ABSTRACT: The underlying cognitive mechanisms that regulate how people formulate moralistic judgements of others’ behaviors and traits are poorly understood. This study tests the novel prediction, based on a hypothesized function of self-interested propaganda, that the extent to which a given trait is perceived as virtuous is positively influenced by one’s own standing on that trait. In a first study, data were gathered from 237 participants who completed an online survey. Participants rated the same list of traits for (i) their self-perceived standing on those traits, and (ii) their judgment of those traits as being virtuous. Some notable correlations between self-perceived trait possession and virtue ratings of those traits are Patriotism (r = 0.56, p < .01), Religiosity (r = 0.56, p < .01), Attractiveness (r = 0.5, p < .01), and Strength (r = 0.49, p < .01). A second study replicated these findings when controlling for participants’ estimates of (i) what others in their immediate social world would perceive as virtues, and (ii) what others in their distant social world would perceive as virtues. Although preliminary, these initial findings suggest that our expressed virtue judgments of specific traits may function, in part, as self-interested propaganda, by influencing the social value assigned by local others to the traits we happen to possess.
Saturday, February 1, 2020
Our expressed virtue judgments of specific traits may function, in part, as self-interested propaganda, by influencing the social value assigned by local others to the traits we happen to possess
Morality and the Modular Mind: Propagandistic Self-Interest and Perceptions of Virtue. Schwab, Leon T. California State University, Fullerton, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019. 27547780. https://search.proquest.com/openview/d3e07a339e0df51cfc8a674b86ab3f5c/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y
ABSTRACT: The underlying cognitive mechanisms that regulate how people formulate moralistic judgements of others’ behaviors and traits are poorly understood. This study tests the novel prediction, based on a hypothesized function of self-interested propaganda, that the extent to which a given trait is perceived as virtuous is positively influenced by one’s own standing on that trait. In a first study, data were gathered from 237 participants who completed an online survey. Participants rated the same list of traits for (i) their self-perceived standing on those traits, and (ii) their judgment of those traits as being virtuous. Some notable correlations between self-perceived trait possession and virtue ratings of those traits are Patriotism (r = 0.56, p < .01), Religiosity (r = 0.56, p < .01), Attractiveness (r = 0.5, p < .01), and Strength (r = 0.49, p < .01). A second study replicated these findings when controlling for participants’ estimates of (i) what others in their immediate social world would perceive as virtues, and (ii) what others in their distant social world would perceive as virtues. Although preliminary, these initial findings suggest that our expressed virtue judgments of specific traits may function, in part, as self-interested propaganda, by influencing the social value assigned by local others to the traits we happen to possess.
ABSTRACT: The underlying cognitive mechanisms that regulate how people formulate moralistic judgements of others’ behaviors and traits are poorly understood. This study tests the novel prediction, based on a hypothesized function of self-interested propaganda, that the extent to which a given trait is perceived as virtuous is positively influenced by one’s own standing on that trait. In a first study, data were gathered from 237 participants who completed an online survey. Participants rated the same list of traits for (i) their self-perceived standing on those traits, and (ii) their judgment of those traits as being virtuous. Some notable correlations between self-perceived trait possession and virtue ratings of those traits are Patriotism (r = 0.56, p < .01), Religiosity (r = 0.56, p < .01), Attractiveness (r = 0.5, p < .01), and Strength (r = 0.49, p < .01). A second study replicated these findings when controlling for participants’ estimates of (i) what others in their immediate social world would perceive as virtues, and (ii) what others in their distant social world would perceive as virtues. Although preliminary, these initial findings suggest that our expressed virtue judgments of specific traits may function, in part, as self-interested propaganda, by influencing the social value assigned by local others to the traits we happen to possess.
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