Monday, September 28, 2020

Do people who claim to be dispositionally open-minded, in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions that run counter to their own? Seems they don't.

 On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics. Emily J. Hanson. Ph D Thesis, Psychological and Brain Sciences. Washington University in St. Louis, 2020. https://search.proquest.com/openview/abe8cf853b03f6f6f5f3377a20bfd498/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310798907291639808

Abstract: This dissertation examines whether people who claim to be dispositionally open-minded, do in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions that run counter to their own. In Study 1, participants rated their partisan identity and dispositional open-mindedness prior to reacting to a series of fictional Facebook posts that varied in both their political ideology and political extremity. The results of this study demonstrated that the most consistent predictor of “open” reactions (operationalized in terms of both cognitive judgements and affective reactions) to each type of Facebook post was whether it was congruent with the participants’ partisan identity. Importantly, this effect was never moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. Thus, the degree to which a participant was high (vs. low) in open-mindedness did not significantly attenuate partisan bias or act to increase the likelihood of “open” reactions to outgroup political views. Study 2 utilized a similar design, except in this case participants were asked to predict how open they thought they would be to the same set of political issues used in Study 1. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that participants predicted they would be most open to attitudinally consistent political views. As in Study 1, these predictions were not moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. This means that participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded were not any more likely to predict they would be open to outgroup political opinions than those participants who scored themselves low in openmindedness. This research both builds upon and significantly extends prior work in both the psychological and political science literatures. The implications of these results and future directions are discussed.


In 1979 marriage was associated with lower earnings among women; by 2018 it was associated with higher earnings, suggesting greater positive selection of women with high earnings potential into marriage

The Declining Earnings Gap Between Young Women and Men in the United States, 1979-2018. John Iceland, Ilana Redstone. Social Science Research, September 28 2020, 102479, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102479

Abstract: We examine the dynamics of the gender earnings gap over the 1979 to 2018 period among full-time workers aged 25-29, focusing on the role of marital status and the presence of children. Using data from multiple years of the Current Population Survey, we find that the earnings gap declined among all groups of men and women, and by 2018 there was earnings parity among the those who were not married and without children. The share of people in this group also grew over the period, and comprised a majority of both men and women by 2018. We also find that while marriage was associated with lower earnings among women in 1979, by 2018 it was associated with higher earnings, suggesting greater positive selection of women with high earnings potential into marriage. The positive association between marriage and earnings among men remained stable. While we found a persistent earnings penalty for having children among women over the period, we found an emerging dampening effect of having children over time among men, which suggests that greater participation in childcare among men has led to lower earnings than in the past (i.e., a causal connection) and/or an emerging selection effect of young men more interested in childrearing over time, perhaps reflecting a cultural shift.

Key words: Gender InequalityEarningsMarriageChildren


Can nations be ranked on the quality of their elites? Elites are dominant coalitions possessing the strongest coordination capacity over a country’s key resources, creating value or extracting it

Casas, Tomas and Cozzi, Guido, Elite Quality Report 2020: 32 Country Scores and Global Rank (August 18, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3676776

Abstract: Can nations be ranked on the quality of their elites? Elites are dominant coalitions possessing the strongest coordination capacity over a country’s key resources. They run the highest impact business models, which can be value creating or value extracting. We aim to produce a political economy index and present the first ever comparative measurement of Elite Quality (EQ), that is, a country’s elites’ propensity – on aggregate – to create value, rather than to rent seek with extractive business models. Using data on 72 Indicators, the Elite Quality Index (EQx) ranks 32 countries. Based on its multi-layered index architecture, we quantify a country’s overall EQ, as well as offer an in-depth analysis of specific dimensions of EQ, such as the role of power (Power Sub-Index I) and current value creation activities (Value Sub-Index II) in the political and economic realm. On a more granular level, the Index consists of 12 Pillars, including Creative Destruction, State Capture and Capital Rent. We reveal substantial differences in the overall state of Elite Quality around the world and hence divergent mid- and long-term economic growth and human development prospects. In-depth analysis of regional dynamics (North East Asia), specific EQ dimensions as well as various country portraits (incl. the United States, China, German, Japan, Russia, Portugal and others) by experts and academics illustrate the varied use of the EQx as a new analytical tool to explain the political economy of countries. This global Index and country ranking is an innovative heuristic and approach that might help interpret – and possibly transform – the state of the world and its future.

Keywords: index, elite quality, institutions, value creation, rent seeking, crony capitalism, political economy, global ranking, international business

JEL Classification: D72, F50, P16, P48

Our unique capability: Once one appreciates that one’s thoughts about the future are just representations, one is in a position to evaluate them, to discount them, or to try to compensate for their shortcomings

From 2019... The future-directed functions of the imagination: From prediction to metaforesight. Adam Bulley, Jonathan Redshaw, Thomas Suddendorf. In book: The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination, Apr 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332154143

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310592701960777728

Abstract: One of the fundamental roles of human imagination is to enable the representation of possible future events. Here, we survey some of the most critical abilities that this foresight supports: anticipating future emotions, setting and pursuing goals, preparing for threats, deliberately acquiring skills and knowledge, and intentionally shaping the future environment. Furthermore, we outline how metacognition bolsters human capacities even further by enabling people to reflect on and compensate for the natural limits of their foresight. For example, humans make contingency plans because they appreciate that their initial predictions may turn out to be wrong. We suggest that the processes involved in monitoring, controlling, and ultimately augmenting future-oriented imagination represent an important and understudied parallel of "metamemory" that should be called "metaforesight".


2. Compensating for anticipated limits: introducing “metaforesight”

Humans, perhaps uniquely, are capable of meta-representational insight into

the relationship between their imagination and reality. In other words, people can

evaluate how imagined scenarios link in with the external world, and thus assess

whether what is imagined is likely to actually occur in the future, and whether it is

biased, pessimistic, or hopeful and so forth. In the broad sense, meta-representation

involves representing the relation between (i) a representation and (ii) what that

representation is about (Pylyshyn, 1978). The development of such a capacity in

childhood is widely considered as critical to the emergence of an understanding of

other people’s minds (e.g., Perner, 1991). In the domain of foresight, this form of

metacognition has long been given a central role (Suddendorf, 1999). Once one

appreciates that one’s thoughts about the future are just representations, one is in a

position to evaluate them, to modify them, to discount them, to discuss them, and to

try to compensate for their shortcomings (Redshaw, 2014; Redshaw & Bulley, 2018).

Indeed, this capacity may be crucial to children acquiring a mature sense of future

time itself – as a series of possible chains of events of which only one will actually

happen (see Hoerl & McCormack, 2018).


Involuntary Mental Time Travel into the Episodic Future, Episodic Past, and Episodic Counterfactual Past in Everyday Life

Branch, Jared. 2020. “Involuntary Mental Time Travel into the Episodic Future, Episodic Past, and Episodic Counterfactual Past in Everyday Life.” PsyArXiv. January 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jbkfg

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310584704555507717

Abstract: To date, studies exploring episodic counterfactual thoughts have employed laboratory studies to discern the subjective qualities of voluntary mental time travel (Branch & Anderson, 2018; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Ă–zbek, Bohn, & Berntsen, 2017). Here, we offer the first diary study of episodic counterfactual thinking, and therefore we report the subjective qualities of involuntary mental time travel into the counterfactual past. We find that such thoughts do occur, although to a much lesser extent than mental time travel into the future or past (i.e. episodic future thinking or episodic memory). The major purpose that episodic counterfactual thinking serves is mood regulation: to daydream and to feel better. We observed that the majority of episodic counterfactual thoughts are experienced in the recent past and decrease as a function of time. We also report on the phenomenological aspects of episodic counterfactual thoughts as they relate to future thinking and memories.


Compared to others of same age & gender, they believed they were unlikely to experience a range of controllable (eg accidentally infect/ be infected) & uncontrollable (eg need hospitalization/ intensive care treatment) COVID‐19‐related risks in the short term

Comparative optimism about infection and recovery from COVID‐19; Implications for adherence with lockdown advice. Koula Asimakopoulou  et al. Health Expectations, September 27 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13134

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310560848943906820

Abstract

Background: Comparative optimism, the belief that negative events are more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself, is well established in health risk research. It is unknown, however, whether comparative optimism also permeates people’s health expectations and potentially behaviour during the COVID‐19 pandemic.

Objectives: Data were collected through an international survey (N = 6485) exploring people’s thoughts and psychosocial behaviours relating to COVID‐19. This paper reports UK data on comparative optimism. In particular, we examine the belief that negative events surrounding risk and recovery from COVID‐19 are perceived as more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself.

Methods: Using online snowball sampling through social media, anonymous UK survey data were collected from N = 645 adults during weeks 5‐8 of the UK COVID‐19 lockdown. The sample was normally distributed in terms of age and reflected the UK ethnic and disability profile.

Findings: Respondents demonstrated comparative optimism where they believed that as compared to others of the same age and gender, they were unlikely to experience a range of controllable (eg accidentally infect/ be infected) and uncontrollable (eg need hospitalization/ intensive care treatment if infected) COVID‐19‐related risks in the short term (P < .001). They were comparatively pessimistic (ie thinking they were more at risk than others for developing COVID‐19‐related infection or symptoms) when thinking about the next year.

Discussion: This is the first ever study to report compelling comparative biases in UK adults’ thinking about COVID‐19 We discuss ways in which such thinking may influence adherence with lockdown regimes as these are being relaxed in the UK.


4 DISCUSSION

On the basis of these data, we suggest that UK adults who meet the demographic characteristics of our sample display comparative optimism concerning many aspects of COVID‐19. Where participants showed comparative optimism its pattern was consistent with earlier findings showing that comparative optimism is stronger for controllable than for uncontrollable events.67 Our participants overwhelmingly believed that as compared to people of their age and gender, they were somewhat or extremely unlikely to have accidentally infected people with COVID‐19 in the past and to infect others or get infected themselves in the next month. They were also comparatively optimistic, but to a lesser extent, about their likelihood of getting hospitalized due to COVID‐19, finding themselves in an ICU, being ventilated, and making a full recovery.

In contrast, participants showed comparative pessimism about COVID‐19 infections in the more distant future. As compared to the average person of their age and gender they felt likely to get infected by COVID‐19 in the next year and to develop COVID‐19‐related symptoms. This pattern is inconsistent with earlier findings showing greater comparative optimism for events that are further in the future than for nearer events.2122 However, such a finding supports earlier research that shows that people who have experienced some ill health tend to unduly exaggerate their future risk of experiencing further ill health.23 One important difference between COVID‐19 and other risks is that controlling the pandemic was very much placed in the hands of individuals restricting their lives in the UK—as seen in the slogan urging people to ‘Stay at home’. It is reasonable that participants would reason that in the long term, staying at home would be less possible, plausible or practical.11 Feeling that compliance with social distancing rules cannot be maintained indefinitely may thus explain these perceptions, in line with research showing that high prevalence negative events may engender comparative pessimism.24

We have thus established the presence of comparative optimism in relation to both controllable and uncontrollable aspects of COVID‐19. We have also found comparative pessimism concerning future infection and symptom development. Both comparative optimism and comparative pessimism may have important consequences for people’s psychological well‐being and their likelihood of engaging in risk behaviours or responding to further lockdown measures.

If people believe COVID‐19 ‘will not happen to me any time now’ or that they are unlikely to have infected others in the past or to do so in future, they may be more relaxed about lockdown advice. In an effort to make people look beyond their own risk (which for some age and gender groups may be lower than for other groups), most governments, including the UK government, have focused their communication about social distancing rules on how much these protect against infecting others. Unfortunately, having infected others and infecting others in the future are precisely the aspects of COVID‐19 on which we found the strongest comparative optimism—people think it is unlikely these will happen to them.

Equally, for people reporting comparative optimism for present and past COVID‐19 infection, these beliefs could fuel resistance to give up on lockdown—because to do so will place them amongst the very same ‘average others’ who—like them—have been unsuccessful in controlling the pandemic. Given that we have now established comparative optimism in relation to COVID‐19, future work should systematically explore how this thinking may influence behavioural outcomes such as returning to school, work and normal life.

There are limitations of this study which, although do not detract from the generalizability of the findings, should be noted. Firstly, the sample was predominantly White. Although this pattern is typical of wider online survey taking behaviour,20 it may well not represent the views of other ethnic groups. Our sample was also predominantly female, although that may be less of a limitation; our findings showed no gender differences in two subscales, entirely in line with previously reported work.3 The sole difference we observed involved men showing less comparative pessimism and thus being relatively more optimistic than women concerning their long term risk. If anything, then, our study may have underestimated comparative optimism by sampling fewer men. A further limitation of our study is that our participants have self‐selected to participate and that we have no means of estimating the participation rate. This is a methodological issue in all surveys conducted on‐line that use a sampling approach similar to ours. We are therefore confident that our results are no less robust and valid than other appropriately powered surveys in the field; the pattern of comparative optimism and pessimism that we have found is very much in line with patterns reported in previous work in the field of comparative optimism, and which used a range of recruitment strategies, response rates and methods of inquiry.23

On the basis of the above, we conclude that UK adults may be comparatively optimistic about the chances of coming to harm due to COVID‐19 at the moment or having caused harm themselves previously. Future research is needed on the implications of comparatively optimistic thinking for future compliance with government guidelines on managing COVID‐19.

Participants believed they would be less likely to find a compatible partner through online dating than either through friends or in everyday activities; age & shyness were negatively associated with optimism of finding a partner

Beliefs About Finding a Compatible Partner in Three Settings. Susan Sprecher. Interpersona, Vol. 13 No. 2 (2019), Jan 6 2020. https://interpersona.psychopen.eu/index.php/interpersona/article/view/3609

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310519708643479554

Abstract: Single adults often exert considerable energy searching for a compatible partner. Until recently, people met partners primarily through everyday activities (work, school) and through friends. These ways of meeting partners are still common, although Internet dating sites have also become a main way for couples to meet. The current study was conducted to examine people’s attitudes about finding a compatible partner in three different settings: online dating, the social network (e.g., friends of friends), and everyday activities. A sample of 702 single (unpartnered) adults (ages 18 to 40) completed a survey that included items that measured their attitudes about finding a compatible partner in the three different ways. Participants believed they would be less likely to find a compatible partner through online dating than either through friends or in everyday activities. Age and shyness were negatively associated with optimism of finding a partner, particularly in the traditional settings of everyday activities and through one’s social network.




Almost total lack of empirical analyses of the psychological characteristics or behavioral implications of doll ownership; existing arguments appear to represent the philosophical positions of those scholars expressing them

Harper, Craig A., and Rebecca Lievesley. 2020. “Sex Doll Ownership: An Agenda for Research.” PsyArXiv. May 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/2uqkf

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310476219775934464

Abstract

Purpose of review: The topic of sex doll ownership is becoming an increasingly discussed issue from both a social and legal perspective. This review aims to examine the veracity of the existing psychological, sexological, and legal literature in relation to doll ownership.

Recent findings: Strong views exist across the spectrum of potential socio-legal positions on sex doll ownership. However, there is an almost total lack of empirical analyses of the psychological characteristics or behavioral implications of doll ownership. As such, existing arguments appear to represent the philosophical positions of those scholars expressing them, rather than being rooted in any objective evidence base.

Summary: Despite an absence of empirical data on the characteristics and subsequent effects of doll ownership, discussions about the ethical and legal status of doll ownership continue. This highlights a real and urgent need for a coherent research agenda to be advanced in this area of work.