Abstract: One promising approach for reducing affective polarization is priming a shared American identity and one promising event to prime that identity is the 4th of July. Prior work showed that proximity to the 4th of July reduced affective polarization. We conceptually replicated this study using a 9-wave longitudinal design in 2019. We found no short-term or long-term effects of the 4th of July on social distance from partisan and ideological ingroups or outgroups. There were individual differences in social distance trajectories across time, but there were not individual differences in short-terms changes in social distance in close proximity to the 4th of July. Although priming a shared American identity may be effective, these findings suggest that the salutary effects of the 4th of July holiday do not emerge in 2019, suggesting that the effectiveness of primes of American identity are not consistent overtime.
Replication data: https://osf.io/26bua/?view_only=a85cb58461c34a59b8db8d2eb5666bfc
This manuscript has not been peer-reviewed. Comments are appreciated. Send any to
m.j.brandt at tilburguniversity.edu
General Discussion
We found no clear effects of proximity to the 4th of July on social distance from partisan and
ideological outgroups, ingroups, or ideological moderates using a preregistered 9-wave panel study.
Although individual differences exist on a number of the relevant longitudinal trajectories, we did
not find individual differences on any of the factors representing short terms changes in social
distance near the 4th of July. These results should cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 4th of July to
reduce affective polarization.
There are important differences from Levendusky’s (2018) original finding. Levendusky used
a between-subjects design in the election year of 2008 and asked participants to evaluate candidates.
We used a within-subjects design in the off-election year of 2019 and asked participants to evaluate
partisan and ideological ingroups and outgroups. All of these methodological differences should not
theoretically cause a problem. For example, the original paper was about affective polarization
broadly (i.e. not just about candidates) and the theorizing should apply to our measures of social
distance. Similarly, it seems that, if anything, a non-election year might be less polarizing because the
political context is less competitive. Nonetheless, the political system in the United States is in a
different place in 2019 compared to 2008. In the summer of 2008, both presidential candidates
expressed support for working with members of the other party and bridging American divides. In
the summer of 2019, Donald Trump advocated for a polarizing military-style parade to help
celebrate the 4th of July. These different political contexts may be enough to shift the meaning of the
4th of July and reduce its potential depolarizing impact.
Levedusky’s (2018) original theoretical insight was that a common ingroup identity might
reduce affective polarization. Although we did not find support for the idea that this might occur via
proximity to the 4th of July, common ingroup identity could still be an effective depolarization
strategy. This suggests that what serves as an effective prime of common ingroup identity is subject
to change. According to Hornsey and Hogg (2000), making the superordinate identity salient while
ignoring subgroup identities might induce identity threat and therefore perpetuate intergroup bias.
As such, future application of Levendusky’s (2018) July the 4th paradigm may find it useful to
acknowledge the American, Democrat and Republican identities simultaneously. However, it is
possible that growing differences between Democrats and Republicans limit the effectiveness of the
American identity to function as a common ingroup. Rutchick and Eccleston (2010) argue that
because Democrats and Republicans have rather different ideas about what the American identity
means, it may be less able to harmoniously unite these subgroups. If this is the case, then carefully
constructing primes to work their current context is important for replicating and extending the
work on American identity primes, as well as using this work in practical settings.
The longitudinal design allowed us to identify the existence of individual differences in
response to the proximity of the 4th of July. However, this came at the cost of nonrepresentativeness. Although our analyses suggest little heterogeneity in the effects of proximity to
the 4th of July, an even more heterogenous sample may identify the predicted effects. We were also
only able to include a single-item measure of affective polarization, although we were able to use this
measure for both ideological and partisan groups. Our results suggest that proximity to the 4th of
July does not impact social distance from ideological and partisan outgroups, ingroups, or
ideological moderates in 2019. Other primes of American identity may be more effective.
This manuscript has not been peer-reviewed. Comments are appreciated. Send any to
m.j.brandt at tilburguniversity.edu
General Discussion
We found no clear effects of proximity to the 4th of July on social distance from partisan and
ideological outgroups, ingroups, or ideological moderates using a preregistered 9-wave panel study.
Although individual differences exist on a number of the relevant longitudinal trajectories, we did
not find individual differences on any of the factors representing short terms changes in social
distance near the 4th of July. These results should cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 4th of July to
reduce affective polarization.
There are important differences from Levendusky’s (2018) original finding. Levendusky used
a between-subjects design in the election year of 2008 and asked participants to evaluate candidates.
We used a within-subjects design in the off-election year of 2019 and asked participants to evaluate
partisan and ideological ingroups and outgroups. All of these methodological differences should not
theoretically cause a problem. For example, the original paper was about affective polarization
broadly (i.e. not just about candidates) and the theorizing should apply to our measures of social
distance. Similarly, it seems that, if anything, a non-election year might be less polarizing because the
political context is less competitive. Nonetheless, the political system in the United States is in a
different place in 2019 compared to 2008. In the summer of 2008, both presidential candidates
expressed support for working with members of the other party and bridging American divides. In
the summer of 2019, Donald Trump advocated for a polarizing military-style parade to help
celebrate the 4th of July. These different political contexts may be enough to shift the meaning of the
4th of July and reduce its potential depolarizing impact.
Levedusky’s (2018) original theoretical insight was that a common ingroup identity might
reduce affective polarization. Although we did not find support for the idea that this might occur via
proximity to the 4th of July, common ingroup identity could still be an effective depolarization
strategy. This suggests that what serves as an effective prime of common ingroup identity is subject
to change. According to Hornsey and Hogg (2000), making the superordinate identity salient while
ignoring subgroup identities might induce identity threat and therefore perpetuate intergroup bias.
As such, future application of Levendusky’s (2018) July the 4th paradigm may find it useful to
acknowledge the American, Democrat and Republican identities simultaneously. However, it is
possible that growing differences between Democrats and Republicans limit the effectiveness of the
American identity to function as a common ingroup. Rutchick and Eccleston (2010) argue that
because Democrats and Republicans have rather different ideas about what the American identity
means, it may be less able to harmoniously unite these subgroups. If this is the case, then carefully
constructing primes to work their current context is important for replicating and extending the
work on American identity primes, as well as using this work in practical settings.
The longitudinal design allowed us to identify the existence of individual differences in
response to the proximity of the 4th of July. However, this came at the cost of nonrepresentativeness. Although our analyses suggest little heterogeneity in the effects of proximity to
the 4th of July, an even more heterogenous sample may identify the predicted effects. We were also
only able to include a single-item measure of affective polarization, although we were able to use this
measure for both ideological and partisan groups. Our results suggest that proximity to the 4th of
July does not impact social distance from ideological and partisan outgroups, ingroups, or
ideological moderates in 2019. Other primes of American identity may be more effective.
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment