Highlights
• Participants made less accurate metacognitive other-judgments than self-judgments.
• Metacognitive other-judgments were also more overconfident than self-judgments.
• This pattern occurred across a variety of contexts and relationships.
• This pattern was not caused by the temporal distance between judgments and testing.
• Possessing a mixed or negative impression of the target eliminated this effect.
Abstract: People are often overconfident in their own cognitive abilities. We investigated whether overconfidence extends to judgments from or about other people, and tested various competing theories of this relationship. Across six studies using various methods and contexts, results showed that people were more confident in others’ cognitive abilities than in their own. This pattern of results occurred in the classroom for grade predictions (Studies 1 and 2), in the laboratory for standard cognitive test predictions (Studies 3–6), when people knew others well or had just met (Study 4), when they liked the other person, but not when they did not like the person (Study 5), and when calibration could be verified and when it could not be verified (Study 6). Results are interpreted in terms of an information-motivation theory, which suggests that people turn to motivational information and thus overpredict others’ performance relative to their own when they lack information about other’s metacognitive states and when they are motivated to see others in a positive light. These findings offer another perspective on overconfidence, both literally and figuratively, by demonstrating that people appear to be more overconfident in others’ cognitive abilities than in their own.
Keywords: OverconfidenceMetacognitionPredictionsSelfOthers
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment