Political polarization in climate change views increases with higher education & income; higher education particularly strengthens the conservative white male (CWM) effect; individualism mediates the ideological divide

Does socioeconomic status moderate the political divide on climate change? The roles of education, income, and individualism. Matthew T. Ballew et al. Global Environmental Change, Volume 60, January 2020, 102024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102024

Highlights
•    Political polarization in climate change views increases with higher education and income.
•    Higher education particularly strengthens the conservative white male (CWM) effect.
•    Individualism mediates the ideological divide in climate change views.
•    Individualism mediates the CWM effect only for those with higher education.

Abstract: Previous research documents that U.S. conservatives, and conservative white males in particular, tend to dismiss the threat of climate change more than others in the U.S. public. Other research indicates that higher education and income can each exacerbate the dismissive tendencies of the political Right. Bridging these lines of research, the present study examines the extent to which higher education and/or income moderate the ideological divide and the “conservative white male effect” on several climate change opinions, and whether these effects are mediated by an individualistic worldview (e.g., valuing individual liberty and limited government). Using nationally representative survey data of U.S. adults from 2008 to 2017 (N = 20,024), we find that across all beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy preferences examined, the ideological divide strengthens with both higher education and higher income. However, educational attainment plays a stronger role than income in polarizing the views of conservative white males. Further analyses support the hypothesis that differences in individualism partially explain the increased political polarization among more educated and higher-income adults, as well as greater dismissiveness among conservative white males relative to other demographic groups. These results highlight key moderators of opinion polarization, as well as ideological differences among conservatives, that are often overlooked in public discourse about climate change. Implications for climate change education and communication across demographic groups are considered.

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4. Discussion
In a large, nationally representative dataset of the U.S. public (2008–2017; N = =20,024), we find that the ideological divide in climate change opinion in the U.S. is exacerbated by higher educational attainment and higher income, thus supporting previous research (e.g., Bohr, 2014; Drummond and Fischhoff, 2017; Ehret et al., 2017; Hamilton, 2011). Further, expanding on research on the “conservative white male effect” (e.g., McCright and Dunlap, 2011b), we find that education plays a stronger and more consistent role than income in bolstering the views of conservative white males—a subgroup of the U.S. population that has been found to be particularly dismissive of climate change and resistant to mitigation policy. Although education seems to positively predict global warming views (e.g., belief that it is happening, is human-caused, etc.) among the U.S. public generally, moderation tests reveal that educational attainment may, conversely, strengthen conservative white males’ dismissive tendencies and opposition to climate policy. Higher education is consistently associated with increased polarization between conservative white males and other Americans across several global warming beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy preferences (e.g., support for CO2 regulation). Although higher income is associated with increased polarization between conservative white males and other Americans on some measures (e.g., policy support), the patterns for income were not as consistent as those for education.

Among conservatives and the conservative white male subgroup, our analyses suggest that those with more education (some college or more) are significantly less likely than those with less education (high school or less) to view global warming as human-caused, to worry about global warming, to perceive it as a risk (in some cases), and to support some climate change mitigation policies. For example, compared to those who are less educated, more educated conservative white males are less worried about global warming (23%% vs. 30% of those with less education), less likely to perceive it as a personal risk (12% vs. 21%), and less supportive of regulating greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions (46% vs. 55%). Further, among conservative white males, compared to differences in views by income, differences by educational attainment are found across a wider range of opinion metrics: education is negatively associated with expressed beliefs and risk perceptions (and to a stronger degree, as indicated by comparisons of effect sizes) for conservative white males than for conservatives in general. While income was significantly negatively associated with some pro-climate views for conservatives in general, these relationships were generally non-significant for conservative white males. Together, these results suggest that, compared to income, educational attainment may play a stronger and more robust role in widening the ideological divide, particularly between conservative white males and other adults in the U.S.

In addition, as hypothesized, education and income significantly moderate ideological differences in individualism. For conservatives and conservative white males, there is a positive relationship between both education and income and endorsing an individualistic worldview; yet, the relationship is negative for other U.S. adults. Further, the results of the moderated mediation analyses suggest that differences in individualism explain, in part, how higher educational attainment and income exacerbate the ideological divide in climate change opinion. For conservative white males in particular, however, education again seems to be a stronger predictor of individualism than income, which, in turn, partially explains how higher educational attainment enhances opinion polarization between conservative white males and other demographic groups. In fact, conditional indirect effect analyses show that individualism significantly mediates differences between conservative white males and other Americans only for those with average or higher education. These results suggest that educational attainment may bolster tendencies of conservative white males to value individualism, and thus strengthen ideologically based opinions about climate change.

Together, the results of this study align with several theoretical accounts, including identity protective cognition (Kahan et al., 2007), ideological consistency and elite cues (e.g., Ehret et al., 2017), and models of the self across socioeconomic status contexts (e.g., Stephens et al., 2014). Because exposure to climate science typically increases alongside higher education (Bohr, 2014), and higher education also leads to increased exposure to the norms of one's political ingroup (Ehret et al., 2016), conservatives and conservative white males, in particular, may be more aware of and motivated to defend ideological positions associated with their worldviews (e.g., individualism) when confronted with information about climate change and climate-related policies (e.g., regulating CO2 emissions). Our findings also support current theoretical accounts of the conservative white male effect which posit a process of reinforcing one's worldview to protect against opposing knowledge and information (McCright and Dunlap, 2011b,2013). Our data suggest a strengthened individualistic worldview may be one way in which higher educational attainment may influence conservative white males’ climate change opinions in ways that diverge from other U.S. adults. Alternatively, lower socioeconomic status (particularly education) may limit ideological polarization by attenuating individualistic resistance to government intervention.

Importantly, individualism, as conceptualized and operationalized here, as well as in previous research (e.g., Peters and Slovic, 1996; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), has clear connections to libertarian values reflecting a focus on individual liberty and limited government involvement (Iyer et al., 2012). As discussed by Iyer and colleagues, the visibility of, and interest in, libertarian values increased in 2008 with the presidential campaign of Texas Congressman Ron Paul and the rise of the Tea Party in 2009. Resistance to government intervention also appears to be common oppositional rhetoric among the political Right (at least among politicians and interest groups) when it comes to U.S. policymaking (e.g., Campbell and Kay, 2014). These values are distinct from other elements of conservatism, such as traditionalism (respect for traditions, institutions, and authority; see Iyer et al., 2012). Because we find that increased individualism partially explains the increased ideological divide associated with higher education and income, it is plausible that conservatives who are higher in socioeconomic status—particularly educated conservative white males—also more strongly identify with libertarianism or hold stronger libertarian values compared to other members of the U.S. public. Future work might further examine ideological differences among conservatives to better understand both pro- and anti-climate positions within the political Right, and the extent to which social and political libertarianism might explain these differences.

5. Limitations and future directions
Future research might further investigate additional processes and disentangle theoretical accounts that explain how social class influences political polarization in climate change opinion. Other mechanisms may well play a role in driving opinion polarization. For instance, Ehret and colleagues (2017) found that as liberals and conservatives become more educated, they also show more interest in government and public affairs, and media and political messengers (i.e., elite cues) communicating these interests, which partially explains divergence in environmental support. Similarly, elite cues may also play a role in reinforcing ideologies and worldviews (for instance, libertarian views that the government should not get involved in people's lives). Another possibility is that greater interdependence observed among lower-SES individuals (e.g., Eom et al., 2018; Stephens et al., 2014) may dampen effects of ideological polarization by reducing libertarian-driven resistance to climate policies. Future research might examine this possibility. Because mitigating climate change is paramount to the future of humanity and other species (IPCC, 2018), it is important to understand the processes by which certain groups become dismissive of climate change and resistant to climate policy, and what factors might limit dismissiveness and opposition.

In addition, income and education are only two of many potential socioeconomic indicators and, thus, further research is needed to understand whether the current results generalize to other dimensions of social class, such as occupational status or subjective assessments (i.e., perceived ranking relative to others; Kraus et al., 2009). Future research might extend our understanding of the relationship between social class and the ideological divide in climate change opinion, for instance, by incorporating subjective aspects of social class (e.g., perceived class rank; Kraus et al., 2009) and the extent to which they influence polarization relative to objective indicators.

Importantly, this study aggregates cross-sectional surveys and, thus, provides only correlational evidence of the role of socioeconomic status and individualism in shaping climate change opinion polarization. Although experimental manipulation of such variables may be difficult or impractical, longitudinal research may provide some additional insights. For example, future studies might track individuals across the political spectrum over the course of their education, or changes in socioeconomic status (e.g., changes in income, employment status), to better understand what factors predict change in climate attitudes, beliefs, and policy preferences over time. Moreover, future work in this area might also help uncover ways to counteract the effect that higher educational attainment may have among the political Right.

6. Implications
The current study has implications for how to foster pro-climate opinion and action, and for identifying subgroups in the U.S. who may be more receptive to climate change education and communication campaigns than others. For example, communicating the scientific consensus is an effective gateway to fostering pro-climate views among the political Right (van der Linden et al., 2015) and people can learn about the scientific consensus through discussion with friends and family (Goldberg et al., 2019). Education initiatives might highlight the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change to combat dismissive tendencies. Also, because misinformation (e.g., the notion that there is scientific uncertainty about climate change) is disseminated through certain media outlets, an “inoculation” strategy may further help to counteract dismissiveness (van der Linden et al., 2017; see also Cook et al., 2017). That is, when individuals are preemptively told that some groups intentionally work to promote doubt on the scientific facts of climate change, it helps build resistance against misinformation. Education initiatives might consider inoculation techniques to help neutralize the negative effects of misinformation on public understanding of climate change.

Further, public discourse focusing on the politicization of climate change and the general ideological divide (e.g., the Right vs. Left) may be exaggerating partisan differences and overlooking distinct sources of opposition (see Van Boven et al., 2018). As we show here, there is clear heterogeneity among conservatives. Conservative white males higher in socioeconomic status (particularly in education) seem to be among the primary oppositional demographic groups, and our findings suggest that this may be due, in part, to heightened individualism among this group. Conversely, conservatives lower in socioeconomic status (including conservative white males) express less opposition and individualism, suggesting they represent an overlooked demographic group that could help bridge political divides on climate change, particularly when it comes to mitigation policy (Pearson et al., 2017). Communications with the public might be sensitive to this distinction. For instance, conservatives higher in socioeconomic status might be more receptive to individual- or libertarian-framed messages (e.g., emphasizing free-market solutions that reinforce notions of individual autonomy; Campbell and Kay, 2014), whereas those lower in socioeconomic status might be more open to government intervention and community-driven action plans.

Although public understanding of climate change has increased over the last five years in the U.S. (Leiserowitz et al., 2018) and there is evidence that understanding is on the rise among the political Right (Leiserowitz et al., 2019), political polarization on the issue remains stark. Tailoring climate change education and communication for different audiences within the U.S. public may help narrow the partisan divide on climate change and foster greater consensus in pro-climate views.

Funding: This project was supported by the 11th Hour Project, the Energy Foundation, the Grantham Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation.