Walk the Line: How Successful Are Efforts to Maintain Monogamy in Intimate Relationships? Brenda H. Lee, Lucia F. O’Sullivan. Archives of Sexual Behavior, June 18 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1376-3
Abstract: Monogamy, typically defined as sexual and romantic exclusivity to one partner, is a near-universal expectation in committed intimate relationships in Western societies. Attractive alternative partners are a common threat to monogamous relationships. However, little is known about how individuals strive to protect their relationships from tempting alternatives, particularly those embedded in one’s social network. The current exploratory study was guided by the Investment Model, which states that satisfaction, investments, and perceived alternatives to a relationship predict commitment, which in turn predicts relationship longevity. The study aimed to identify relationship and extradyadic attraction characteristics associated with monogamy maintenance efforts, specifically relationship commitment, as predicted by the Investment Model. The efficacy of monogamy maintenance efforts was assessed via sexual and emotional infidelity measures at a 2-month follow-up. U.S. adults in heterosexual intimate relationships (N = 287; 50.2% male; M age = 34.5 years; M relationship length = 87 months) were recruited online to complete the survey study. Through structural equation modelling, the Investment Model structure was replicated, and relationship commitment predicted use of relationship-enhancing efforts as well as self-monitoring/derogation efforts. Individuals who experienced reciprocated attraction used significantly more avoidance and self-monitoring/derogation efforts than did those who experienced unreciprocated attraction. Ultimately, monogamy maintenance efforts did not significantly predict success in maintaining monogamy at follow-up. These findings have important research, educational, and clinical implications relating to relationship longevity.
Tuesday, June 18, 2019
Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching?
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jillian Jacob Jordan, David G. Rand. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching? We propose that reputation concerns shape outrage and punishment even in anonymous interactions, because people employ the heuristic that somebody is usually watching. In anonymous experiments, subjects (n = 8440) are more outraged by selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing money)—such that if somebody were watching, punishment would have greater signaling value. Additionally, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Furthermore, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And moderation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, supporting the role of heuristics: less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969063
https://osf.io/7z8b6
---Final version:
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jordan, Jillian J.,Rand, David G. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 15 , 2019 [Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186
Abstract: Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
Keywords: signaling, third-party punishment, morality, trustworthiness, anger
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186.supp
Abstract: Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching? We propose that reputation concerns shape outrage and punishment even in anonymous interactions, because people employ the heuristic that somebody is usually watching. In anonymous experiments, subjects (n = 8440) are more outraged by selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing money)—such that if somebody were watching, punishment would have greater signaling value. Additionally, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Furthermore, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And moderation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, supporting the role of heuristics: less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969063
https://osf.io/7z8b6
---Final version:
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jordan, Jillian J.,Rand, David G. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 15 , 2019 [Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186
Abstract: Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
Keywords: signaling, third-party punishment, morality, trustworthiness, anger
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186.supp
Compensating victims of unfairness leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators; even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate
Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation. Indrajeet Patil, Nathan Dhaliwal, Fiery Cushman. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Humans sometimes intervene in moral conflicts between others—so-called “third-party responding”. Sometimes third parties punish perpetrators; other times they provide aid to victims. Across 24 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the different benefits third-parties accrue based on their choice between these two forms of response, as well as third-parties’ understanding of those benefits. We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. Finally, we find that this selective preference for a compensation strategy is limited to fairness violations and does not extend to harm violations. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.
https://psyarxiv.com/c3bsj
https://osf.io/yhbrc
Abstract: Humans sometimes intervene in moral conflicts between others—so-called “third-party responding”. Sometimes third parties punish perpetrators; other times they provide aid to victims. Across 24 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the different benefits third-parties accrue based on their choice between these two forms of response, as well as third-parties’ understanding of those benefits. We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. Finally, we find that this selective preference for a compensation strategy is limited to fairness violations and does not extend to harm violations. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.
https://psyarxiv.com/c3bsj
https://osf.io/yhbrc
Women used more voice messaging, but not more texts, to text relatives, family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more; ment sent voice messaging more to opposite-sex friends
Who is the loudest in the communication jungle? An evolutionary perspective on mobile instant messaging. Dorothea Cosima Adler, Benjamin Philip Lange. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: A world without smartphones and mobile instant messaging (mim) via texting or voice messaging (vm) is unthinkable. While texting has already been investigated (e.g., Sultan, 2014), vm has not. It can be assumed that both channels fulfil different purposes. Taking an evolutionary perspective, sex differences in channel choice, motives, and target groups are assumed. Generally, women should use more mim (especially vm) with only one exception: Men should send more vm to the opposite sex. Two online studies were conducted (Study 1: N=317, 232 f; Study 2: N=307,197 f). Study 1. Women used more mim (d=0.30) and liked texting (d=0.23), and vm more (d=0.22). No sex differences emerged on frequency or length of vm/texts. Study 2. Women used more vm (d=0.26), but not more texts. They texted relatives (d=0.70), family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more (d=0.72) and scored higher on several motives (e.g., intimacy motive in vm, d=0.41). Men sent vm more to opposite-sex friends (d=-0.51; all ps<.05, one-tailed). Our study is the first empirical study that gives insights into sex differences in channel choice of mim from an evolutionary perspective. Further differences (e.g., personality) will be presented at the conference.
Abstract: A world without smartphones and mobile instant messaging (mim) via texting or voice messaging (vm) is unthinkable. While texting has already been investigated (e.g., Sultan, 2014), vm has not. It can be assumed that both channels fulfil different purposes. Taking an evolutionary perspective, sex differences in channel choice, motives, and target groups are assumed. Generally, women should use more mim (especially vm) with only one exception: Men should send more vm to the opposite sex. Two online studies were conducted (Study 1: N=317, 232 f; Study 2: N=307,197 f). Study 1. Women used more mim (d=0.30) and liked texting (d=0.23), and vm more (d=0.22). No sex differences emerged on frequency or length of vm/texts. Study 2. Women used more vm (d=0.26), but not more texts. They texted relatives (d=0.70), family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more (d=0.72) and scored higher on several motives (e.g., intimacy motive in vm, d=0.41). Men sent vm more to opposite-sex friends (d=-0.51; all ps<.05, one-tailed). Our study is the first empirical study that gives insights into sex differences in channel choice of mim from an evolutionary perspective. Further differences (e.g., personality) will be presented at the conference.
Pathogen disgust sensitivity changes according to the perceived harshness of the environment
Pathogen disgust sensitivity changes according to the perceived harshness of the environment. Carlota Batres, David I Perrett. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Much research has explored behaviours that are linked with disgust sensitivity. Few studies, however, have been devoted to understanding how fixed or variable disgust sensitivity is. We therefore aimed to examine whether disgust sensitivity can change with the environment by repeatedly testing university students whose environment was not changing as well as university student cadets undergoing intensive training at an army camp. We found that an increase in the perceived harshness of the environment was associated with a decrease in pathogen disgust sensitivity. Our results support the idea that disgust sensitivity is malleable depending on the environment. More specifically, we propose that in a harsh environment, where survival may be more difficult, pathogen disgust sensitivity may decrease to allow the consumption of available resources.
Abstract: Much research has explored behaviours that are linked with disgust sensitivity. Few studies, however, have been devoted to understanding how fixed or variable disgust sensitivity is. We therefore aimed to examine whether disgust sensitivity can change with the environment by repeatedly testing university students whose environment was not changing as well as university student cadets undergoing intensive training at an army camp. We found that an increase in the perceived harshness of the environment was associated with a decrease in pathogen disgust sensitivity. Our results support the idea that disgust sensitivity is malleable depending on the environment. More specifically, we propose that in a harsh environment, where survival may be more difficult, pathogen disgust sensitivity may decrease to allow the consumption of available resources.
People prioritize expected growth over expected value
People prioritize expected growth over expected value. Adam Bear, Dorsa Amir, Matthew R. Jordan, Fiery Cushman. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: How should people make decisions? A voluminous literature dating back to Bernoulli suggests that people should maximize expected utility. According to this theory, we should prefer an investment that, at every time step, either grows by 40% or shrinks by 30% to an investment that grows by 10% or shrinks by 5%. But while the former investment offers a higher average return over time, the latter investment is expected to grow over time at a faster rate, as characterized by the geometric mean of its payoffs (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016). Given that this growth rate will largely determine which people or traits survive over evolutionary time, we hypothesized that people’s investment decisions would prioritize this quantity over the more familiar expected value. In a first experiment, we show that people prefer a ‘safe’ investment to its riskier, but higher expected-value, counterpart when this safe investment has a faster growth rate. However, when the riskier investment has a faster growth rate than the safer investment, this pattern reverses: people are more likely to take the risk. These findings provide initial evidence, consistent with evolution, that people may rationally prioritize the long-run growth of a process over simple expected value.
Abstract: How should people make decisions? A voluminous literature dating back to Bernoulli suggests that people should maximize expected utility. According to this theory, we should prefer an investment that, at every time step, either grows by 40% or shrinks by 30% to an investment that grows by 10% or shrinks by 5%. But while the former investment offers a higher average return over time, the latter investment is expected to grow over time at a faster rate, as characterized by the geometric mean of its payoffs (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016). Given that this growth rate will largely determine which people or traits survive over evolutionary time, we hypothesized that people’s investment decisions would prioritize this quantity over the more familiar expected value. In a first experiment, we show that people prefer a ‘safe’ investment to its riskier, but higher expected-value, counterpart when this safe investment has a faster growth rate. However, when the riskier investment has a faster growth rate than the safer investment, this pattern reverses: people are more likely to take the risk. These findings provide initial evidence, consistent with evolution, that people may rationally prioritize the long-run growth of a process over simple expected value.
A functional affordance-management approach to stigma-by-association: Does stigma transfer depend on type of stigma?
A functional affordance-management approach to stigma-by-association: Does stigma transfer depend on type of stigma? Jarrod Bock, Jaimie Arona Krems. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Social psychological descriptions of stigma-by-association suggest that, because we devalue and/or dislike stigmatized people, we will devalue and/or dislike their traditionally non-stigmatized associates. However, functional approaches to stigma imply that people hold qualitatively distinct prejudices—rather than generalized devaluation or dislike—which are underlain by the qualitatively distinct threats that stigmatized people are perceived to afford. For example, whereas we might equally stigmatize them, we may perceive Black men as threats to physical safety and religious fundamentalists as threats to freedoms. We ask: If different stigmas represent different, specific threats, (1) which stigmas are transferred and (2) do all stigmas transfer equally? Across three experiments, participants read one of several vignettes describing an average White male (Brad), Brad and a similar friend (control), or Brad and a stigmatized friend (e.g., African-American male, religious fundamentalist), reporting the extent to which Brad—and/or his friend—evoked various threats and affective reactions. We investigated the prediction that, whereas, (1) the generalized stigma might be transferred to Brad when he has a stigmatized friend, (2) the specific stigmas transferred to Brad—and their affective reactions (e.g., fear, anger)—will vary as a function of the specific threat Brad’s friend is perceived to afford.
Abstract: Social psychological descriptions of stigma-by-association suggest that, because we devalue and/or dislike stigmatized people, we will devalue and/or dislike their traditionally non-stigmatized associates. However, functional approaches to stigma imply that people hold qualitatively distinct prejudices—rather than generalized devaluation or dislike—which are underlain by the qualitatively distinct threats that stigmatized people are perceived to afford. For example, whereas we might equally stigmatize them, we may perceive Black men as threats to physical safety and religious fundamentalists as threats to freedoms. We ask: If different stigmas represent different, specific threats, (1) which stigmas are transferred and (2) do all stigmas transfer equally? Across three experiments, participants read one of several vignettes describing an average White male (Brad), Brad and a similar friend (control), or Brad and a stigmatized friend (e.g., African-American male, religious fundamentalist), reporting the extent to which Brad—and/or his friend—evoked various threats and affective reactions. We investigated the prediction that, whereas, (1) the generalized stigma might be transferred to Brad when he has a stigmatized friend, (2) the specific stigmas transferred to Brad—and their affective reactions (e.g., fear, anger)—will vary as a function of the specific threat Brad’s friend is perceived to afford.
Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users; those significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating
The Dark Side of Tinder: The Dark Triad of Personality as Correlates of Tinder Use. Barış Sevi. Journal of Individual Differences, June 17, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000297
Abstract: Tinder is the leading online dating application. This study (N = 271) explored the Dark Triad personality traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and sociosexuality as correlates of Tinder use. The results revealed that Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users. Also, Tinder users with higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating; however, there was no significant relation with Tinder use and motivation for long-term mating. This finding supports the idea that Tinder can be a new venue for people high on the Dark Triad to pursue their short-term mating strategies.
Keywords: tinder, dark triad, sociosexuality, sexual strategies, online dating
Abstract: Tinder is the leading online dating application. This study (N = 271) explored the Dark Triad personality traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and sociosexuality as correlates of Tinder use. The results revealed that Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users. Also, Tinder users with higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating; however, there was no significant relation with Tinder use and motivation for long-term mating. This finding supports the idea that Tinder can be a new venue for people high on the Dark Triad to pursue their short-term mating strategies.
Keywords: tinder, dark triad, sociosexuality, sexual strategies, online dating
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