Abstract: Evolution proposes differences in mate preferences between the two sexes. Females prefer mates who can invest in them and their offspring. In the contemporary era, gender ideologies are not always in line with these premises, but desires still could be. The conflict between ideology and desire could trigger cognitive dissonance in contemporary feminist women. We recruited 246 women online to investigate the occurrence of dissonance based on feminist attitudes, and whether dissonance reduction strategies (i.e., behavior change, cognition change) differed based on their preference for consistency. Results showed that highly feminist women who desire sexist men experienced more cognitive dissonance (operationalized as negative affect) than women lower in feminist attitudes. Preference for consistency moderated cognitive dissonance's association with behavior, but not cognition change.
Keywords: Cognitive dissonanceMate preferenceFeminismPreference for consistency
4. Discussion
The current study showed that desire toward evolutionarily preferable mate behaviors conflicted with feminist attitudes, creating cognitive dissonance. We predicted that when attraction was held constant, such behaviors would trigger cognitive dissonance in heterosexual feminist women, deeming them sexist. Indeed, our pilot study supported this finding, and its association with high negative affect as indicative of cognitive dissonance. In the experiment, in line with our hypothesis, feminist women attributed to the vignette protagonist similar dissonance regardless of the type of sexist behaviors, be it overt or subtle. We found support for findings on within-sex variation in mate preferences; desiring resource display was challenged by those who had strong endorsement of feminism, and their desire toward any sexist-deemed behavior proved problematic. Hughes and Aung (2017) found several individual differences that moderated women's mate preferences. We expanded their list with feminism; feminist women were put off by resource display, unlike their non-feminist counterparts. Less feminist women did not experience dissonance in the subtle condition because the man's manner of displaying resources was deemed attractive (as evolutionary trends and traditional gender roles suggest) and was not misaligned with any prior attitudes. They still experienced higher NA in the overt condition compared to the control. Although Harmon-Jones (2000) found that NA measures dissonance irrespective of aversive situations, this could still be due to the overall unpleasantness of the interaction, and not a reflection of feminist attitudes.
Our findings showed that once women experienced cognitive dissonance, they employed dissonance reduction strategies to relieve the emerging negative arousal. This supports previous research in the validity of assessing affect as an indicator of cognitive dissonance. Overall, we found that women who felt high negative affect were more likely to use behavior change (i.e., terminate the interaction). Furthermore, individual's preference for consistency moderated this effect. Previous research had examined preference for consistency as an individual difference that predicted cognitive dissonance (Nolan & Nail, 2014). We, in return, investigated the moderating role of preference for consistency on dissonance reduction strategies. We showed, contrary to our hypothesis, that the association of negative affect with behavior change was stronger for women who were low (vs. high) on preference for consistency. This may be because high PFC participants sought consistency with the “going on the date” decision, and not with their feminist attitudes. That is, once people engage in attitude deviating behaviors, seeking consistency is fixed on the deviation and not on the attitudes, demonstrating the foot-in-the-door effect (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010).
Interestingly, there was no systematic explanation for employing cognition change after experiencing dissonance. All participants employed it for overt and subtle sexist men, independent of their negative affect and level of feminism. However, in the control condition, only women low on feminism used it. We are not surprised, as without attitude violation, there is no need for cognition change. Less feminist women, conversely, may have needed to change cognitions to adapt to the feminism-aligned treatment of the control man. As for the unexpected findings on NA and PFC, Vaidis and Bran (2018) differentiated between “inconsistency resolution” and “arousal reduction” in dissonance reduction processes. Following that, we argue that our model was based on negative arousal; therefore, PFC was not a suitable variable in explaining cognitions that seek to resolve the inconsistency.
In the current study, it is evident that various cognitive dissonance reduction strategies, such as behavior and/or cognition change, can be employed depending on the individual's dispositions and the context. This study allowed participants to choose several strategies, thus enabling us to approach real life and see that strategies are not necessarily concomitant. People may change cognitions while they terminate the relationship to modify their narrative about the date and feel better, or they may use it to keep dating without feeling dissonance. McGrath (2017) argued that which strategy to use depends on its likelihood of success and effortfulness. In a dating context, termination is a conclusive strategy to end dissonance, whereas cognition change requires effortful restructuring and has the potential to recur. Therefore, the data revealed higher use of behavior change overall, even though both strategies were used.
4.1. Limitations and suggestions for further research
We treated behavior change and cognition change as concurrent independent dimensions; further research should explore reduction strategies with forced-choice paradigms. Our vignettes read from the point of view of a fictional protagonist, inducing vicarious dissonance, to avoid the attraction constant being met with resistance, as was found in our pilot study. However, making termination decisions for another person might be more straightforward, and this might be why our model did not explain the process of cognition change. We manipulated various behaviors of male gender roles and found an additive effect; different contexts and behaviors should be examined to parse this effect. Measures other than negative affect could be implemented to assess dissonance. Additionally, having recruited participants online resulting in a self-selected sample might limit the generalizability of our findings. Future research can investigate how cognitive change strategies influence long-term attitudes and behaviors. Finally, our findings should be taken into consideration within the cultural characteristics of the Turkish population. As a collectivist culture enforcing traditional gender roles that reinforce evolutionary mate preferences, the dissonance feminist participants felt might be indicative of tension between their ideologies and cultural values rather than with sexual desire. This finding should be further replicated in cultures with higher gender equality and lower traditional values.
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