You Can Learn a Lot About Religion From Food. Adam B Cohen. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 6 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.07.032
Highlights
• Religions have a lot of rules about food and fasting, such as what foods are acceptable for which people to eat, and when.
• Understanding food practices can provide insight into religion, such as what it means to obey God, and the social order and worldview.
• Thinking about religious food practices can generate testable psychological hypotheses, such as whether caste- and gender-based food practices make people more attuned to class, hierarchy, and sex distinctions.
• Religious food practices provide basis for theorizing about the evolution of religious cultures, and about group and individual differences, which likely interact at multiple levels of analysis (individual motivations and dispositions, with ecological and cultural level influences).
Abstract: Religions’ food practices can illustrate a lot about religions, and can raise new research questions. I will give examples of ways in which religious food practices are reflections of broader religious ideals. Foods contain essences and are religiously symbolic; foods are a window into how people understand the necessity to obey God; food practices relate to health outcomes; and food practices reflect and inculcate social structures and worldviews. The article will go on to consider some broader questions raised including the origins and cultural evolution of food rules, and how food practices relate to group differences and individual differences.
Tuesday, August 18, 2020
The development of narrative identity & the emergence of personality disorders in adolescence: Adolescents & adults with PD narrate their lives in ways that are more negative & express lower agency
The development of narrative identity and the emergence of personality disorders in adolescence. Rebecca Shiner et al. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 6 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.07.024
Abstract: Narrative identity is likely to be important in the development of personality disorder (PD) in adolescence. Adolescents’ life narratives provide rich material that is near to their lived experiences and reveal individual differences in self and relatedness and in ways of constructing meaning. Narrative identity is linked with well-being and psychopathology and shapes coping with adversity. Preliminary research suggests that adolescents and adults with PD narrate their lives in ways that are more negative and express lower agency; narratives may also contain content reflecting PD symptoms. Youth’s narrative identities may express personality disturbances in self and relationship processes and may affect the consolidation of or recovery from emerging PD in the transition to adulthood—all possibilities worthy of future investigation.
Abstract: Narrative identity is likely to be important in the development of personality disorder (PD) in adolescence. Adolescents’ life narratives provide rich material that is near to their lived experiences and reveal individual differences in self and relatedness and in ways of constructing meaning. Narrative identity is linked with well-being and psychopathology and shapes coping with adversity. Preliminary research suggests that adolescents and adults with PD narrate their lives in ways that are more negative and express lower agency; narratives may also contain content reflecting PD symptoms. Youth’s narrative identities may express personality disturbances in self and relationship processes and may affect the consolidation of or recovery from emerging PD in the transition to adulthood—all possibilities worthy of future investigation.
Religions facilitate long-term, committed mating strategies by increasing paternal certainty or by pooling parenting resources; religious individuals are seen as sexually restricted, which has implications for mate choice & trust
Why are world religions so concerned with sexual behavior? Jordan W Moon. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.07.030
Highlights
• Religious beliefs and behavior across the world are closely linked to restricted sexual attitudes and behavior.
• Religions facilitate long-term, committed mating strategies by increasing paternal certainty or by pooling parenting resources.
• Social perceivers view religious individuals as sexually restricted, which has implications for mate choice and for trust.
• These aspects of religion may help explain why certain religions spread successfully, and why religions vary cross-culturally.
Abstract: Many religions emphasize the importance of sexual morality. This article argues mating strategies are central to understanding religion. I highlight the reproductive-religiosity model, which suggests that religious behavior is partly motivated by preferences for restricted mating strategies. I then discuss how religion can lead to reproductive benefits. Specifically, religions can make parenting a relatively safer strategy by increasing paternal certainty, which drives men toward parental investment, and alloparenting, which reduces offspring mortality rates. Next, I discuss the social implications of reproductive-religiosity, including mate selection and trust. Finally, I discuss the potential role of mating strategies in the evolution and cultural evolution of religion and discuss future directions for developing an approach to religion rooted in mating interests.
Highlights
• Religious beliefs and behavior across the world are closely linked to restricted sexual attitudes and behavior.
• Religions facilitate long-term, committed mating strategies by increasing paternal certainty or by pooling parenting resources.
• Social perceivers view religious individuals as sexually restricted, which has implications for mate choice and for trust.
• These aspects of religion may help explain why certain religions spread successfully, and why religions vary cross-culturally.
Abstract: Many religions emphasize the importance of sexual morality. This article argues mating strategies are central to understanding religion. I highlight the reproductive-religiosity model, which suggests that religious behavior is partly motivated by preferences for restricted mating strategies. I then discuss how religion can lead to reproductive benefits. Specifically, religions can make parenting a relatively safer strategy by increasing paternal certainty, which drives men toward parental investment, and alloparenting, which reduces offspring mortality rates. Next, I discuss the social implications of reproductive-religiosity, including mate selection and trust. Finally, I discuss the potential role of mating strategies in the evolution and cultural evolution of religion and discuss future directions for developing an approach to religion rooted in mating interests.
Death anxiety and religious belief relationship is inconsistent & probably near zero; extremely religious & irreligious individuals report lower death anxiety; nonbelievers pursue nonreligious forms of literal immortality
Death anxiety and religion. Jonathan Jong. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 19 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.08.004
Highlights
• The linear relationship between death anxiety and religious belief is inconsistent and probably averages around zero.
• There is some—albeit limited and culturally specific—evidence for a quadratic relationship between death anxiety and religion, such that extremely religious and irreligious individuals report lower death anxiety than others.
• Experiences with and proximity to death do not consistently predict religious belief.
• Reminders of death probably temporarily strengthen religious belief among believers, but not nonbelievers. Early evidence suggests that nonbelievers pursue nonreligious forms of literal immortality.
Abstract: This review summarises research on the relationship between death anxiety and religiosity. The fear of death is commonly hypothesized as a motivation for religious belief. From a Terror Management Theory perspective, religious beliefs are especially attractive because they offer both literal and symbolic immortality in the form of afterlife beliefs and belonging in venerable systems of value respectively. However, the evidence for any relationship—whether correlational or causal—between death anxiety and religious belief is weak. Indeed, evidence for death anxiety under normal (i.e., non-life threatening) circumstances is surprisingly hard to find. If the fear of death motivates religiosity, it does so subtly, weakly, and sporadically.
Highlights
• The linear relationship between death anxiety and religious belief is inconsistent and probably averages around zero.
• There is some—albeit limited and culturally specific—evidence for a quadratic relationship between death anxiety and religion, such that extremely religious and irreligious individuals report lower death anxiety than others.
• Experiences with and proximity to death do not consistently predict religious belief.
• Reminders of death probably temporarily strengthen religious belief among believers, but not nonbelievers. Early evidence suggests that nonbelievers pursue nonreligious forms of literal immortality.
Abstract: This review summarises research on the relationship between death anxiety and religiosity. The fear of death is commonly hypothesized as a motivation for religious belief. From a Terror Management Theory perspective, religious beliefs are especially attractive because they offer both literal and symbolic immortality in the form of afterlife beliefs and belonging in venerable systems of value respectively. However, the evidence for any relationship—whether correlational or causal—between death anxiety and religious belief is weak. Indeed, evidence for death anxiety under normal (i.e., non-life threatening) circumstances is surprisingly hard to find. If the fear of death motivates religiosity, it does so subtly, weakly, and sporadically.
Self-reported ideology does drift left at liberal arts colleges, but this is explained by a peer effect: students at liberal arts colleges drift more to the left because they have more liberal peers
Why College Students Drift Left: The Stability of Political Identity and Relative Malleability of Issue Positions among College Students. Matthew Woessner, April Kelly-Woessner. PS: Political Science & Politics, August 18 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096520000396
Abstract: In considering the liberalizing effect of college on students’ political values, we argue that political identities—in the form of self-identified ideology or partisanship—are components of social identity and are resistant to change. Using data from the Higher Education Research Institute’s student surveys, we show that what movement in identity does occur is mostly a regression to the mean effect. On several issue positions, however, students move in a more uniform leftward direction. We find that liberal drift on issues is most common among students majoring in the arts and humanities. Self-reported ideology does drift left at liberal arts colleges, but this is explained by a peer effect: students at liberal arts colleges drift more to the left because they have more liberal peers. The results have implications for future research on college student political development, suggesting that attitudinal change can be more easily identified by examining shifts in policy preferences rather than changes in political identity.
Abstract: In considering the liberalizing effect of college on students’ political values, we argue that political identities—in the form of self-identified ideology or partisanship—are components of social identity and are resistant to change. Using data from the Higher Education Research Institute’s student surveys, we show that what movement in identity does occur is mostly a regression to the mean effect. On several issue positions, however, students move in a more uniform leftward direction. We find that liberal drift on issues is most common among students majoring in the arts and humanities. Self-reported ideology does drift left at liberal arts colleges, but this is explained by a peer effect: students at liberal arts colleges drift more to the left because they have more liberal peers. The results have implications for future research on college student political development, suggesting that attitudinal change can be more easily identified by examining shifts in policy preferences rather than changes in political identity.
Common wisdom in paleoanthropology is that Neandertals had bigger brains than recent humans; but only had significantly larger endocranial volume when compared with recent human females
Did Neandertals have large brains? Factors affecting endocranial volume comparisons. Caroline VanSickle Zachary Cofran David Hunt. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, August 16 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.24124
Abstract
Objectives: Common wisdom in paleoanthropology is that Neandertals had bigger brains than recent humans. Here we tested the hypothesis that there is no difference in brain size between Neandertals and recent humans while accounting for methodological variation and the makeup of both the Neandertal and recent human samples.
Materials and Methods: We examined endocranial volume (ECV) derived from virtually reconstructed endocasts of 11 Neandertals, six of which had associated femoral head diameters (FHD). Our recent human comparative dataset consisted of virtually measured ECV and associated FHD from 94 recent humans from the Robert J. Terry Anatomical Collection (63 male, 31 female). ECV of Neandertals and recent humans was compared using bootstrap resampling, repeating the analysis for two groupings of Neandertals (all and classic) and for three groupings of recent humans (all, males, and females). To examine brain size scaling, we completed an ordinary least squares regression of log (ECV) against log (FHD) for Neandertals and recent humans.
Results: The results of the bootstrap resampling analyses indicated that Neandertals only had significantly larger ECV when compared with recent human females. The regression between ECV and FHD suggested that Neandertals fall within the range of variation for larger humans.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that Neandertals do not have uniquely large brains when compared with recent humans. Their brain size falls in the large end of the recent human range of variation, but does not exceed it. These results have implications for future research on Neandertal encephalization.
Abstract
Objectives: Common wisdom in paleoanthropology is that Neandertals had bigger brains than recent humans. Here we tested the hypothesis that there is no difference in brain size between Neandertals and recent humans while accounting for methodological variation and the makeup of both the Neandertal and recent human samples.
Materials and Methods: We examined endocranial volume (ECV) derived from virtually reconstructed endocasts of 11 Neandertals, six of which had associated femoral head diameters (FHD). Our recent human comparative dataset consisted of virtually measured ECV and associated FHD from 94 recent humans from the Robert J. Terry Anatomical Collection (63 male, 31 female). ECV of Neandertals and recent humans was compared using bootstrap resampling, repeating the analysis for two groupings of Neandertals (all and classic) and for three groupings of recent humans (all, males, and females). To examine brain size scaling, we completed an ordinary least squares regression of log (ECV) against log (FHD) for Neandertals and recent humans.
Results: The results of the bootstrap resampling analyses indicated that Neandertals only had significantly larger ECV when compared with recent human females. The regression between ECV and FHD suggested that Neandertals fall within the range of variation for larger humans.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that Neandertals do not have uniquely large brains when compared with recent humans. Their brain size falls in the large end of the recent human range of variation, but does not exceed it. These results have implications for future research on Neandertal encephalization.
Those who believed they had contracted COVID-19 engaged in greater rates of concealment of their social distancing practices & evaluated concealment more positively compared to those without the virus
Dishonesty during a pandemic: The concealment of COVID-19 information. Alison M O’Connor, Angela D Evans. Journal of Health Psychology, August 17, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105320951603
Abstract: Honest disclosures of COVID-19 behaviors and symptoms is critical. A sample of adults on MTurk (N = 451, 20–82 years of age) were asked if they have concealed social distancing practices, COVID-19 symptoms, and quarantine instructions, as well as how they evaluated others’ COVID-19 concealment. Those who believed they had contracted COVID-19 engaged in greater rates of concealment and evaluated concealment more positively compared to those without the virus. As age and communal orientation increased, COVID-19 concealment behaviors decreased, and evaluations of this concealment were rated more negatively. Implications for public health initiatives and psychological theory on concealing health information is discussed.
Keywords: age, community, disclosure, health, lie-telling
Abstract: Honest disclosures of COVID-19 behaviors and symptoms is critical. A sample of adults on MTurk (N = 451, 20–82 years of age) were asked if they have concealed social distancing practices, COVID-19 symptoms, and quarantine instructions, as well as how they evaluated others’ COVID-19 concealment. Those who believed they had contracted COVID-19 engaged in greater rates of concealment and evaluated concealment more positively compared to those without the virus. As age and communal orientation increased, COVID-19 concealment behaviors decreased, and evaluations of this concealment were rated more negatively. Implications for public health initiatives and psychological theory on concealing health information is discussed.
Keywords: age, community, disclosure, health, lie-telling
Participants preferred quality over quantity when choosing for a friend vs for themselves because of heightened self-presentation concerns: People choosing for friends are more concerned about conveying poor taste
The Quality Versus Quantity Trade-Off: Why and When Choices for Self Versus Others Differ. Peggy J. Liu, Ernest Baskin. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, August 17, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220941677
Abstract: The trade-off between quality and quantity pervades many domains of life, including that of making product choices for ourselves and others, whether as gifts or as everyday favors. In five studies (four pre-registered), participants preferred quality over quantity when choosing for a friend versus for themselves. We demonstrate that one reason why this difference in choice for self and other arises is because of heightened self-presentation concerns: People choosing for friends (vs. self) are more concerned about conveying poor taste, thus increasing choice of quality (vs. quantity). Consistent with this process, the effect is mitigated when choosing for a nonjudgmental friend or when choosing for a person whom one does not highly value. Finally, this effect is particular to quality-quantity trade-offs; it does not occur for flavor-quantity trade-offs, indicating that the effect is driven by the quality aspect rather than by the quantity aspect or by cost-per-unit considerations.
Keywords: self–other decision-making, quality, quantity, self-presentation, trade-offs
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Appearing as of bad taste was stronger motivation than appearing as cheap
Abstract: The trade-off between quality and quantity pervades many domains of life, including that of making product choices for ourselves and others, whether as gifts or as everyday favors. In five studies (four pre-registered), participants preferred quality over quantity when choosing for a friend versus for themselves. We demonstrate that one reason why this difference in choice for self and other arises is because of heightened self-presentation concerns: People choosing for friends (vs. self) are more concerned about conveying poor taste, thus increasing choice of quality (vs. quantity). Consistent with this process, the effect is mitigated when choosing for a nonjudgmental friend or when choosing for a person whom one does not highly value. Finally, this effect is particular to quality-quantity trade-offs; it does not occur for flavor-quantity trade-offs, indicating that the effect is driven by the quality aspect rather than by the quantity aspect or by cost-per-unit considerations.
Keywords: self–other decision-making, quality, quantity, self-presentation, trade-offs
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Appearing as of bad taste was stronger motivation than appearing as cheap
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