees, and others, firms, universities, and government agencies should regularly conduct Sludge Audits to catalogue the costs of sludge, and to decide when and how to reduce it. Much of human life is unnecessarily sludgy. Sludge often has costs far in excess of benefits, and it can have hurt the most vulnerable members of society.

The socially anxious are more likely to share partisanship with their social network ties; those with greater increase in heart rate when anticipating a discussion are more likely to be in homogeneous networks

Follow Your Heart: Could Psychophysiology Be Associated with Political Discussion Network Homogeneity? Taylor N. Carlson, Charles T. McClean, Jaime E. Settle. Political Psychology, May 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12594

Abstract: Most Americans are sorted into social networks that are largely politically homogeneous. A large body of political science research has explored the behavioral implications of being embedded in a politically homogeneous or heterogeneous network, but substantially less attention has been given to explaining why some people find themselves in politically homogeneous or heterogeneous social networks. In this article, we explore the psychological and physiological underpinnings of political network homogeneity. We use social network data from an original survey of 129 undergraduates paired with lab experimental evidence that measures individuals' physiological reactivity to an anticipated political discussion. Using our original survey and a separate nationally representative survey, we find suggestive evidence that individuals who are more socially anxious are more likely to share partisanship with their social network ties. Moreover, we find that individuals who experienced a greater increase in heart rate when anticipating a political discussion were more likely to be in homogeneous discussion networks, but we do not find a relationship between electrodermal activity and network homogeneity. Aversion to psychological and physiological discomfort induced by political discussions could contribute to social polarization in the American public.

Firm Size, Life Cycle Dynamics and Growth Constraints in Mexico: Reduce informality, combat the undue use of market power in concentrated industries and strengthen access to financial services

Firm Size, Life Cycle Dynamics and Growth Constraints: Evidence from Mexico. Christian Saborowski, Florian Misch. IMF Working Paper No. 19/87. May 2, 2019. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/05/02/Firm-Size-Life-Cycle-Dynamics-and-Growth-Constraints-Evidence-from-Mexico-46819

Summary: This paper examines the variation in life cycle growth across the universe of Mexican firms. We establish two stylized facts to motivate our analysis: first, we show that firm size matters for development by illustrating a close correlation with state-level per capita incomes. Second, we show that few firms grow as much as their U.S. peers while the majority stagnates at less than twice their initial size. To gain insights into the distinguishing characteristics of the two groups, we then econometrically decompose life cycle growth across firms. We find that firms that have financial access and multiple establishments and that are formal, part of diversified industries and located in population centers can grow at sizeable rates.

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I Introduction

Mexico’s low productivity growth in recent decades has puzzled many observers (Levy and Rodrik, 2017). Slow technology diffusion is unlikely to be the main explanation given that Mexico has benefited from large foreign investment inflows after opening up its economy as part of a series of sweeping structural reforms since the 1990s. A recent strand of work argues that Mexico’s productivity has been held back in part because the allocation of labor and capital is distorted (e.g. Levy, 2018; Misch and Saborowski, 2018).1

In this paper, we focus on within-firm growth as a complementary explanation for Mexico’s low productivity growth.2 We argue that individual firms do not invest enough, thus depressing firm growth and preventing firms from taking sufficient advantage of economies of scale. The paper calculates individual firm growth over the life cycle based on five waves of the Mexican Economic Census from 1993 to 2013, complemented by longitudinal firm identifiers constructed by Busso and others (2018) and expanded by INEGI staff. We then decompose our estimates of life cycle growth at the firm level to better understand the distinguishing features of firms that grow at sizeable rates compared to those that stagnate.

We establish two stylized facts to motivate our analysis. First, we show that firm size is positively correlated with state-level per capita incomes. The finding complements previous results at the cross-country level and highlights the close association between firm growth and economic development (Bento and Restuccia, 2018). Second, we show that there is a small minority of Mexican firms that does grow at rates similar to the average U.S. firm. While we confirm the finding of Hsieh and Klenow (2014) that the vast majority of Mexican firms stagnate at about 15-19 years of age, there are some firms that do grow continuously to several times their initial size by the age of 20-24.3 Given the close association between firm size and development, it is thus natural to ask what it is that allows this small minority of firms to perform well in an environment in which the majority does not.

We decompose firm life cycle growth into the contributions of individual firm characteristics using a simple regression framework in the second part of the analysis. Our findings suggest that Mexican firms that have financial access and multiple establishments and that are formal, part of diversified industries and located in population centers can grow at sizeable rates. The regressions predict that a firm that is both formal and has financial access would grow to some 2.4 times its initial size. Formal firms with financial access and multiple establishments, in turn, are predicted to grow to 3-4 times their initial size over their life cycles, an order of magnitude similar to that of the average U.S. firm (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014). We further illustrate that these ‘superstar’ firms tend to be very large firms in industries that form part of the North American supply chain.

We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, by using data that is perfectly comparable across Mexican states, our paper lends greater credibility to estimates in the literature that find evidence of a positive link between firm size and development. These include the findings by Bento and Restuccia (2017) and Bento and Restuccia (2018) who estimate an elasticity of establishment size with respect to GDP per capita of around 0.3.4 Second, we provide a more nuanced view on firm life cycle dynamics in Mexico than Hsieh and Klenow (2014). We document not only that the average Mexican firm grows less than the average U.S. firm, but also that firms that have managed to overcome a well identified set of distortions are able to grow at rates similar to the average U.S. firm. Third, our findings provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical proposition that distortions that constrain productivity through misallocation of resources between more and less productive firms also depress investment by individual firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, and Bento and Restuccia, 2017).5 We show that life cycle dynamics can indeed be decomposed into a very similar set of distortions to those identified in Misch and Saborowski (2018) as drivers of resource misallocation in Mexico.

From a policy perspective our findings highlight the importance of pushing ahead with structural reforms in priority areas. This includes efforts to reduce informality, combat the undue use of market power in concentrated industries and strengthen access to financial services. Furthermore, targeted infrastructure investments would help better connecting more remote regions to the major population centers in the country.

[...]

V CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on within-firm growth as an explanation for Mexico’s low productivity growth. A recent strand of work argues that Mexico’s productivity has been held back in part because the allocation of labor and capital is distorted (e.g. Levy, 2018; Misch and Saborowski, 2018). In this paper, we argue that individual firms do not invest enough, thus depressing firm growth and preventing firms from taking sufficient advantage of economies of scale.

We establish two stylized facts to motivate our analysis: First, we show that firm size is positively correlated with state-level per capita incomes. The finding mirrors previous results at the cross-country level and highlights the close association between firm growth and economic development (Bento and Restuccia, 2018). Second, we show that there is a small minority of Mexican firms that do not grow at rates similar to the average U.S. firm while most of their peers stagnate at less than two times their initial size.

The remainder of the paper analyzes the distinguishing factors of the small minority of firms that manage to grow in an environment in which the majority does not. We decompose life cycle growth into the contributions of individual distortions using a simple regressions framework. Our findings suggest that Mexican firms that are formal, have multiple establishments and financial access, are part of diversified industries as well as located in population centers can grow at sizable rates. The regressions predict that a firm that is both formal and has financial access would see a cumulative growth rate of some 140 percentage points more than an informal firm without financial access. Formal firms with financial access and multiple establishments, in turn, are predicted to grow to 3-4 times their initial size over their life cycles, and thus by an order of magnitude similar to that of the average U.S. firm.

Our findings support the theoretical proposition that distortions that constrain productivity through misallocation also depress investment by individual firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, and Bento and Restuccia, 2017). We show that life cycle dynamics can indeed be decomposed into a very similar set of distortions to those that have been identified as drivers of resource misallocation in Misch and Saborowski (2018).

From a policy perspective, our findings are consistent with continued emphasis on structural reforms. This includes efforts to reduce tax evasion, limit the use of market power in concentrated industries and strengthen access to financial services. Furthermore, targeted infrastructure investments that help to better connect the more remote regions to the major population centers in the country also matter for firm growth. We leave several issues to future work. These include a more detailed study of differences in the distribution of life cycle growth across cohorts and age groups. Another avenue could be to more explicitely examine the role of market power in driving life cycle growth.

Life expectancy after age 65 & parental education: Life expectancy increases with higher maternal education, no link with paternal education; maternal impact on children's health-related behaviours is a potential channel

Life expectancy and parental education. Mathias Huebener. Social Science & Medicine, May 2 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.04.034

Highlights
•    We analyse the link between life expectancy after age 65 and parental education.
•    Analysis based on German Socio-Economic Panel Study and Cox models.
•    Life expectancy increases with higher maternal education, no link with paternal education.
•    Link persists when we control for children's education and other parental characteristics.
•    Maternal impact on children's health-related behaviours is a potential channel.

Abstract: This study analyses the relationship between life expectancy and parental education. Based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study and survival analysis models, we show that maternal education is related to children's life expectancy – even after controlling for children's own level of education. This applies equally to daughters and sons as well as to children's further life expectancies examined at age 35 to age 65. This pattern is more pronounced for younger cohorts. In most cases, the education of the father is not significantly related to children's life expectancy. Neither the vocational training nor the occupational position of the parents in childhood, which both correlate with household income, can explain the connection. The health behaviour of the children and the health accumulated over the life course appear as important channels. This study extends the previous literature that focused mostly on the relationship between individuals' own education and their life expectancy. It implies that the link between education and life expectancy is substantially stronger and that returns to education are higher if the intergenerational component is considered.

Life expectancy and parental education.

Frequent gossipers tend to be more extraverted; women engage in more neutral gossip than men, & younger people tend to negatively gossip more than older people; gossip tends to be neutral, rather than positive or negative

Who Gossips and How in Everyday Life? Megan L. Robbins, Alexander Karan. Social Psychological and Personality Science, May 2, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619837000

Abstract: Although laypeople often view gossipers as immoral, uneducated, typically female, and of lower social class, no systematic observation has empirically revealed the characteristics of those who gossip more than others nor examined the characteristics of gossip across everyday contexts. We used data from five naturalistic observation studies (N = 467) to examine who gossips and how. All participants wore the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), which acoustically sampled 5–12% over 2–5 days, and completed demographics and personality questionnaires. Sound files were coded for gossip, valence (positive, negative, and neutral), subject (acquaintance and celebrity), and topic (social information, physical appearance, and achievement). Frequent gossipers tended to be more extraverted. Women engaged in more neutral gossip than men, and younger people tended to negatively gossip more than older people. Gossip tended to be neutral, rather than positive or negative, and about social information. These naturalistic observation findings dispel some stereotypes about this prevalent yet misunderstood behavior.

Keywords: Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), naturalistic observation, social interaction, personality


Check also A Small Town Takes a Stand: It Banned Gossip. James Hookway. Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/04/neighborhoods-in-philippines-pass-anti.html

Reassessing the “Meritocratic Power” of a College Degree in Intergenerational Income Mobility: Expanding the pool of college graduates per se is unlikely to boost intergenerational income mobility in the US

Equalization or Selection? Reassessing the “Meritocratic Power” of a College Degree in Intergenerational Income Mobility. Xiang Zhou. American Sociological Review, April 30, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419844992

Abstract: Intergenerational mobility is higher among college graduates than among people with lower levels of education. In light of this finding, researchers have characterized a college degree as a great equalizer leveling the playing field, and proposed that expanding higher education would promote mobility. This line of reasoning rests on the implicit assumption that the relatively high mobility observed among college graduates reflects a causal effect of college completion on intergenerational mobility, an assumption that has rarely been rigorously evaluated. This article bridges this gap. Using a novel reweighting technique, I estimate the degree of intergenerational income mobility among college graduates purged of selection processes that may drive up observed mobility in this subpopulation. Analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, I find that once selection processes are adjusted for, intergenerational income mobility among college graduates is very close to that among non-graduates. This finding suggests that expanding the pool of college graduates per se is unlikely to boost intergenerational income mobility in the United States. To promote mobility, public investments in higher education (e.g., federal and state student aid programs) should be targeted at low-income youth.

Keywords: intergenerational mobility, inequality, education, selection bias