An Upper Limit to Youth Psychotherapy Benefit? A Meta-Analytic Copula Approach to Psychotherapy Outcomes. Payton J. Jones et al. Clinical Psychological Science, August 6, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702619858424
Abstract: Across 50 years of research, extensive efforts have been made to improve the effectiveness of psychotherapies for children and adolescents. Yet recent evidence shows no significant improvement in youth psychotherapy outcomes. In other words, efforts to improve the general quality of therapy models do not appear to have translated directly into improved outcomes. We used multilevel meta-analytic data from 502 randomized controlled trials to generate a bivariate copula model predicting effect size as therapy quality approaches infinity. Our results suggest that even with a therapy of perfect quality, achieved effect sizes may be modest. If therapy quality and therapy outcome share a correlation of .20 (a somewhat optimistic assumption given the evidence we review), a therapy of perfect quality would produce an effect size of Hedges’s g = 0.83. We suggest that youth psychotherapy researchers complement their efforts to improve psychotherapy quality by investigating additional strategies for improving outcomes.
Keywords: meta-analysis, psychotherapy, youth psychotherapy, psychotherapy research, copula, open data, open materials
Bipartisan Alliance, a Society for the Study of the US Constitution, and of Human Nature, where Republicans and Democrats meet.
Tuesday, August 6, 2019
The present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts
What is ‘mental action’? Yair Levy. Philosophical Psychology , Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 969-991. Jul 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427
ABSTRACT: There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.
KEYWORDS: Mental action, embodied cognition, extended mind, covert action, overt action
ABSTRACT: There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.
KEYWORDS: Mental action, embodied cognition, extended mind, covert action, overt action
Partisan extremity was related to lower levels of cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation, across 3 independent cognitive assessments of cognitive flexibility
Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2019). The partisan mind: Is extreme political partisanship related to cognitive inflexibility? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000661
Abstract: The rise of partisan animosity, ideological polarization, and political dogmatism has reignited important questions about the relationship between psychological rigidity and political partisanship. Two competing hypotheses have been proposed: 1 hypothesis argues that mental rigidity is related to a conservative political orientation, and the other suggests that it reflects partisan extremity across the political spectrum. In a sample of over 700 U.S. citizens, partisan extremity was related to lower levels of cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation, across 3 independent cognitive assessments of cognitive flexibility. This was evident across multiple statistical analyses, including quadratic regressions, Bayes factor analysis, and interrupted regressions. These findings suggest that the rigidity with which individuals process and respond to nonpolitical information may be related to the extremity of their partisan identities.
In experiments with university students and low‐educated adults all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work in numerical topics
Poor peer work does not boost student confidence. Heather Barry Kappes, Barbara Fasolo, Wenjie Han, Jessica Barnes, Janna Ter Meer. Journal of Behaviroal Decision Making, August 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2148
Abstract: Students' low confidence, particularly in numerical topics, is thought to be a barrier to keeping them engaged with education. We studied the effects on confidence of exposure to a peer's work of varying quality (very good or bad) and neatness (messy or neat). Previous research underpinned our hypothesis that a peer's bad‐quality work—which students rarely see—might boost student confidence more than very good work. We also predicted that a peer's very good work—which students are often shown—might be less discouraging if it were messy, suggesting it required effort and struggle. However, in experiments with university students and low‐educated adults, these hypotheses were not supported, and all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work. The failure to find support for these hypotheses can inform future research into social comparison effects on self‐confidence in numerical topics. These results also have practical implications for teachers and managers who are expected to provide examples of peer work.
Abstract: Students' low confidence, particularly in numerical topics, is thought to be a barrier to keeping them engaged with education. We studied the effects on confidence of exposure to a peer's work of varying quality (very good or bad) and neatness (messy or neat). Previous research underpinned our hypothesis that a peer's bad‐quality work—which students rarely see—might boost student confidence more than very good work. We also predicted that a peer's very good work—which students are often shown—might be less discouraging if it were messy, suggesting it required effort and struggle. However, in experiments with university students and low‐educated adults, these hypotheses were not supported, and all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work. The failure to find support for these hypotheses can inform future research into social comparison effects on self‐confidence in numerical topics. These results also have practical implications for teachers and managers who are expected to provide examples of peer work.
Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive; seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation; seems a type of mental state which is not up to us
Active desire. Uku Tooming. Philosophical Psychology, Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 945-968, Jun 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1629406
ABSTRACT: Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.
KEYWORDS: Desire, agency, imagination, affect, reasons
ABSTRACT: Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.
KEYWORDS: Desire, agency, imagination, affect, reasons
Negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS, as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration; mood was linked negatively with total usage time & call duration
Insights: Future Implications of Passive Smartphone Sensing in the Therapeutic Context. E.-M. Messner et al. Verhaltenstherapie 2019, https://doi.org/10.1159/000501735
Abstract
Background: Due to the ubiquitous use of smartphones in daily life, they offer unique opportunities to study human behaviour. This study sheds light on associations between self-reported stress, drive and mood levels and smartphone usage behaviour.
Methods: A total of 157 students installed the Insights app on their personal smartphone and tracked smartphone usage behaviour. Furthermore, students assessed self-reported levels of stress, drive and mood for 8 weeks.
Results: Three multi-level models were used to associate smartphone usage behaviour and self-reported mood, drive and stress levels. Results indicate a negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS (–3.539, SE = 0.937) as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration (0.018, SE = 0.937). Mood was linked negatively with total usage time (–0.019, SE = 0.004) and call duration (–0.016, SE = 0.007). Moreover, drive was negatively associated with Facebook usage time (–0.127, SE = 0.041).
Discussion: Overall smartphone usage behaviour is negatively associated with measurements of well-being.
Conclusion: Passive smartphone tracking could assist in the standardized assessment of behavioural data in real life in the future. Due to the risk of data misuse, ethical, legal and clinical guidelines have to be developed.
Keywords: Drive · Smartphone-tracking · Psychotherapy · Mood · Stress ·
Abstract
Background: Due to the ubiquitous use of smartphones in daily life, they offer unique opportunities to study human behaviour. This study sheds light on associations between self-reported stress, drive and mood levels and smartphone usage behaviour.
Methods: A total of 157 students installed the Insights app on their personal smartphone and tracked smartphone usage behaviour. Furthermore, students assessed self-reported levels of stress, drive and mood for 8 weeks.
Results: Three multi-level models were used to associate smartphone usage behaviour and self-reported mood, drive and stress levels. Results indicate a negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS (–3.539, SE = 0.937) as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration (0.018, SE = 0.937). Mood was linked negatively with total usage time (–0.019, SE = 0.004) and call duration (–0.016, SE = 0.007). Moreover, drive was negatively associated with Facebook usage time (–0.127, SE = 0.041).
Discussion: Overall smartphone usage behaviour is negatively associated with measurements of well-being.
Conclusion: Passive smartphone tracking could assist in the standardized assessment of behavioural data in real life in the future. Due to the risk of data misuse, ethical, legal and clinical guidelines have to be developed.
Keywords: Drive · Smartphone-tracking · Psychotherapy · Mood · Stress ·
In philosophy of mind, the difference between perception & misperception is seen in terms of accuracy (perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate); but perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy
Perceptual precision. Adrienne Prettyman. Philosophical Psychology, Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 923-944. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1598765
ABSTRACT: The standard view in philosophy of mind is that the way to understand the difference between perception and misperception is in terms of accuracy. On this view, perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate. However, there is some evidence (albeit controversial evidence) that perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy. I add to that evidence in the paper. Then I point toward a way of understanding the difference between perception and misperception, not in terms of accuracy alone, but in terms of precision. That is, I argue that perceptual experience is designed to enable more fine-grained discrimination among the properties that are most useful for action, even if that involves inaccuracy. The view in this paper motivates a new account of illusion, on which illusions are imprecise as well as inaccurate. I call this the Precision Account of Illusion.
KEYWORDS: Perception, illusion, psychology, philosophy of mind
ABSTRACT: The standard view in philosophy of mind is that the way to understand the difference between perception and misperception is in terms of accuracy. On this view, perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate. However, there is some evidence (albeit controversial evidence) that perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy. I add to that evidence in the paper. Then I point toward a way of understanding the difference between perception and misperception, not in terms of accuracy alone, but in terms of precision. That is, I argue that perceptual experience is designed to enable more fine-grained discrimination among the properties that are most useful for action, even if that involves inaccuracy. The view in this paper motivates a new account of illusion, on which illusions are imprecise as well as inaccurate. I call this the Precision Account of Illusion.
KEYWORDS: Perception, illusion, psychology, philosophy of mind
An empirical investigation of guilty pleasure (trash TV, kitsch)
An empirical investigation of guilty pleasures. Kris Goffin & Florian Cova. Philosophical Psychology, Aug 5 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1646897
ABSTRACT: In everyday language, the expression ‘guilty pleasure’ refers to instances where one feels bad about enjoying a particular artwork. Thus, one’s experience of guilty pleasure seems to involve the feeling that one should not enjoy this particular artwork and, by implication, the belief that there are norms according to which some aesthetic responses are more appropriate than others. One natural assumption would be that these norms are first and foremost aesthetic norms. However, this suggestion runs directly against recent findings in experimental philosophy, according to which most people deny the existence of aesthetic norms. Through three studies, we investigated people’s experiences of guilty pleasures and the norms that underlay these experiences. We tentatively conclude that guilty pleasures are more often connected to one’s personal norms and social expectations than to properly aesthetic norms.
KEYWORDS: Experimental philosophy, aesthetic normativity, emotions, guilty pleasures
ABSTRACT: In everyday language, the expression ‘guilty pleasure’ refers to instances where one feels bad about enjoying a particular artwork. Thus, one’s experience of guilty pleasure seems to involve the feeling that one should not enjoy this particular artwork and, by implication, the belief that there are norms according to which some aesthetic responses are more appropriate than others. One natural assumption would be that these norms are first and foremost aesthetic norms. However, this suggestion runs directly against recent findings in experimental philosophy, according to which most people deny the existence of aesthetic norms. Through three studies, we investigated people’s experiences of guilty pleasures and the norms that underlay these experiences. We tentatively conclude that guilty pleasures are more often connected to one’s personal norms and social expectations than to properly aesthetic norms.
KEYWORDS: Experimental philosophy, aesthetic normativity, emotions, guilty pleasures
Psychological reactions to human versus robotic job replacement
Psychological reactions to human versus robotic job replacement. Armin Granulo, Christoph Fuchs & Stefano Puntoni. Nature Human Behaviour (2019), August 5 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0670-y
Abstract: Advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are increasingly enabling organizations to replace humans with intelligent machines and algorithms1. Forecasts predict that, in the coming years, these new technologies will affect millions of workers in a wide range of occupations, replacing human workers in numerous tasks2,3, but potentially also in whole occupations1,4,5. Despite the intense debate about these developments in economics, sociology and other social sciences, research has not examined how people react to the technological replacement of human labour. We begin to address this gap by examining the psychology of technological replacement. Our investigation reveals that people tend to prefer workers to be replaced by other human workers (versus robots); however, paradoxically, this preference reverses when people consider the prospect of their own job loss. We further demonstrate that this preference reversal occurs because being replaced by machines, robots or software (versus other humans) is associated with reduced self-threat. In contrast, being replaced by robots is associated with a greater perceived threat to one’s economic future. These findings suggest that technological replacement of human labour has unique psychological consequences that should be taken into account by policy measures (for example, appropriately tailoring support programmes for the unemployed).
Abstract: Advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are increasingly enabling organizations to replace humans with intelligent machines and algorithms1. Forecasts predict that, in the coming years, these new technologies will affect millions of workers in a wide range of occupations, replacing human workers in numerous tasks2,3, but potentially also in whole occupations1,4,5. Despite the intense debate about these developments in economics, sociology and other social sciences, research has not examined how people react to the technological replacement of human labour. We begin to address this gap by examining the psychology of technological replacement. Our investigation reveals that people tend to prefer workers to be replaced by other human workers (versus robots); however, paradoxically, this preference reverses when people consider the prospect of their own job loss. We further demonstrate that this preference reversal occurs because being replaced by machines, robots or software (versus other humans) is associated with reduced self-threat. In contrast, being replaced by robots is associated with a greater perceived threat to one’s economic future. These findings suggest that technological replacement of human labour has unique psychological consequences that should be taken into account by policy measures (for example, appropriately tailoring support programmes for the unemployed).
Cognition in the fast lane: Ravens’ gaze duration are half as short as humans’ when choosing objects; their vision picks up more information per time unit
Bobrowicz, K., & Osvath, M. (2019). Cognition in the fast lane: Ravens’ gazes are half as short as humans’ when choosing objects. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6(2), 81–97. https://doi.org/10.26451/abc.06.02.01.2019
Abstract: Time cannot be directly perceived; instead, its flow is inferred from the influx of sensory information. To prevent sensory overload, attentional mechanisms split up information into processable units. This portioning remains imperceptible to the individual. However, the length of these units still influences the speed of perception and the speed at which behaviors are performed. Previous studies have focused on establishing the length of these units in various mammalian species – mainly humans – by measuring different types of behaviors, including gaze. However, no such studies have been conducted on birds. We measured duration of ravens’ (Corvus corax) single gazes towards selectable objects before a choice was made, and compared it with that of humans in a similar set up. The raven gaze durations were approximately half those of humans (which fell slightly short of previously established ranges). We hypothesize that these differences are mainly due to the much higher so-called flicker-fusion-frequency in birds, which makes their vision faster in the sense that it picks up more information per time unit than mammalian vision does. We further discuss that the speed of perception might influence the general speed of cognitive processing in more complex tasks as well, and suggest that the addition of a temporal component in comparative cognitive studies might be informative.
KeywordsTime constant, Raven, Moment, Temporal processing, Cognition, Visual perception
Abstract: Time cannot be directly perceived; instead, its flow is inferred from the influx of sensory information. To prevent sensory overload, attentional mechanisms split up information into processable units. This portioning remains imperceptible to the individual. However, the length of these units still influences the speed of perception and the speed at which behaviors are performed. Previous studies have focused on establishing the length of these units in various mammalian species – mainly humans – by measuring different types of behaviors, including gaze. However, no such studies have been conducted on birds. We measured duration of ravens’ (Corvus corax) single gazes towards selectable objects before a choice was made, and compared it with that of humans in a similar set up. The raven gaze durations were approximately half those of humans (which fell slightly short of previously established ranges). We hypothesize that these differences are mainly due to the much higher so-called flicker-fusion-frequency in birds, which makes their vision faster in the sense that it picks up more information per time unit than mammalian vision does. We further discuss that the speed of perception might influence the general speed of cognitive processing in more complex tasks as well, and suggest that the addition of a temporal component in comparative cognitive studies might be informative.
KeywordsTime constant, Raven, Moment, Temporal processing, Cognition, Visual perception
A partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness; however, female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner
Show Me Your Partner and I’ll Let You Know if You are a Leader. Ipek Kocoglu and Murad A. Mithani. Academy of Management ProceedingsVol. 2019, No. 1, Aug 1 2019. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2019.13175abstract
Abstract: We integrate the research on evolutionary leadership with the evolutionary psychology of mate choice to investigate if the perception of an individual’s leadership capability is affected by the attractiveness of their partner. We argue that attractive partners signal unobservable leadership qualities, and accordingly, individuals are likely to be viewed more leader-like in the presence of an attractive partner than when seen alone. Study 1 found that a partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness. However, the benefits were limited to male CEOs. Female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner. In study 2, we found that while the penalty for female CEOs increased when they were synthetically coupled with an attractive male, the spillover of partner’s attractiveness was positive for females that were perceived to be significantly more attractive than their partners. Our findings suggest that indirect cues that emanate from the partner are critical for leadership assessment. They invoke attributions that enhance the perceived leadership of males but largely disapprove of females as leaders.
Abstract: We integrate the research on evolutionary leadership with the evolutionary psychology of mate choice to investigate if the perception of an individual’s leadership capability is affected by the attractiveness of their partner. We argue that attractive partners signal unobservable leadership qualities, and accordingly, individuals are likely to be viewed more leader-like in the presence of an attractive partner than when seen alone. Study 1 found that a partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness. However, the benefits were limited to male CEOs. Female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner. In study 2, we found that while the penalty for female CEOs increased when they were synthetically coupled with an attractive male, the spillover of partner’s attractiveness was positive for females that were perceived to be significantly more attractive than their partners. Our findings suggest that indirect cues that emanate from the partner are critical for leadership assessment. They invoke attributions that enhance the perceived leadership of males but largely disapprove of females as leaders.
Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development
Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development. Nadia Chernyak et al. Psychological Science, August 5, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619854975
Abstract: The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments (N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.
Keywords: direct reciprocity, altruism, social groups, cognitive development, social norms, open data, open materials
Abstract: The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments (N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.
Keywords: direct reciprocity, altruism, social groups, cognitive development, social norms, open data, open materials