We the ugly can be subject to structurally unjust patterns of sexual desire; the others can be held responsible for correcting this injustice

Sexual Desire and Structural Injustice. Tom O'Shea. Journal of Social Philosophy (forthcoming). Oct 2020. https://philpapers.org/rec/OSHSDA

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1318434723962769409

Abstract: This article argues that political injustices can arise from the distribution and character of our sexual desires and that we can be held responsible for correcting these injustices. It draws on a conception of structural injustice to diagnose unjust patterns of sexual attraction, which are taken to arise when socio-structural processes shaping the formation of sexual desire compound systemic domination and capacity-deprivation for the occupants of a social position. Individualistic and structural solutions to the problem of unjust patterns of sexual attraction are assessed in the context of racialised sexual aversion, racial fetishism, and the desexualisation of people with disabilities. While both forms of intervention can help, some of the advantages of structural approaches are laid out. A schema for assigning political responsibilities for addressing this injustice is proposed, with some limits identified to the kinds of state and social responses that are justified. Finally, the status of the merely aesthetically unappealing is considered, with a relational egalitarian approach concluding that they are subject to structurally unjust patterns of sexual desire only when exposed to oppression or second-class citizenship as a result.

Keywords: sexual desire  structural injustice  race  disability  dating  social structure  orectic injustice  sex  online platforms  desire

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Is it unjust that some people are less sexually desired than others? We might have sympathy for the sexually undesired but supposing they suffer an outright injustice can seem absurd. My view is that this reaction is too hasty, and that sexually desirability can be a matter of political justice. This is a strong claim, which is likely to invite a torrent of objections, whether for confusing misfortune with injustice, licensing unwarranted political meddling, indulging in sexual moralism, or asking the impossible of us. But I shall suggest a compelling social philosophy of sexual attraction can be articulated by considering the scope and character of sexual desires through the lens of structural injustice, while looking to collective and political rather than primarily individual and ethical remedies to the problem of unjust desire.

Sexual desirability is not a resource which can or should be doled out to the needy; nor is there a duty to desire, or a right to be so desired. Yet, sexual attractiveness matters in many of our lives – potentially influencing not only our opportunities for sexual intimacy, but our self-respect, social standing, and access to romantic relationships. Going sexually undesired or under-desired can compound disadvantage in these respects. Mere disadvantage, however, is not sufficient for political injustice. Instead, I shall argue there can be grounds of justice for holding people responsible for transforming the socio-structural processes which shape the distribution and character of sexual desires when these processes underpin domination and deprivation.