Increase in health anxiety in university student samples 1985-2017; the annual percentage of Internet users was not predictive of mean health anxiety

Three decades of increase in health anxiety: Systematic review and meta-analysis of birth cohort changes in university student samples from 1985 to 2017. Amanda Kosic et al.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2020.102208

Highlights
• It is hypothesised that health anxiety has increased over the past decades.
• We reviewed birth cohort health anxiety in university student samples 1985–2017.
• Student mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales (IAS) increased by 4.61 points
• The annual percentage of Internet users was not predictive of mean health anxiety.
• Findings were robust, at least with regard to undergraduate samples.

Abstract: Health anxiety can be defined as a multifaceted trait that is primarily characterised by a fear of, or preoccupation with, serious illness. Whereas low levels of health anxiety can be helpful, clinically significant levels are associated with personal suffering and substantial societal costs. As general anxiety is probably on the rise, and the Internet has increased access to health-related information, it is commonly speculated that health anxiety has increased over the past decades. We tested this hypothesis based on a systematic review and meta-analysis of birth cohort mean health anxiety in Western university student samples from 1985 to 2017. Sixty-eight studies with 22 413 student participants were included. The primary analysis indicated that the mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales had increased by 4.61 points (95 % CI: 1.02, 8.20) from 1985 to 2017. The percentage of general population Internet users in the study year of data collection was not predictive of student mean health anxiety. In conclusion, this study corroborates the hypothesis of an increase in health anxiety, at least in the student population, over the past decades. However, this increase could not be linked to the introduction of the Internet.

Keywords: Birth cohortCross-temporal meta-analysisGenerationsHealth anxietyHypochondriasisStudents

Outgroup members are not thought to experience all secondary emotions less intensely; rather, they are thought to experience prosocial emotions less intensely but antisocial emotions more intensely

Enock, Florence, Steven Tipper, and Harriet Over. 2020. “No Convincing Evidence That Outgroup Members Are Dehumanised: Revisiting Trait and Emotion Attribution in Intergroup Bias.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/hm82y

Abstract: We challenge the prevalent claim that outgroup members are dehumanised. In study 1, we conducted a systematic content analysis of historical documents from Nazi Germany and showed that, even in these supposedly prototypical cases of extreme dehumanisation, victims are described in ways that only make sense when applied to humans. In studies 2a-c, we test Haslam’s influential dual model of dehumanisation. We show that outgroup members are thought to possess positive human attributes to a lesser extent but negative human attributes to a greater extent. In study 3, we test Leyens’ prominent infrahumanisation model and demonstrate that, contrary to a body of previous work, outgroup members are not thought to experience all secondary emotions less intensely. Rather, they are thought to experience prosocial emotions less intensely but antisocial emotions more intensely. In a final study, we question the hypothesised relationship between dehumanisation and modulation of prosocial behaviour. We demonstrate that describing someone in uniquely human terms can actually reduce prosociality towards them when those terms are antisocial. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that representing others as ‘less human’ holds explanatory power in the study of intergroup bias.

Possible Fiscal Policies for Rare, Unanticipated, and Severe Viral Outbreaks

Possible Fiscal Policies for Rare, Unanticipated, and Severe Viral Outbreaks. Bill Dupor. St Louis Fed, Mar 17 2020. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020/03/17/possible-fiscal-policies-for-rare-unanticipated-and-severe-viral-outbreaks

Consumer spending in restaurants, travel, leisure, hospitality, and some retail trade sectors is falling because of precautions taken by businesses, households, and governments to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Social distancing and similar actions are reducing demand in some sectors.

The proper fiscal policy response in this situation is not necessarily to try to replace or stimulate that demand, given that the fall in demand is a natural byproduct of the caution.1 Rather, the proper policy response may look different from conventional stabilization policy. This essay asks: What should guide a fiscal authority in conducting macroeconomic policy in the event of a severe viral outbreak?

Below I describe some potential fiscal policies that may be appropriate. Two economic principles and one operational principle motivate these potential recommendations.

First, incentivize behavior to align with recognized public health objectives during the outbreak.

Second, avoid concentrating the individual financial burden of the outbreak or the policy response to the outbreak.

Third, implement these fiscal policies as quickly as possible, subject to some efficiency considerations.

At this point, experts are evaluating a wide range of scenarios for the trajectory of the virus in the United States. Some of these scenarios involve a substantial toll on Americans' health. If coordinated macroeconomic policies could help to slow the rate of transmission—by an amount that would reduce overloading U.S. hospitals and help buy time to find a vaccine—so that some of the negative health effects were reduced, this would be a major return on the federal dollars invested in such a program. The pay-off would be in addition to some of the standard business cycle mitigation that motivates standard fiscal interventions.

I describe a $197.1 billion proposal with the above issues in mind. Because some observers have advocated for tax rebates in response to COVID-19, and these could prove useful, I also add this component as an option. It increases the overall size of the fiscal intervention to nearly $350 billion.2 For comparison, the 2009 Recovery Act had a budget impact of about $815 billion.3

It is well understood that fiscal policy operates with a lag. Parts of a proposal such as the one outlined below might take several weeks to a few months to undergo CBO assessment and budget projections, the federal legislative process, and coordination between state, local, and federal officials to implement those fiscal policies. If the planning process were started now, legislators would have the option to vote for or against federal authorizations depending on whether the policies were deemed necessary up to the moment before a final vote was taken.

Younger adults were self-biased, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, exerting less force into prosocial work; older people were more willing to put in effort for others

Lockwood, Patricia, Ayat Abdurahman, Anthony Gabay, Daniel Drew, Marin Tamm, Masud Husain, and Matthew A. J. Apps. 2020. “Ageing Increases Prosocial Motivation for Effort.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8c5ra

Abstract: Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly ageing populations. Helping others requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit ourselves and other people, and whether such behaviours shift across the lifespan, is poorly understood. Using computational modelling we tested the willingness to exert effort into self or other benefitting acts in younger (age 18-36) and older adults (55-84, total n=187). Participants chose whether to work and exert effort, (between 30-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or prosocially for another. Younger adults were self-biased, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, but also superficial, exerting less force into prosocial work. Strikingly, compared to younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for self and other. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behaviour and societal structure.

Adults demonstrating lower personal on-line risk perceptions and higher third-person perceptions of risk than their adolescent counterparts

Asymmetrical third-person effects on the perceptions of online risk and harm among adolescents and adults. Sarah L. Buglass et al. Behaviour & Information Technology, Mar 17 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2020.1742380

ABSTRACT: Although research has identified a range of opportunities, risks, and harms related to online social networking, the public debate on online risks follows a set pattern by which members of older age groups (parents, regulators) hold a picture of members of younger age groups (teenagers, digital natives) at a uniformly high level of risk. Perceptions of online risk, however, are prone to third-person effects in which individuals perceive risks to be more apparent in others than themselves. This study investigated third-person effects across age groups to further our understanding of the set positions found in current public debate. Multivariate analysis was used to compare adolescent and adult users’ personal and third-person perceptions of common psycho-social risks associated with social networking engagement in a sample of 506 UK-based Facebook users (53% male; 13–77 years). Results indicated that rates of exposure to online vulnerabilities were similar for both age groups. However, differences in adult and adolescent perceptions of risk highlighted apparent mismatches between reported exposure to risk and an individual’s perceptions, with adults demonstrating lower personal perceptions and higher third-person perceptions of risk than their adolescent counterparts. The research considers the implications of risk perception on an individual’s online vulnerability.

KEYWORDS: Facebook, risk perception, online vulnerability, third-person effect, adolescent users, online networking

Women in same-sex couples spend more time together, both alone and in total, than individuals in different-sex arrangements and men in same-sex couples, regardless of parenthood status

Same-Sex Couples’ Shared Time in the United States. Katie R. Genadek, Sarah M. Flood & Joan Garcia Roman. Demography (2020). Mar 17, https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-020-00861-z.

Abstract: This study examines and compares shared time for same-sex and different-sex coresident couples using large, nationally representative data from the 2003–2016 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). We compare the total time that same-sex couples and different-sex couples spend together; for parents, the time they spend together with children; and for both parents and nonparents, the time they spend together with no one else present and the time they spend with others (excluding children). After we control for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the couples, women in same-sex couples spend more time together, both alone and in total, than individuals in different-sex arrangements and men in same-sex couples, regardless of parenthood status. Women in same-sex relationships also spend a larger percentage of their total available time together than other couples, and the difference in time is not limited to any specific activity.

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In countries with high levels of gender inequality, women often walk faster than men in public places.