Abstract: Moral pride acts as an intrinsic reinforcement of moral behavior. However, a study with adolescents revealed a paradoxical effect: prosocial behaviors which involved either going against the group majority or other personal costs (dedication of time and effort, a possible punishment, etc.) generated less, not more, moral pride, indicating that moral pride is weakened just when it is needed most. Does this effect reflect a specific characteristic of adolescent morality or a relatively stable weakness in moral functioning? The aim of the present study was to determine whether or not this effect continues beyond adolescence. The sample was made up of 152 young adults, 78 women and 74 men. Participants were given 8 scenarios in which someone needed help (two for each combination of the two variables considered: going against the majority and other costs) and were asked how proud they would feel if they helped. Among this age group, the negative effect of other costs was reversed (higher costs, more pride); that of going against the majority had weakened, but had not been reversed. Women scored higher for moral pride than men.
Keywords: Moral pride, moral emotions, young adulthood, group influence, personal costs, gender differences
Discussion
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In relation to the measure of general moral pride (pride in all 8 scenarios, regardless
of whether or not participants said they would actually help), the results revealed that,
among young adults, the negative and paradoxical effect of the other personal costs factor had disappeared altogether. Indeed, our study found the opposite effect, which, in
principle, is more logical from a psychological perspective, namely that more costly
actions generated significantly greater pride. Moreover, the effect size was relevant: g2 ¼
.096 (medium effect size, see Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Nevertheless, the
negative effect of the going against the group majority factor had not disappeared (i.e.
behaviors which involved going against the majority continued to generate significantly
less pride), although it was considerably weaker in the present sample of young adults,
g2 ¼ .120, than in the adolescent sample, g2 ¼ .301 (Etxebarria et al., 2014).
If we analyze the pride felt in situations in which participants said they would actually help (a measure we feel is more appropriate), among the young adults in our sample, the negative effect of the personal costs factor was not only not significant, as
indeed occurred in this measure of pride in the adolescent sample (Etxebarria et al.,
2014), it was again totally reversed. This, more logical, opposite effect was found to be
both significant and large (g2 ¼ .221), indicating that, among young adults, more costly
actions one believes one would actually carry out generate more moral pride. As regards
going against the group majority, a certain amount of progress was observed in comparison with the adolescent sample (Etxebarria et al., 2014), since the negative effect
was no longer found to be significant. In other words, behaviors which involved going
against the majority did not generate significantly less pride among young adults.
Nevertheless, the effect was not completely reversed, since this type of behavior still was
not found to generate significantly more pride.
In sum, we can conclude that, among young adults, and unlike that observed with
adolescents, behaviors which involve a personal cost of some kind do indeed generate
significantly more pride. However, behaviors that involve going against the group
majority do not, although, at least in relation to the pride felt due to actions one thinks
one would take, neither do they generate less pride. In short, the results presented here
indicate that, in this age group, the negative effect of the other personal costs factor has
completely disappeared, to the point of being reversed (the more costly the behavior,
the more pride generated). In contrast, the negative effect of the going against the group
majority factor is considerably weakened, but has not yet been reversed.
The effects outlined above were similar in both men and women, although –as
hypothesized– women scored significantly higher for moral pride (or, more specifically,
authentic moral pride, as specified earlier). This is an interesting result. In the same
context, Etxebarria et al. (2018) found no significant gender differences in authentic
moral pride in four studies focusing on this emotion: two with children aged between 9
and 11, and two with adolescents aged between 14 and 16. They did, however, find significant differences in a fifth study with adolescents aged between 16 and 18. For their
part, Krettenauer and Casey (2015) found significant differences in favor of women
among Canadian adolescents and young adults (M ¼ 17.72 years, SD ¼ 3.65). Taken
together, these findings suggest that gender differences in moral pride may be clearer
from late adolescence onwards. Evidently, further research is required to determine
whether or not this is truly the case and, above all, if it is, to what it is due.
We shall now discuss the most relevant findings of the present study. The total disappearance, and even reversal, of the negative effect of the other personal costs factor
on moral pride among young adults not only supports our initial hypothesis, but actually goes one step further than we ventured to predict. Unlike that observed in adolescents (Etxebarria et al., 2014), among young adults the effect of this factor is positive,
with more costly actions generating more moral pride. This finding is consistent with
the changes that occur during this developmental stage transition in the assessment of
moral actions (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 2005; Kohlberg,
1984; Walker, 1989). As regards the weakening of the negative effect of the group opinion on moral pride, this result also supports our original hypothesis and is consistent
with the increase in resistance to peer pressure observed by Steinberg and Monahan
(2007) between the ages of 14 and 18. Also consistent with the results of the aforementioned study is the absence here of interactions between the gender variable and the
going against the group majority variable, since Steinberg and Monahan (2007)
observed that, although women were more resistant to peer pressure than men, the
increase in this resistance between the ages of 14 and 18 was identical for both genders.
Our results reveal that the negative effect of others’ opinion on pride when the
behavior involves going against the group majority is not limited to adolescence, a stage
in which the group opinion carries particular weight (Allen et al., 2005; Berndt, 1979;
Brown, 2004; Hart & Carlo, 2005). Although to a lesser degree, among young adults
also, fear of the group reaction and opinion also undermines the moral pride that may
be expected following a particularly costly moral action (precisely because it goes against
the group majority opinion), thereby preventing a significantly greater level of pride
from being generated in comparison with a behavior that does not involve this difficulty. This is consistent with the work of several authors (Asch, 1951; Suhay, 2015;
Turner, 1991) who have highlighted the fact that group opinion has a major effect on
people’s actions and judgments throughout the entire course of their lives.
The present study has a series of limitations that should be taken into account. In
addition to the measure of pride being based on participants’ own responses, a common
problem in this type of study (Hart & Carlo, 2005), it also uses a fairly low number of
scenarios. An attempt was made to control for the effect of the specific content of the
situations by having various different scenarios for each combination of the variables
studied. Nevertheless, in order to avoid tiring participants (which may have had a detrimental effect on their responses), we opted to include only 2 scenarios for each of the 4
combinations of the two variables analyzed. Future research may wish to include a
higher number of scenarios for each combination, and it would also be useful to replicate this study using different scenarios.
It would also be interesting to analyze what happens after young adulthood. Does the
paradoxical effect observed in adolescence become even weaker? Do older adults feel
significantly more moral pride also when their prosocial actions go against the group
majority? While this would be the ideal outcome, the data do not suggest that this is
indeed the case. In their study, Steinberg and Monahan (2007) found no evidence of
any increase in resistance to peer pressure between the ages of 18 and 30. Alongside age
differences, it would also be interesting to analyze possible cultural differences in this
sense. It may be that this paradoxical effect and its continued presence beyond adolescence are stronger in cultures characterized by an interdependent self than in those with
an independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Mesquita & Markus, 2004).
We believe that the results of the study by Etxebarria et al. (2014), as well as those
presented here, are vital to attaining a more comprehensive understanding of moral
pride. Moral pride is an emotion that, without doubt, plays a very important regulatory
role in moral action, since it acts as an intrinsic booster of this particular type of behavior (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007, 2008; Etxebarria et al., 2015; Hart & Matsuba, 2007;
Ortiz et al., 2018). However, it is also a weak emotion, overly influenced by the opinions of others, and often disappears just when it is most needed.
From a practical perspective, the results of these studies highlight the need for resources designed to ensure that not only children and adolescents, but also young people and adults in general, understand that moral action often requires diverging from, or even going against the group majority opinion, and that this should not be a reason to feel shame or embarrassment, but rather should give rise to legitimate feelings of authentic moral pride.
This is an idea that should be promoted at home, at school and in the media, with careful attention being paid in all three contexts to the messages being conveyed. Each context and each age group requires a different approach, but in one way or another, in all cases it is important to underscore the fact that it is ultimately up to the individual him or herself to assess actions ethically and that the goodness of an act cannot be measured simply in terms of the majority opinion. There are (unfortunately) many situations, in both the personal and the social-historical fields, which we could use to illustrate this. In short, from childhood onwards, we need to develop the resources necessary to ensure individuals are capable of withstanding this (often pernicious) group influence and that they understand that, in moral terms, being in the minority does not necessarily invalidate one’s position, but rather, on the contrary, sometimes even increases one’s merit. By doing this, we can help people conserve the legitimate moral pride they feel as a result of actions which justify it, thereby safeguarding the important moral motivation that this emotion generates.
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