Prevalent emotion‐theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, leading to the hypothesis that psychopaths are (almost) completely unable to make moral judgments

Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations. Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen. Mind & Language, September 22 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12317

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1308793107358658563

Abstract: Psychopathy has been theorized as a disorder of emotion, which impairs moral judgments. However, these theories are increasingly being abandoned as empirical studies show that psychopaths seem to make proper moral judgments. In this contribution, these findings are reassessed, and it is argued that prevalent emotion‐theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the unjustified assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, which leads to the hypothesis that psychopaths are completely unable to make moral judgments. An alternative and novel explanation is proposed, theorizing psychopathy as a degree‐specific emotional deficiency, which causes degree‐specific differences in moral judgments.