There is a positive relation between the personal importance that subjects attribute to a moral issue and the objectivity they bestow to it; presenting moral demands as objective may be instrumental to the function of choosing sides in moral debate

Hopster, Jeroen and Klenk, Michael, Evolution and the Objectivity of Moral Judgments (December 9, 2019). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500683

Abstract: Can findings from experimental and evolutionary psychology help to adjudicate the debate between moral realism and moral antirealism? In this article we address this question from two angles. First, we present the results of an experiment in moral psychology we have conducted, which shows that there is a positive relation between respondents’ ratings of the ‘personal importance’ and the ‘objectivity’ attributed to moral issues. Second, we discuss these results in the context of a recent hypothesis from evolutionary psychology, according to which objectifying moral issues serves a signaling function: agents present moral issues as objective to flag that they find these issues important. Does this hypothesis, if correct, have any metaethical implications? We acknowledge some of the pitfalls in drawing robust metaethical conclusions from this body of work, but argue that it is metaethically relevant nonetheless: it overturns a key desideratum of metaethical analysis in a realist-unfriendly way.

Keywords: Metaethics, moral psychology, experimental psychology, folk objectivity, evolutionary debunking arguments, social consensus, personal importance, signalling, choosing sides


4. General Discussion: The Psychosocial and Evolutionary Functions of Objectifying Morality

In the previous section we presented experimental evidence which suggests that personal
importance is one of the determinants of regarding moral statements as objective. In this section
we turn to the question of what psychosocial function objectifying moral issues might serve,
and what this function might tell us about morality’s evolutionary origins. Objectifying moral
demands may serve multiple psychosocial functions; here we will highlight some of the
functions that we think are particularly prevalent. While these proposals are not directly
implied by our experimental work, they have a good fit with our experimental findings.

4.1 What Is the Function of Externalizing Moral Demands?
Perhaps the first metaethicist to suggest that objectifying moral judgments serves a
psychosocial function was John Mackie (1977). According to Mackie, it often serves
interpersonal relations well to behave as morality requires: ‘We need morality to regulate
interpersonal relations, to control some of the ways in which people behave towards one
another, often in opposition to contrary inclinations. We therefore want our moral judgments
to be authoritative’ (1977 p. 43). Think of situations which involve a tragedy of the commons:
to coordinate action by referring to common moral values might help to solve social
predicaments.
Why should moral values be regarded as objective to serve this function? Followers of
Mackie, such as Joyce (2006), have argued that objectifying moral demands has a motivational
upshot: feeling an internal sense of moral obligation motivates us to behave as morality
requires. Perhaps this is part of the explanation, but as Stanford (2018) has recently argued, it
cannot be the full story. We are also motivated by subjective experiences, such as the
experience of pain or hunger, which we do not cast in terms of having an external authority.
What additional function is served by supposing moral demands to be objective?
Wright et al. (2013; 2014) have formulated a hypothesis about the psychosocial
function of moral objectivism that may answer this question. Building on experimental findings
which suggest that subjects’ attitudes towards regarding moral issues as objective is quite
flexible and diverse, they suggest that a capacity to modulate the objectivity ascribed to moral
issues helps to coordinate dialogue and action both within and between sociocultural groups
(Wright, McWhite, Grandjean 2014 p. 31):
Viewing a moral issue as objectively grounded removes it from the realm of legitimate
personal/social negotiation (…). Viewing a moral issue as non-objectively grounded,
on the other hand, allows people to acknowledge its moral significance (…), while at
the same time maintaining room for choice, dialogue, and debate.
We think that Wright et al.’s hypothesis is along the right lines: presenting a moral
demand as objective typically signals an unwillingness of the agent making the demand to
easily change her mind about it. But we disagree that objectifying moral issues removes them
from the realm of legitimate negotiation. More plausibly, we think, an ascription of objectivity
serves to signal on which topics agents are willing to stand their ground in moral discussion.
This function, in turn, is at least partly modulated by what issues agents find important, as our
experimental results suggest. Presenting an issue as objective typically signals that agents are
willing to stand their ground in moral debate, often with regard to issues which they judge to
be of specific personal importance.

4.2 Moral Objectification: A Signalling Hypothesis
Our signalling hypothesis contrasts with the view that the function of objectifying moral
judgments serves the function of moral persuasion. As Mercier, Sperber (2017) argue,
discussions typically do not serve to grasp truths but to persuade other parties. We grant that
the same might typically be true for moral discussions, but we do not think that this is the main
function of presenting moral issues as objective. Rather than dialectical effectiveness – i.e. an
ability to efficaciously change other people’s minds – we think that objectifying moral issues
typically serves to signal that agents care about an issue and are not easily prepared to change
their minds about it. In doing so they give others a choice: on this issue you’re either with me,
or against me. Hence, presenting moral issues as objective may be an effective means to form
moral alliances, to enhance in-group cohesion and to demarcate the out-group.
Our signalling hypothesis also contrasts with the view that moral objectification is
mostly due to conformity bias. We do not deny that conformity bias may play a role in moral
decision-making, but hypothesize that when issues are presented as objective, this is typically
not due to an agent seeking conformity. Rather than siding with the majority, presenting a
moral issue as objective serves to signal agents’ personal commitment to the issue and their
willingness to stand their ground, even in the face of contrary moral viewpoints and regardless
of the consensus view. Perhaps signalling this commitment is specifically beneficial if a moral
stance is a minority view: it allows fellow activists to rally support for specific moral issues
irrespective of what the majority says.

4.3 Choosing Sides
Two of the features of moral objectification outlined in the previous subsection – objectifying
moral issues often instigates third parties to choose sides, and often does so on the basis of the
contents of specific issues rather than majority consensus – are congruent with a recent
evolutionary hypothesis by DeScioli, Kurzban (2013), who have argued in detail in support of
the thesis that the main evolutionary function of moral judgment is choosing sides in conflict.
Choosing sides is a strategic interaction problem that involves a perpetrator, a victim and a
third-party condemner. Different solutions are possible, some which involve decision
procedures that would never be advisable in making individual choices, but may be beneficial
in multiplayer interactions.
One possible solution is to choose sides on the basis of pre-existing alliances. However,
this strategy has the downside of escalating conflicts, resulting in greater fighting costs. A
second solution is to choose sides on the basis of power: third parties side with the most
powerful party in the conflict. However, this strategy has the downside of concentrating power
in the hands of high-status individuals and may lead to authoritarianism and exploitation. A
third solution is to choose sides by focusing on the contents of an action. Some actions may be
flagged as never–to-be-done or categorically wrong; this public signal can subsequently
coordinate third-party judgment. This solution is characteristic of moral conflicts, in which
bystanders typically coordinate which side they choose not on the basis of the identities of the
disputants but on the basis of their actions. Indeed, some characteristic features of morality –
its impartiality, non-consequentialist characteristics and the categorical nature of moral
demands – can be explained by this strategic interaction framework.
Our hypothesis fits well with that of DeScioli, Kurzban (2013) and extends it to the
metaethical domain. We think that objectifying moral issues is instrumental to the function of
choosing sides. For parties engaged in conflict, presenting an issue as objective serves as an
effective instrument to force third parties to choose sides in the debate. By objectifying an
issue, members of the party engaged in conflict signal their intention to stand their ground, and
force bystanders to choose: on this issue they are either with them, or against them.

5. A Challenge for Moral Realism from Evolutionary Psychology?

In this article we have highlighted recent experimental findings from moral psychology,
including those of our own, as well hypotheses from moral psychology concerning the
psychosocial and evolutionary functions of moral objectivism. Let’s assume that they are along
the right lines. Do they have any implication for metaethics? More specifically, do they give
rise to a challenge for moral realism, which does not face the same objections as Ruse’s EDA
(subsection 1.2)?
We think they do – not by debunking realism, but by challenging the presumptive
assumption of realism based on the phenomenological claim. Recall that realists typically
support their position by appealing to the seeming objectivity of moral demands (e.g. Brink
1989; Enoch 2015).7 As noted, recent experimental findings do not straightforwardly vindicate
the assumption that moral demands are conceived as objective in the realist’s sense. Moreover,
to the extent that moral demands are conceived as strongly objective, we have provided
evidence that this is plausibly regarded as an artefact of our psychology, and that our tendency
to objectify moral demands can be understood in evolutionary terms. This does not establish
that the objectivity of moral demands is merely an illusion, as Ruse argues, but it does serve to
undercut the presumptive support that our moral phenomenology bestows upon moral realism
– which, as mentioned, is one of the main arguments that realists have traditionally provided
in support of their view.

Differently put, the findings we have presented serve to undercut the validity of the
desideratum that metaethicists should vindicate the ‘objective seemings’ of our moral
experience. To the extent that this objectivist phenomenology is real, debunkers can argue that
our perceived sense of moral objectivity can be explained in evolutionary terms. The upshot is
that, whether or not moral realism is ultimately tenable, it need not be regarded as the default
position in metaethics, as its defenders typically suggest (e.g. Enoch 2015). For those who think
that realism is the ‘view to beat’ in metaethics, our conclusion provides an important change
to the dialectic of the debate.
In closing, let us point out exactly how the relation between scientific findings and their
metaethical implications should be understood, in the context of the case-study we have
presented. Underlying the presumptive assumption of moral realism is an inference to the best
explanation: a realist metaethics provides the best explanation for the ‘datum’ that moral
demands are typically regarded as strongly objective (a datum that was originally assumed
from the armchair, and that has subsequently been partly corroborated by experimental work).
Realists present a metaethical explanation to account for this datum: we think of moral
demands as objective, because we have some intuitive grasp of a stance-independent moral
reality. This is not the only kind of explanation that could be advanced, however. For instance,
the datum could also be explained in scientific terms. Indeed, in this article we have argued
that a convincing explanation for the flexible objectivism found in experimental research
comes from evolutionary psychology: that some (but not all) moral issues are associated with
a strong sense of objectivity has to do with the psychosocial benefits of objectifying them,
specifically those moral issues that are of personal importance to agents.
Our alternative explanation does not establish that the realist’s metaethical explanation
is false. However, given the good fit our alternative explanation has with findings from
experimental metaethics, and given its evolutionary plausibility, we do think that realists lose
their presumptive entitlement to claim that they have the better explanation. As far as our
argument goes, it is an open question which explanation will ultimately be better – but realists
will have to argue for a claim to superiority. An appeal to the apparent objectivity of moral
experience no longer suffices to think that the starting point of moral realism is more intuitive
than the starting point of antirealist positions. This conclusion may have ramifications for the
success of EDAs against moral realism, insofar as some argue that those EDAs can be resisted
if assumptions about the truth of moral realism are granted.
Interestingly, in the foregoing discussion two different kinds of explanation have been
pitted against each other: the psychological explanation favoured by antirealists, versus
the metaethical explanation favoured by realists. We think that not too much weight should be
attached to these classifications, however: in the present context both of them refer to
descriptive explanations, albeit with different metaphysical postulates. It would be a fallacy to
think that one kind of explanation should be favoured over the other in principle. This fallacy
is reminiscent of the flaw of Ruse’s EDA: as noted in section 1.2, Ruse wrongly assumed that
his evolutionary explanation for the characteristics of our moral phenomenology automatically
renders the metaphysical postulates of realism redundant.
Hence, in explaining the nature of our moral phenomenology, it cannot simply
be assumed that either a psychological or a metaethical explanation will be superior.
Nonetheless, to the extent that these are explanations of the same phenomenon, they may
justifiably be regarded as rivalling explanations. Since this condition is met in the case-study
we have presented, and since moral realists previously assumed to be uniquely able to account
for the objectivist features of moral experience, the psychological findings we have discussed
in this article overturn an important argument in support of moral realism. However, they do
not debunk moral realism as such. Even if an explanandum originally explained in terms of a
realist metaethics is actually better explained in psychological terms, there might still be other
grounds for defending moral realism as the preferred metaethical framework. The burden-of-proof, however, has now shifted to realists to demonstrate this.


6. Conclusion
We presented experimental findings which indicate that there is a positive relation between the
personal importance that subjects attribute to a moral issue and the objectivity they bestow on
this issue. Subsequently, we discussed these findings in the context of the psychosocial and
evolutionary functions of moral objectivity, and proposed that presenting moral demands as
objective may be instrumental to the function of choosing sides in moral debate. This
evolutionary account helps to explain the objectivist phenomenology of moral demands, and
its flexibility depending on different moral issues. The ability to provide such an explanation,
in turn, has implications for the metaethical debate: it serves to undercut the presumptive
assumption of moral realism.